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Abstract
With the growing use of automated systems in military environments it remains vital
that research continues to explore the use of such systems operationally. The recent
literature has tended to take a systems focused approach, which has concentrated on
features of the system and what impact alterations have upon task performance. How-
ever, research has begun to see the value in taking a human-centred perspective to
understanding the use of automated systems in military environments; asking research
questions that remain focused on the human operators that are required to utilise auto-
mated systems in increasingly complex environments. Therefore, this thesis contributes
to the literature on human-machine-interaction through exploring the operational use
of automated systems in the maritime environment. Research into sociotechnical sys-
tems is complex, therefore this thesis adopted a Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM)
approach utilising mixed-methods to elicit understanding and knowledge from unique
access to Royal Navy (RN) Subject Matter Experts (SME). Privileged access to a large
number of RN experts (N =53) enabled novel and interesting findings to be drawn from
two qualitative surveys. The first explored the stages of the air defence task conducted
by RN personnel to better understand where uptake of automation may be beneficial.
The findings of this questionnaire revealed that the high-level stages of the air defence
task (Observe, Identify and Classify, and Decide and Act) have remained unchanged
over the last 20 years and the areas that have previously been identified as potentially
benefiting from automated system support remain the same. These findings raised
pertinent questions as to why the same areas are still in need of support. Therefore,
the second study of this thesis aimed to explore where automated systems have been
brought into service to support RN operations to understand how the current procure-
ment process functions. A second questionnaire was developed which allowed RN SME
to discuss how automated systems are currently used across all operational settings and
where they may be used in the future. Crucially, this second questionnaire explored
RN SME opinions towards the existing procurement process. Of concern was that the
findings of this study revealed the disconnect that often exists between end user and
system designer which has a negative effect on the development of systems being fit
for purpose at time of release. This in turn can have severe negative consequences to
capability, appropriate system use and can increase the financial costs of developing
i
and implementing new systems. The findings from the first two studies presented in
this thesis highlighted the need for, and recommended an increase in use of, immer-
sive simulation environments to support automated system development and research.
Therefore, the third part of this thesis presents the development and validation of a
simulated microworld, the Automatic Radar Classification Simulation (ARCS). ARCS
was designed by the author of this thesis in collaboration with a software engineer to
replicate aspects of the air defence task conducted by RN personnel. This design pro-
cess included 2 pilot studies, the results of which informed developments and changes to
ARCS. Overall, this design process took 8 months with several iterations of ARCS be-
ing developed. Following the development stage, an experiment was conducted (N =42
university students) to validate the utility of ARCS as a microworld using a holistic
real-time scenario to explore individuals rationales for using a generic automated system
when performing a threat detection task. In line with previous research, participants
cited workload and managing uncertainty as reasons for selecting to use the automated
decision support system. However, unexpectedly task performance was not significantly
improved with access to the support system and strong learning effects were observed.
Overall, this thesis supports the newly proposed move away from traditional “levels of
automation” approaches, advocating for taking a more holistic approach to research
into human-machine-interaction. This can be achieved through promoting long-term
and continuous engagement between end users and system designers, ensuring that a
human-human relationship is maintained throughout the life-cycle of the automated
system. Additionally, this thesis highlights the importance of effective communication
within and between the military, industry and academia, and the negative implications
that ineffective communication has upon naval capability. Finally, this thesis supports
the literature that highlights the importance of training in immersive environments and
has provided academia with a high-fidelity microworld with which to explore operator
use of automated decision support systems in the maritime environment.
ii
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Chapter 1
When above water warfare meets
human-machine-interaction: an
overview of what is known and
what remains to be answered
1.1 Introduction
The focus of this thesis is in exploring the operational application of automated systems
in the military maritime above water environment. This thesis aims to firstly describe
the environment naval personnel are operating in by investigating the current decision
stages that occur when personnel conduct the air defence task. Secondly, this thesis will
explore and discuss the current state of automated systems and their potential future
state. Uniquely this thesis will explore Royal Navy (RN) personnel’s experiences of the
current procurement process. Finally, in response to the findings of the first two aims,
this thesis will present the development of an above water maritime micro-world that
will support academia in understanding how individuals interact with decision support
systems in an ecologically valid and holistic way. This introductory chapter will outline
the problem space that above water maritime operations sits in before presenting the
psychological literature that has informed this thesis.
1.2 Problem Space
The remit of the UKs Royal Navy is vast, encompassing many roles and duties “char-
acterised by rapid, unpredictable changes and increasing global interdependence” (Min-
istry of Defence, 2011, p. 1-1). However, battle-spaces are becoming less clearly defined
(Ministry of Defence, 2014) compared to historical warfare and recently there has been
an increase in joint operations. For example, CTF 150 a joint task force which currently
operates over two million square miles around the Indian Ocean. This task forces’ pri-
mary role is to counter terrorism and prevent trafficking of drugs and weapons that
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fund terrorist organisations (Royal Navy., nd). Conflict is increasingly dynamic and
challenging; and requires operations and actors to adaptively adjust to context, circum-
stances and team structure (Hutton et al., 2017; Mendonc¸a, 2007), “Teams will need to
be ‘expert teams’ that are flexible and able to cope with change, both predicted and un-
predicted” (Brown, 2007, p. 379). Adaptation has become a fundamental requirement
to ensuring mission success; adaptable expertise from actors and adaptable automated
systems.
In October 2016, a UAE vessel was hit by a guided missile fired from a Yemeni
rebel boat, injuring one crew member (Binnie, 2017). Shortly following this incident,
USS Mason deployed countermeasures in response to suspected anti-ship missiles fired
from the Yemini shore by Houthi rebels (Huffington Post, 2016). These incidents serve
to highlight “that the anti-ship missile threat is increasingly transcending definitions
of conventional and asymmetric warfare” (Scott, 2017). Each naval vessel performs a
specific role within the fleet. Several different ship classes will be mentioned in this
thesis and Table 1.1 provides an overview of the roles of each ship class discussed.
Within recent history there have been a number of cases that have highlighted the
fatal consequences when errors transpire in maritime operations. One such incident
occurred on 17th May 1987 when the USS Stark was hit by two Exocet missiles fired
from an Iraqi Mirage F1 (Brummer and Hirst, 1987; LaGrone, 2017). The USS Stark
was operating 20 Nautical Miles (NM) outside of the Iranian declared war zone during
the Iran-Iraq war when at around 21:09 the first Exocet hit the ship, 30 seconds later a
second Exocet hit the target. The formal investigation into the incident revealed that
miscommunication, non-consistent monitoring of the aircraft and errors in operating
procedures resulted in the Stark being hit without taking any evasive manoeuvres or
defensive actions - 37 crew lost their lives that day (Department of Defense, 1987). The
full declassification of the report into the HMS Sheffield incident during the Falklands
campaign echoes these findings. Members of the crew were disengaged from their tasks,
being bored and a little frustrated by inactivity, leading to the ship being unprepared
for an attack; no evasive manoeuvres or defensive actions were taken which resulted in
the loss of 20 RN personnel (Cobain, 2017).
1.2.1 Current and Future Capabilities
“Advantages arise from the location, from the organization and from having either
greater or better forces 1”
Radar use is widespread as it is an effective way to detect the presence of objects at
range where visual detection is either difficult or impossible. However, radar is inher-
1(Machiavelli, 2006) p97.
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Table 1.1: Types of ship classes that are mentioned within this thesis
Ship Class Role of Ship Examples
Destroyer Destroyers are fast and manoeu-
vrable warships that provide air de-
fence protection to larger vessels in
a fleet or to escorted vessels.
Examples from the Royal Navy include:
 Country-class Destroyers which op-
erated between 1962 to 2006, includ-
ing HMS Glamorgan.
 Type 42 Destroyers which operated
between 1975 and 2013, including
HMS Sheffield.
 Type 45 Destroyers (Daring Class)
which have been operating since
2010 and includes HMS Daring,
HMS Dauntless, HMS Diamond,
HMS Dragon, HMS Defender, HMS
Duncan.
 An example from the United States
Navy is the USS Mason which has
been operating since 2003.
Frigate In modern Navies Frigates tend to
perform the role of an escort vehi-
cle. Providing protection to other
military vessels or merchant ships.
An example from the United States Navy
is the USS Stark which operated from
1982 to 1999.
Cruiser A type of warship that is similar
to a Destroyer class and is used
to provide air defence cover to the
fleet. The USA and Russia are the
only navies that continue to operate
cruisers.
An example from the United States Navy
is the USS Vincennes which operated be-
tween 1985 and 2005.
Aircraft
Carrier
The role of an aircraft carrier is
to project air power by providing
Naval forces with a seagoing airbase.
The Royal Navy has had several classes of
aircraft carrier including:
 Invincible class carriers which oper-
ated between 1980 to 2014 included
HMS Invincible.
 In service now are the Queen
Elizabeth-class carriers, commis-
sioned in 2017 for example HMS
Queen Elizabeth.
Mine coun-
termeasures
vessels
This type of ship is used to mine-
sweep and safely remove and/or
neutralise active underwater mines.
An example from the Royal Navy is HMS
Cattistock.
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ently uncertain. Signals are transmitted from the radar towards an object, part of that
signal is reflected to be received and interpreted. However, signals have an associated
measurement error typically based upon the beam width. If an aircraft is flying below
the radar line, which is tangent to the surface of the Earth, it may not be detected due
to the effects of the radar horizon. It is also possible for reflected signals from the sur-
face to produce a radar return that can be misinterpreted as multiple targets. Although
uncertain, radar remains the primary sensor and data input used to develop maritime
situational awareness at range. Within commercial Air Traffic Control recent evidence
suggests that the accuracy of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
data could replace current radar operations, however, caution should be applied as
Borst et al. (2017) point out, “studies in Europe and Asia have reported frequently
occurring ADS-B position errors reaching up to 7.5 NM” (p5). Although sensor tech-
nology continues to improve, there remains uncertainty with the fusing of data relating
to air track movements.
Several examples from the Falklands war (2nd April 1982 - 14th June 1982) high-
light the complexities associated with maritime defence. For example, HMS Invincible
fired a Mark 46 torpedo and depth charge at what was thought to be a submarine
periscope but, with hindsight, was a whale (Inskip, 2002). Anecdotally, instances of
sonar errors leading to torpedo strikes against whales and radar errors resulting in mis-
sile firings at flocks of birds have occurred on multiple occasions. These false alarms
and erroneous firings are due to a combination of factors, including the heightened
stress levels during a conflict situation as well as due to sensor uncertainty. For ex-
ample, radar returns can be received from a wide range of objects, including hostile
actors but also weather patterns or animals. This can negatively impact operator situ-
ational awareness as they are incorporating uncertain information into the operational
picture. This can have a dramatic impact on the crew and immediate future operations
of that vessel. For instance, it could potentially cause a fratricide incident or result
in the loss of ammunition that may be essential if the ship is required to defend itself
against further threats. Reduced ammunition will limit the ships options for avoid-
ing and/or dealing with future threats. Heightened vigilance during conflict situations
combined with radar uncertainty can increase the number of false alarms which can
have a negative knock on effect to further contact identification. This sadly was the
case during the Falklands conflict. In an account, several years following the end of this
conflict, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) reported that HMS Invincible had sightings
of two incoming Exocet missiles 19 minutes before HMS Sheffield was hit, resulting in
the tragic loss of 20 lives and injuries to 24 other crew on-board (Ezard, 2000). The
number of fatalities and injuries was partly due to HMS Sheffield operating without a
fully operational radar and the crew being on half-alert; they had less than a minute
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of warning before being hit. The warning that should have come from HMS Invincible
did not arrive due to Command attributing the radar tracks to being spurious. Had
that warning arrived, HMS Sheffield would have had up to 19 minutes to prepare their
defensive posture, and may have been able to deploy countermeasures and manoeuvre
to reduce the likelihood of being hit. Ships have three countermeasure options that
can be deployed in an emergency situation to cause confusion, distraction or seduc-
tion. Confusion involves deploying chaff to provide a number of realistic false targets
to prevent or delay acquisition of the real target. Distraction can be effective against
missiles during the target search phase, by surrounding the vessel with decoys that are
hopefully locked onto by the missile. Finally, seduction is designed for when a missile
is locked onto the vessel. A large decoy is propelled from the vessel in an attempt to
lure the missile to follow the decoy. Each countermeasure has maximum effectiveness
if used at the optimum time. For example, distraction measures can only be deployed
before the missile is locked onto the target vessel. Therefore, the criticality of time in
conflict situations cannot be emphasised enough.
In his book on his experiences during the Falklands War on board HMS Glamorgan,
Inskip (2002) writes
“I noticed the faintest of small blips [radar detection], about the size of echo
given by an albatross. It was unusual, albeit not unknown, to detect birds
at that range . . . At the next sweep of the radar it was gone and I breathed
a sigh of relief but this was shattered one sweep later when, on the same
baring and closer in, a firm echo painted for the first time. In my heart of
hearts I knew it was an Exocet.” (p157).
Shortly after this initial identification, HMS Glamorgan was hit by an Exocet before
she was able to complete evasive manoeuvres - 14 crew members were killed. It should
be noted that Inskip refers to the raw radar data that used to be analysed by officers on
board warships. Current radar data is digitally processed, removing the requirement
for current RN personnel to read raw data.
Instances of false positive judgements have also sadly occurred, for example during
the Iran-Iraq War on the 3rd July 1988 the USS Vincennes incorrectly considered an
Iran Air Airbus A300 to be a threat which they shot down, killing 290 people over the
Arabian Gulf (Hammond, 2017). These cases highlight the difficult position operators
are faced with and the consequences to themselves (if false negative decisions are made)
or to civilians (if false positive decisions are made).
To add to this complex environment are the progressively sophisticated threats that
are operating within the air defence domain. Current supersonic missiles, for example
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Yakhont/Onyx/BrahMos, are capable of reaching up to Mach 3 (1029 m/s) operating
at ranges of up to 300 km 2. If a radar system is able to detect potential threats up to
400 km away, the operations team would have just over 4 minutes to detect the threat,
identify as hostile, perform threat evaluation, allocate and launch the appropriate hard
or soft kill countermeasures (see Table 1.2). However, to defeat the long-range detection
of radars, threats can use the curvature of the earth to cruise below the radar horizon3,
preventing detection until much later in an engagement. For example, if a threat (i.e.
missile) was cruising at 15 ft and the detecting radar stood at a height of 123.3 ft, with
the missile travelling at Mach 3, the ship would have around 33 seconds from radar
detection to the missile hitting the ship. (see Figure 1.1).
Table 1.2: Types of countermeasure used in maritime operations
Hard kill countermeasure an effect that physically counters an incoming
threat. For example, a missile that is fired to
destroy an incoming missile.
Soft kill countermeasure an effect that aims to cause the incoming threat
to be confused, distracted or seduced away.
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Figure 1.1: Earth Curvature Nomograph (adapted from www.rfcafe.com). The red
line running from the height of the radar (123.3 ft) to the height of the target, in this
instance the missile cruising at a height of 15 ft, indicates that the radar could detect
the threat at 18.4 NM. If the missile was travelling at Mach 3, this would mean 33
seconds from detection to missile hit.
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Future missile systems currently under development are aiming to reach Mach 5-7
(1715 m/s-2401 m/s) (McDermott, 2017), detection at 400 km would give the opera-
tions team 2-3 minutes to respond and counter each threat. This time is further reduced
if these threats are capable of operating below the radar horizon, severely limiting the
ships ability to respond. For example, if we increase the speed at which the missile
was cruising at 15 ft in the previous example to Mach 5, the ship would have 19.8
seconds from detection to missile hit. The loss of 37 lives aboard USS Stark during the
Iran-Iraq war is testament to the danger of threats operating at sea-skimming levels.
Since the USS Stark incident the American Navy has invested heavily in increasing
defensive capability against standard anti-ship missile threats. However, recently Rus-
sia announced the successful testing of the Zircon (3M22 Tsirkon) hypersonic missile
claiming to have reached speeds of up to Mach 8 (McDermott, 2017). This class of mis-
sile pose an equally significant threat due to their speed which severely limits operator
reaction time. Correlational analysis of radar returns increases in uncertainty due to
the vast distances that can be covered by the missile between radar sweeps. To counter
this danger, the requirement to detect or identify threats at greater distances from the
ship is crucial.
It is not only air defence that ships have to contend with. Increasingly close-range
surface threats are highlighting potential areas of weakness in the overall defence of a
ship or fleet. The diverse threats crews face requires a complete and constant under-
standing of the current environment. Due to the inherent uncertainty with radar and
the speed of current and future threats, automated systems are essential to enabling
complete situational awareness to be formed and maintained by the crew. New auto-
mated systems and robotics are transforming the art of war (de Boisboissel, 2017).
A multitude of actors may be in play at any one time which requires personnel to be
continually updating their understanding of the environment, mission parameters and
possible courses of action. The development of Situation Awareness (SA), defined as
“the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space,
the comprehension of meaning and the projection of their status in the near future”
(Endsley, 1988) is crucial to facilitating effective decision making (Figure 1.2).
The research that Endsley and colleagues have conducted over the last 25 years has
highlighted the importance of SA in facilitating the performance of military personnel
and the achievement of their overall mission objectives (Endsley, 1995, 2015c). In
fact, Endsley herself has highlighted how the terminology arose from military personnel
(Endsley, 2015a) and remains commonly used, thereby supporting the concepts validity.
This body of research has also identified several challenges associated with developing
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SA including, data overload and automation design and implementation, both of which
will be discussed in greater detail below. SA is intrinsically linked to decision making,
“decisions are formed by SA and SA is formed by decisions.” (Endsley, 2000, p. 5)
however, it remains useful to view SA and decision making as individual concepts. For
instance, it is possible to have a thorough SA of the environment and still make an
incorrect decision, and vice versa (although less common) to make the correct decision
and hold inaccurate or incomplete SA. Theoretically, SA and decision-making influence
upon each other in a cyclical manner, yet can be decoupled through the impact of
various factors. Chapter 3 discusses further the complexities associated with operating
in the air defence theatre, the stages of decision making that exist and the facilitators
and barriers to effective decision making at each stage. The next section of this chapter
presents a hypothetical scenario to put the information presented so far into context.
Perception
Comprehension
Projection
• Consists of observing the 
attributes, status and 
dynamics of salient objects 
within the environment
•Understanding of current 
environment
• Synthesis of the elements 
observed at stage 1
•Mental simulation of the 
future actions of the 
observed elements
•Aided by level 1 and 2
Figure 1.2: Levels of Situation Awareness (adapted from Endsley, 1988)
1.2.2 The Importance of Synergy between Man and Machine
Imagine a Type 45 Destroyer (T45) is operating in a littoral environment - an area of
water close to land. The operations team are monitoring the incoming information on
the Combat Management System (CMS). There are two major airports operating in
the vicinity, with an average of 1250 flights a day 4. The team have been operating in
this vicinity for a week and there has been no suspicious or hostile activity. It is now the
daily handover: one team has been operating through the morning and the afternoon
team are about to take over control. Half an hour into the afternoon teams duties,
4http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/475537/London-Heathrow-the-best-facts-stats-and-trivia-
behind-the-UK-s-busiest-airport
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and whilst they are finalising their understanding of the current environment, multi-
ple suspicious aircraft (from this point on referred to as tracks) are picked up by the
sensors. The operators monitoring the radar picture identify two tracks flying in for-
mation on a direct heading towards the T45. The tracks are currently 50 NM from the
ship and travelling upwards of 450 knots. This behaviour would be typically associated
with military action, i.e. two military aircraft flying in attack formation. As the team
are monitoring these tracks and continue to scan the environment, they identify three
further potentially suspicious tracks travelling along the coast at low altitude. This
is typical behaviour for a military aircraft that is attempting to use clutter from the
land to mask its approach. They continue to monitor the five potentially hostile tracks
observing standard Rules of Engagement (ROE). The initial two tracks increase their
speed and descend to 500 ft, as they reach 15 NM from the T45 they turn away and
increase their altitude, behaviour that would symbolise a release of weapons. Simulta-
neously a salvo of incoming missiles is picked up by the radar at close range. Whilst the
operators were monitoring the suspicious tracks initially identified, they failed to pick
up a sixth track that had been travelling within a designated airlane. This track had
already fired a salvo of supersonic high dive missiles before turning away. The team
have now just seconds to try and neutralise the imminent threat. The requirement
for the appropriate use of automated systems to aid air defence operations is not just
helpful, it is essential to increase the probability of survival.
As the example highlights, time pressures are critical. The complexity of the envi-
ronment is caused not only by the number of actors that can be in play and the size of
operational areas, but by the inherent uncertainty of radar and sonar data. The speed
at which a potentially hostile situation can become critical places the operation teams
under insurmountable cognitive load. Fighting power is built on capability (Ministry
of Defence, 2014), a capability that can only be extended through the synergy of man
and machine. Therefore, this thesis, in line with research exploring human machine
interaction, argues that understanding when and why individuals would use an auto-
mated support system can further our understanding of how better to integrate and
deploy such tools.
1.2.3 Historical research into use of automated systems
The area of Human Factors research is considered to have originated during the second
world war (Wickens and Hollands, 2000) and focuses on exploring the relationship be-
tween humans and systems in sociotechnical environments. How interfaces are designed,
what systems are developed and how they are updated, maintained and improved, are
all part of this body of research. Research into human-machine-interaction remains top-
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ical due to the proliferation of automated systems across all aspects of society (Roth
and Pritchett, 2017). Specific to military use of automated systems one focus is on
facilitating the processing of the sheer volume of data that must be managed in order
to build and maintain SA and increase capability to ensure operational success (Hawley
et al., 2005; Ministry of Defence, 2011; Nguyen, 2002).
However, research conducted into human-machine-interaction argues that instead
of automation being presented as “a technology that executes a function that was pre-
viously performed by humans” (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997), automated tools and
systems change task structure. Arguably such systems do, in certain environments,
replace the human, moving the human from the role of operator to one of being a su-
pervisor to the system (Ghazizadeh et al., 2012). It has therefore been argued that it is
important to conceive human-machine-interaction as an integrated series of tasks and
subtasks allocated between the team dyad (Hoc, 2000). One way in which the concept
of tasks and subtasks has been described and translated from the human-machine-
interaction community to wider audiences is through the categorisation of levels of
automation.
Table 1.3: Taxonomy of Automated Decision Action and Selection from (Parasuraman
et al., 2000)
Low Automation 1 The computer offers no assistance: human must take
all the decisions and actions.
2 The computer offers a complete set of decision/action
alternatives, or
3 Narrows the selection down to a few or,
4 Suggests one alternative,
5 Executes the suggestion if the human approves, or
6 Allows the human a restricted time to veto before au-
tomatic execution, or
7 Executes automatically, then necessarily informs the
human, and
8 Informs the human only if asked or
9 Informs the human only, if it, the computer, decides
to
High Automation 10 The computer decides everything, acts autonomously,
ignoring the human.
Currently there is a drive to increase the Level of Automation (LOA) systems
have, which is posited to increase the support that systems can provide to the opera-
tor. Table 1.3 details the most commonly cited LOA proposed by Parasuraman et al.
(2000). These levels highlight how automation function acts on a continuum, from no
automation (1 on the scale) to complete automation (10 on the scale). However, recent
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concerns have been raised with regards to the predictive power of LOA based predic-
tions of humans interaction with automation, and therefore the utility of taking such an
approach to system design (Jamieson and Skraaning, 2017). LOA assumes linear and
hierarchical concepts of how automation functions alongside personnel operating in the
field, this is however not a true reflection on how systems are used operationally. Re-
search has found that automated systems tend not to be employed at certain task levels
but through operator experience features of the system are employed in an intuitive
and fluid manner (Abbott, McKenney, and Railsback, 2013, as cited in Jamieson and
Skraaning 2017). This mirrors the findings from Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM)
research that exposed the use of intuitive, pattern matching decision making techniques
of experts when facing high-stakes uncertain environments. As automation has tended
to be employed to support operators when facing complex, uncertain and high-stake
environments, such as flying a plane or detecting faults in a nuclear reactor, it seems
sensible that with experience automated systems would be included in the intuitive
and flexible decision making of operators. However, with system designers wanting to
breakdown tasks to their abstract components, task complexity (Miller, 2018), flexibil-
ity (Naikar, 2018) and intuition are lost which brings into question to utility of taking
such an approach. Jamieson and Skraaning (2017) argue for researchers to take a more
pragmatic and inductive approach to understanding how better to support system de-
signers in order to ensure that automated systems are built to support the operators,
as the role of the human becomes more critical with more automation (Carr, 2015).
From these concerns one train of thought has gained steam with researchers focusing
on how to get humans and machines to work together as opposed to focusing on who
performs what task (Roth and Pritchett, 2017).
As a result of this disconnect between system design and operational functions there
remains reticence to move to fully automated operations, “the aversion to algorithms
making decisions that affect humans is rooted in the strong preference that many people
have for the natural over the synthetic or artificial” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 228); reticence
that is not unfounded. Hoc (2000) identifies 4 failures of human-machine-interaction,
barriers that are commonly cited as underpinning the disuse of automation: (i) loss of
expertise, (ii) complacency, (iii) trust and self-confidence and (iv) loss of adaptability.
The key focus and drive of the research into human-machine-interaction is to develop
tools and systems that reduce or prevent these failures from occurring as it is these
failures that underlie operators reticence to utilise new tools and system to their full
extent. Nonetheless, as the nature of warfare continues to increase in complexity and
the capabilities of operations are pushed to their limits, the answer to combating and
remaining operationally superior is argued to lie in the appropriate use of automated
systems and tools.
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1.2.4 Barriers to automation uptake and use
In order to piece apart what motivates individuals to use automated systems, the bar-
riers to or reticence towards automation use must also be explored. The literature has
provided countless examples of the antecedents to not using automation. Several review
papers (Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010; Parasuraman and Riley, 1997; Parasuraman
and Wickens, 2008) highlight the factors that result in automation misuse, disuse and
abuse focusing on the changes that can be made to the system itself in order to reduce
erroneous automation usage decisions. The most commonly cited barriers are unreli-
ability of the system, skill decrement, loss of situational awareness and complexity of
the system itself. As each barrier has been thoroughly explored within the literature,
only a brief overview of each will now be presented.
Unreliability of the System. Arguably the most important factor that must be
considered when developing automated support tools is the reliability of the system.
Research has shown that an operator’s trust in the system significantly reduces when
the machine errs (Dzindolet et al., 2003; Moray et al., 2000). Trust has been linked to
the use of complex technological systems (Lee and See, 2004), therefore the reliability
of the system arguably directly impacts upon automation usage decisions. It is not just
the reliability of single aspects of the system that individuals perceive; research has
shown that individuals view the system as a whole. Therefore, if one aspect of the sys-
tem errs, the perception of the reliability of the system as a whole reduces. The concept
of system-wide trust was proposed by Muir and Moray (1996) in their experiments in a
system-supervisory context (i.e. in the context of the operator acting as supervisor to
the system). The potential impact of holding a system-wide view could be disastrous.
For example, if a single gauge errs but goes unnoticed with the operator continuing to
hold the reliability of other gauges as a global measure of system function, a nuclear
reactor could melt down, as occurred at Three Mile Island. Conversely, if the last time
a GPS tool provided an updated and faster route that was in fact not faster, when it
again suggests a re-programmed route, individuals are more likely to ignore this new
route or even use a different GPS tool.
However, highly reliable tools and systems do not always improve performance
(Dzindolet et al., 2010), and can lead to automation complacency and bias. This leads
to the requirement for systems to allow the operator to remain cognitively involved
in the task, particularly with regards to decision support tools (Kaplan et al., 2001).
Automation complacency and bias can also result in the next two barriers to erroneous
automation usage decisions, skill decrement and loss of situational awareness.
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Skill decrement and Loss of Situational Awareness. When the operator‘s
role becomes that of system supervisor, skill decrement (Casner et al., 2014; Wiener and
Curry, 1980) and loss of situational awareness (Endsley, 1987) can occur. Two factors
that are attributable to out-of-the-loop performance (Endsley and Kaber, 1999). One
way in which system developers have attempted to address this barrier is to explore
the appropriate LOA to task requirement. Endsley and Kaber (1999) in an experi-
mental dynamic control task found that individuals were hindered if the automated
system provided high cognitive functions. They did not however repeat the findings of
Endsley and Kiris (1995) in relation to reduced SA when the operator was paired with
full automation compared to a system with an intermediate LOA. The authors posit
their findings may be due to the participants only performing a single task. Vigilance
decrement has been observed with studies that require the participants to complete
several tasks simultaneously (Parasuraman et al., 1993). It should be noted that RN
personnel are involved in several tasks simultaneously during above water operations.
Therefore, the potential for skill and vigilance decrement to occur, should the operators
become complacent or bias towards a fully automated system, exists.
From conversations with Subject Matter Experts (SME) around the views and at-
titudes naval personnel hold towards semi-automated and fully automated systems, it
is clear that the potential loss of skill and SA are considered as particularly salient.
Arguably the fear of skill and vigilance decrement is the predominant cause behind
reticence to utilise new systems to their full capabilities.
Complexity of the System. Finally, the third barrier to effective automation
usage decisions is the complexity of the system itself. Poor design and lack of train-
ing can negatively impact upon the safety of the operator and the team around them
(Stowers et al., 2017). Unanimously across the literature is the requirement that auto-
mated decision support tools do not operate as “black-boxes”. In order for the human
operator to remain in the loop they must be able to comprehend how the automation is
reaching a decision or suggested action; system designers must aim to ensure that the
system operates in a transparent manner (Colebank, 2008; Johansson, 2010). Trans-
parency also has implications for the ethics associated with using automated systems,
particularly if the automated system is making decisions. One such way in which to im-
prove the transparency of the system, and thereby in effect its simplicity, is to program
the system to follow the logic that a human would use to solve the problem or reach
a decision (Hawley et al., 2005). However, achieving this requires that the cognitive
functions of the operator must be understood in detail which has been approached by
employing cognitive task analysis methods. There may however be instances where the
logic employed by the operator is flawed, for example negatively influenced by incorrect
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heuristics or biases, therefore the system will need to function in a cognitively different
manor and yet remain understandable to the operator.
Further, research has highlighted that individuals hold a “automation schema”, that
results in expectations towards how the system will perform and function. Rice and
McCarley (2011) explored the impact of different error types (false alarms and misses)
on performance of an x-ray baggage screening task. Participants found false alarms to
be more salient and therefore weigh into their decision to use the system more that au-
tomation misses. Their findings support the argument for a perfect automation schema
that is held by individuals (Dzindolet et al., 2002) that assumes an automated system
will be reliable. What this means is that unless informed otherwise, individuals expect
automation to function in a highly reliable way and when this expectation is not met
they will disuse the system. That is, participants were not expecting the automation
to falsely identify objects as this contradicts the perception that automated systems
function perfectly. When the system does not function as expected the perceived com-
plexity of the system increases, reducing trust levels and thereby reducing system use.
The complexity of the system also links into the perceived use and perceived ease
of system use, the key components of the Technology Acceptance Model, TAM (Davis,
1989). These components are posited to predict behavioural intention. Primarily ex-
perience with the system, allows an understanding of the perceived use and increases
the ease at which the system is used, positively influencing behavioural intention and
usage (Kim and Malhotra, 2005). Additionally, perceived ease of use has been found to
exhibit a stronger influence than perceived use on automation acceptance (Ghazizadeh
et al., 2012), further highlighting the salience of system complexity.
Summary of the barriers to appropriate automation usage decisions.
These three barriers to effective and appropriate automation usage decisions further
highlight the complex relationship humans have with automated systems. Although
such systems can improve performance, thereby benefiting the operator, research has
shown that individuals still hold a preference towards manual task completion (Navarro
and Osiurak, 2015). Both system features and features of the operator must be ex-
plored and considered when building and implementing automated decision support
tools (Byrne, 2018). It is clear that a broad approach is required in order to fully
understand the complexities behind automation use. Additionally, it is not only the
barriers to automation use that must be explored but also how incorrect decisions are
made, therefore this thesis will also draw from decision making literature.
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1.2.5 Overview of the literature on decision making
Cognitive processing, styles and strategies are woven into the ability to make decisions.
Seminal work conducted by Tversky and Khaneman in the 1970s revealed that humans
are prone to make mistakes or make less than perfect decisions (Baron, 1993). Klein
and colleagues further showed the role of recognition and intuition behind decision
making, particularly in challenging environments. That is, environments characterised
by time pressure, uncertainty and risk (Klein, 1998). The use of biases, heuristics
and time saving satisficing strategies is now commonly recognised within the literature
on decision making, not only on an individual level but also within teams. Of most
relevance to military tasks, and when acting under uncertainty, are the heuristic strate-
gies of availability, representativeness and anchoring (Tversky and Khaneman, 1973;
Williams, 2010).
The availability heuristic posits that individuals estimate the frequency of an event
based on their ability to retrieve the recollection of such an event or, associations of
the event, from memory, i.e. on the availability of that memory (Tversky and Khane-
man, 1973). This is not a surprising finding as “ones judgements are always based on
what comes to mind” (Taylor, 1982, p. 199). Research has shown that individuals are
more likely to make frequency judgements based on recalled content when the task was
perceived to be of high personal relevance (Rotliman and Schwarz, 1998). When facing
a possible air threat that would result in potential destruction of the ship that the
operators are on, it is easy to assume this task would be considered of high personal
relevance. In addition to this, knowledge accessibility may reveal an innate preference
for subjective recall experiences over that of accessible declarative information (Schwarz
and Vaughn, 2002). This could result in error biases as incoming information may be
overlooked or perceived to be irrelevant if it does not fit with the expectations associ-
ated with the recalled similar scenario.
The second heuristic discussed is representativeness, used to evaluate the proba-
bility of an object belonging to a certain class of objects, i.e. how representative is
object A of the objects within class B (Tversky and Khaneman, 1973). When entering
into the next stages the air defence task, that is, the identification and classification of
objects, it would not be uncommon to see this bias in operation. However, research has
found that individuals are prone to certain biases with this heuristic which can result
in incorrect judgements being made. It is here that the development of systems, that
can be programmed to statistically work out probabilities, can provide humans with
support to facilitate accurate classification judgements.
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Anchoring has been argued to explain why our judgements tend to be influenced by
initial perception, i.e. the primary information or perception held acts as an anchor,
from which all subsequent information is compared to. This can however, lead to biases
with how further information is valued in terms of its salience (Baron, 1993). Research
has shown that when experiencing high cognitive load or stress individuals are less
able to adjust their initial disposition in light of new information compared to those
who are not experiencing this cognitive load (Epley and Gilovich, 2006; Starcke and
Brand, 2012). The development and maintenance of SA requires constant updating
and readjustment to newly incoming information. It is obvious that cognitive load can
have a detrimental impact upon the ability to effectively adjust perceptions in light of
new information, and further upon the overall mission objectives.
Additionally, default bias could play a role in the continual use or disuse of an auto-
mated system. When facing complex decisions individuals have a tendency to defer to
the default option, thereby not making a decision at all (Redelmeier and Shafir, 1995).
Decision inertia, i.e. the failure to execute an action, is posited to occur in multi-team
systems when facing a lack of clear strategic direction in a non-time bounded environ-
ment (Alison et al., 2015). Utilising NDM methods to explore decision making in a
multi-agency emergency services response to a critical incident, Alison and colleagues
(2015) identified three barriers to effective decision making; (i) a non-time bounded
situation, (ii) multiple agencies (teams) and (iii) unclear strategic direction. Arguably
all three of these barriers could exist within the air defence task. For example, prior to
a critical situation, operators are working in a non-time bounded situation. Although
primarily working within a single team, i.e. the team on their ship, they may also
be operating as part of a task force, thereby working with multiple teams. With the
increasing interoperability of allied militaries, the task force may also span several na-
tions. Additionally, automated tools and systems can be conceived as members of the
operations team. Therefore, the multi-team system on naval vessels can be comprised
of human and machine teams, as well as teams from multiple nations. Finally, although
the Command and Control (C2) structure is clearly defined, to avoid unclear strategic
direction, with any team, when operating in critical environments there is a chance for
this strategic direction to break down, or become unclear.
Operational environments present individuals with challenges to overcome in order
to make effective decisions. Additionally the organisational environment can influence
decision making. Drawing from an interactionist model of organisational ethical de-
cision making proposed by Trevino in 1986, several factors from this model arguably
influence automation usage decisions. Defined as “the common set of assumptions,
values and beliefs shared by organizational members” (Trevino, 1986, p. 611) organisa-
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tional culture can influence decision making of an individual in several ways. In relation
to the use of automated decision support tools, organisational culture may indirectly
effect automation usage decisions via obedience to authority, a normative structure,
accountability and reinforcement.
For instance, new naval recruits are being trained by very experienced personnel,
who were trained to carry out their tasks manually or with limited automated support,
due to the type of systems that were in service 20-30 years ago. There is also the re-
quirement for each recruit to be able to complete such tasks manually, to prevent skill
decrement. However, if the focus from trainers is on the ability to manually complete
such tasks this may result in maintaining the reticence to utilise automated systems
to their full capability thus, forming the default option to task completion as manual.
A focus on manual task completion may also extenuate the availability bias. If newly
trained operators are primed to perceive total manual completion of the task as ex-
pected and desired, this may derail the decision-making process to focus on manual
completion, when at times it may be more appropriate to work synergistically with
the automated system. Additionally, as the operator remains legally responsible for
the consequences of any decision or action taken, this further increases reticence to
use automation systems. The normative structure of naval operations is maintained
through traditional training and reinforcement of the history of the RN. Not that tradi-
tion and history should be lost, but arguably the organisational culture of such military
organisations must adapt to future warfare, this adaptation must be at an organisa-
tional level to truly bring about change. Default bias and decision inertia have also
been linked to organisational structures and climates (Eyre et al., 2008a), in particu-
lar high-accountability environments (Alison et al., 2010). Hierarchical organisations
have a tendency to foster a blame culture, which increases the accountability felt by
the individuals with the organisation. The military is grounded in hierarchy therefore,
decision inertia may also be an influential factor that can lead to automation misuse
or disuse.
Dzindolet et al. (2010) posit that automation misuse and disuse may result, in part,
from automation bias. Defined by Mosier and Skitka (1996) as “the tendency to use
automated cues as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and pro-
cessing” (p205). Automation bias can result in appraisal errors - which are errors in
judgement in relation to how best to complete the task at hand, i.e. with an automated
or non-automated option; and/or intent errors knowing the utilities of the automated
system and yet not taking into account these properties when deciding on using the
system or not (Beck et al., 2007). Both appraisal and intent errors can negatively im-
pact upon automation usage decisions, i.e. an individual holding an automation bias
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may misappraise the situation (an appraisal error) and use the automated option when
the non-automated option was more appropriate for task completion (an intent error).
Several aviation disasters in recent years have been due to the crews’ overreliance on
their aircrafts automatic pilot and have ultimately resulted in the loss of life of the crew
and passengers. For example, in July 2013 Asiana Airlines flight 214 crashed attempt-
ing to land at San Francisco, of the 291 passengers, 3 were killed and 187 injured, 49
seriously (Konnikova, 2014). The cause of the crash was ruled due to the pilot selecting
the wrong autopilot setting and then failing to recognise that the aircraft was going too
slow and descending too fast. Conversely, not utilising an automated tool in favour of
manual control can also have negative consequences. For example, the Costa Concodria
disaster in January 2012 resulted in the loss of life of 32 passengers. The captain chose
to manually control the navigation of the vessel, which upon investigation following the
crash was found to have been taken off the computer programmed course, resulting in
the cruise ship hitting a coral reef (Levs, 2012). Therefore, the ability to discriminate
when to rely on an automated system and when to rely on manual control is critical to
successful task completion.
It has been posited that involving individuals in the development of an automated
aid can enhance reliance (Kaplan et al., 2001). This study also highlighted the value
of allowing decision makers to remain cognitive involved in the decision process. Sup-
ported by Casner et al. (2014) who found that ‘think aloud’ protocols mitigated pilots
cognitively disengaging from the task when using an automated flight path system.
These studies show how easy it is for individuals to disengage from a task when they
assume that the automated feature is performing correctly. However, the 7th May 2016
saw the first fatality from an automated car5. The autopilot was unable to discrimi-
nate between the white cloudy sky and a white trailer truck and did not take avoidant
action. It should be noted however, that although in autopilot, the driver was still
required to remain alert in order to take back control if necessary, as is expected within
human-automation teams. Unfortunately, the driver in this instance did not take back
control in time to avoid the crash, and ultimately lost his life. A second incident that
involved an autonomous car killing a pedestrian on 18th March 2018 has also raised
questions on the safety of such vehicles6. Later analysis of the incident showed that
the car incorrectly categorised the pedestrian as a bicycle and was not programmed
to perform an emergency brake procedure. The system designers were relying on the
individual in the car, who was not paying attention to the road at the time of the
collision, to stop the vehicle 7. Incidents in the aviation industry, as well as those just
5https://www.teslamotors.com/blog/tragic-loss
6https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/22/video-released-of-uber-self-driving-
crash-that-killed-woman-in-arizona
7https://www.wired.com/story/uber-self-driving-crash-arizona-ntsb-report/
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mentioned, also highlight the importance of not assuming that the automated systems
in use can be easily understood by the people operating them. For example the Lion
Air Boeing 737 MAX 8 incident in October 2018. The pilots were overwhelmed by the
feedback they were receiving from the system during an error which resulted in them
not following a checklist procedure to recover the aircraft. Ultimately 189 people were
killed when the plane nosedived into the sea (Learmount, 2019).
Arguably, the drivers, pilots and captains in these cases succumbed to automation
complacency, as has been seen with many incidents across the aviation industry and
within the military. Operators of automated systems are required to continually re-
evaluate and update their understanding of the environment, as they would normally
do when completing a task. However, an additional evaluation of the automated sys-
tem must now also occur alongside evaluating the environment in order to supervise
the functioning of the system. If overreliance on automation leads to complacency then
individuals will not understand the current situation and therefore will not be anticipat-
ing potential future actions, decisions or consequences. Therefore, research is required
to explore what makes some individuals more susceptible to automation complacency
than others and how best to mitigate the negative consequences of such complacency.
1.2.6 Naturalistic decision making and decision centred design
NDM research has sought to explore cognitive work performed within complex so-
ciotechnical environments and as a research domain has grown from work conducted
with the US Military and Navy (Schraagen et al., 2008). NDM research has been de-
fined as the study of how experience is used by people in the field to support their
decision making (Zsambok and Klein, 1997). This body of literature has contributed
greatly to furthering our understanding into, but not limited to, how complex decisions
are effectively made within military and emergency services contexts. NDM approaches
are pragmatic (Gore et al., 2006) and have been well established within the literature,
dating back to the late 1980s when Gary Klein and colleagues (1986) explored the de-
cision making of fire ground commanders. The development of the Recognition Primed
Decision making (RPD) model, that depicts the decision-making process that occurs in
extremis, opened the field of decision making to look beyond rational decision-making
theories i.e. utility theory. The RPD model depicts how experience facilitates the
ability to intuitively respond to a situation through utilising subtle cues within the
environment (Klein, 1998), highlighting experts tacit knowledge of the task. Experts
use mental simulation to evaluate the worth of a particular course of action, often only
considering one course of action at a time (Ross et al., 2006).
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Johnston et al. (1997) found U.S. Navy personnel utilising more hypervigilant
decision-making strategies (i.e. selectively scanning information available to rapidly
attend to the meaningful data) performed significantly quicker, without a cost to their
accuracy, whilst also making a significantly greater number of accurate target identi-
fications compared to those using vigilant decision-making strategies (i.e. those who
conducted a systematic information search and considered multiple alternatives). Fur-
ther, Ross et al. (2004) found that military personnel did not find training in the RPD
model to be anything new, that is, they continued to formulate and make decisions as
they naturally did. Conceptualised by Boyd in 1987 OODA loops (Observe, Orientate,
Decide and Act) remain the dominant model behind C2 development and military deci-
sion making (Ministry of Defence, 2010). Although not intended as a model of decision
making (Brehmer, 2005), OODA loops provide a useful tool to explain the high-level
stages of thinking that individuals cognitively progress through to achieve their goal.
Each stage of the loop can be iterative, with individuals completing multiple OODA
loops sequentially and in parallel. A key component of being able to progress through
the loop is to understand the current situation, this enables you to anticipate the next
action or decision. OODA loops are similar in nature to the RPD model citing intu-
ition and experience as key facilitators of effective decision making when faced with
time pressured and critical environments.
The value of understanding the macrocognition of experts has also been argued
to facilitate the development of better technology interfaces and training programmes
(Klein et al., 2003), exploring where technology can support macrocognition of individ-
uals and teams and where it may hinder it. This body of literature has underpinned the
development of decision centred design (Hutton et al., 2003) which uses NDM meth-
ods such as cognitive task analysis to build an understanding of the experts task and
where a system may be of use in supporting that task, for example, the Tactical Deci-
sion Making Under Stress (TADMUS) programme (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 1998).
TADMUS had several aims, one of which was to develop a decision support system
that would enhance tactical decision making in a single ship conducting the air defence
task in a littoral environment. Taking an NDM approach to this programme the re-
searchers aimed to create a decision support tool that “cognitively fit” to the way in
which operators completed the task. Upon testing the interface experts were found to
identify more critical contacts earlier when using the decision support system suggest-
ing that automated system which support the intuitive process of feature matching as
well as the more analytical process of explanation based reasoning can provide effective
support to operators (Morrison et al., 1996).
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A key premise of NDM research is to talk to, and crucially, to learn from experts.
This is due to expertise being associated with superior decision making in certain
environments as it provides individuals will high-levels of proficiency and task based
knowledge (Kobus et al., 2001). This proficiency facilitates the speed at which good
judgements can be made or actions completed (Hoffman et al., 2013). However, when
exploring sociotechnical systems, Mosier et al. (1998) found that pilots with more ex-
perience made more automation errors than pilots with less experience. This suggests
that it is not just expertise in the task that is required by personnel operating in so-
ciotechnical environments but also expertise of the system(s) they are interacting with.
Therefore, focus remains on how to facilitate the development and maintenance of ex-
pertise (Gore et al., 2006). It has been found that both novices and experts benefit from
slow and deliberate thinking (Moxley et al., 2012). Accordingly, slow and deliberate
practice with the system(s) they are required to co-operate with may provide human
operators the chance to develop expertise on how the system functions.
Taking an NDM perspective provides researchers with a robust way in which to
approach exploring the cognitive processes associated with automation usage decisions.
However, as the very nature of automated systems stems from the development of
complex algorithms, this thesis will also draw from the heuristics and biases literature.
According to the NDM school of thought, expertise and intuitive judgments arise from
experience, whereas, from a heuristics and biases perspective, intuitive judgements
arise from the use of simplifying heuristics (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). Therefore,
when making decisions the human-machine dyad (of operator and automated system)
conceptually utilise both experience and heuristics/statistics to make judgements. To
support the development of this human-machine dyad the human operator must learn
the task skill and the skills required to use the system effectively in order to prevent
incorrect intuitions. In line with this there is a danger in being overconfident in ones
own abilities which could lead to missing a novel cue that has not been seen before
(Klein et al., 2011). It is in these instances that working alongside an automated sys-
tem may mitigate against the error of missing a critical cue as the system may flag the
error. However, the system is only as good as the information it has been coded and
trained on and so the problems that can arise with novel events or cues may continue
to persist. The introduction of automated systems has in parts reduced the challenges
associated with making decisions in military environments, however, in other ways au-
tomated systems have also increased the complexity of these decisions (Brown, 2007).
A key factor revealed by NDM research that can derail decision making is uncer-
tainty. Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) classified uncertainty into two categories, endoge-
nous - relating to the problem environment and exogenous - relating to the system
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responding to the environment. In relation to human-machine-interaction, endogenous
uncertainty can be conceived of as the incompleteness of the incoming data and the un-
certainty around how reliable the source of that information is. Exogenous uncertainty
can be thought of as the relationship between operator and system, for instance, how
much trust the operator has in the system to inform them of the relevant information
and how reliable is the information being presented to the operator from the system.
Both forms of uncertainty have been found to negatively impact upon the decision mak-
ing process. Endogenous uncertainty was found to have a greater impact during the SA
and plan formation phases of a decision whereas exogenous uncertainty was found to
have a higher impact upon the plan formation and action phases (Alison et al., 2014).
Uncertainty can result in the inability to make a decision (Shafir, 1994), individuals
can find themselves trapped in a loop of continually searching for more information,
which can detrimentally impact upon performance (Klein, 2015). Inevitably, within
the air defence task, this would result in an object not being classified which could be
potentially fatal if that object was in-fact a hostile unit about to strike.
“each Commander can only fully know his own position, that of his oppo-
nent can only be known to him through reports, which are uncertain; he
may, therefore, form a wrong judgement with respect to it upon data of
this description, and, in consequence of that error, he may suppose that the
power of taking the initiative rests with his adversary when it lies really
with himself”8
The increasing capabilities of sensors have to some extent reduced information un-
certainty. It is now possible to detect, record and log far more data points than his-
torically was the case. Automation applied to the fusion of these types of data enables
the operators to engage in higher level tasks and decision-making processes, such as
threat evaluation. However, as Clausewitz wrote and is commonly accepted, military
environments are inherently uncertain (Kobus et al., 2001). It is how this uncertainty
is dealt with that can make the difference between a successful mission and a failure.
Although technology can reduce certain aspects of uncertainty, simultaneously the
inappropriate application of systems can increase uncertainty relating to the system
itself (e.g. the system operating as a “black-box”). It is vital to ensure the appropriate
level of automation is used for the task in question. For instance, Kaber et al. (2005)
found that using adaptive automation during the information and acquisition stages
of the decision-making process improved performance and reduced workload. How-
ever, automation applied to the information analysis and decision-making stages (i.e.
8Von Clausewitz (1832) (p.115).
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the high-level stages of the decision-making process) resulted in increased workload.
Although the prescription of levels to a task facilitates comprehension of where the
system will slot into the decision-making process, artificially deconstructing tasks into
subcomponents has led to the loss of flexibility which is required when facing uncer-
tain environments (Naikar, 2018). Therefore, research should explore approaching the
development of automated systems in a new way, one that embraces the complex and
at times messy way in which teams perform tasks.
More recently there has been a call for a more pragmatic approach to research-
ing human-machine-interaction and not just subscribing to narrow models of design or
conceptualisation (Jamieson and Skraaning, 2017). As Stowers et al. (2017) write, “it
is essential for attitudes, behaviours and cognitions to be continuously monitored and
quantified, as they provide great insight into how to improve or design more usable, safe
and efficient systems” (p177). Additionally, the development and application of auto-
mated systems must move beyond looking primarily at workload as a user assessment
measure (Schwarz et al., 2014). Therefore, this thesis proposes to take a pragmatic
and holistic approach to exploring automation use in the operational setting of above
water warfare. Further, it is not just cognitions towards automation and/or the specific
automated decision support system that can influence uptake and task performance.
Cognitive traits specific to the end user may also play a role in automation usage de-
cisions. Hoff and Bashir (2015) highlight the requirement for further research into the
role of cognitive factors behind the development of dispositional trust, and therefore,
automation usage decision. This thesis proposes to fill this gap, exploring the influence
of six cognitive traits and their association to automation usage decisions: (i) Cogni-
tive Flexibility; (ii) Need for Closure; (iii) the self-regulation processes of Assessment
& Locomotion; (iv) Impulsivity; (v) Conscientiousness; and (vi) Propensity to Trust.
1.2.7 Thesis Structure
This thesis aims to add to the body of literature exploring how to improve maritime
capability. The focus of this work is on exploring the operational application of auto-
mated systems in the maritime above water environment and begins by describing the
environment naval personnel are operating in. Next this thesis will explore current RN
use of automation and where personnel view that use to extend in the future, evidenc-
ing if current personnel are consulted in the development of new automated systems
that they will be required to use. Finally, this thesis will present the development of an
above water micro-world used to explore individuals uptake of an automated decision
support tool in a holistic way.
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This chapter has discussed the psychological underpinnings of this thesis, pro-
viding context on the problem space and an overview of the historical literature that
has been conducted on human machine interaction. It has drawn from the NDM and
heuristics & biases literature on decision making in critical environment as the use of
automated systems in military contexts impacts directly upon decision making. Ad-
ditionally, the factors that effect decision making in these environments arguably also
impact upon decisions that relate to ‘if to’ and ‘how to’ use automated systems.
Chapter 2 presents the mixed-methods approach taken by this research, discussing
the challenges that are characteristic of mixed-methods and interdisciplinary research.
The merits of applying NDM approaches in complex, high-stake environments that are
often interdisciplinary are also discussed. This thesis consists of three stages which are
presented in this chapter. Stages 1 and 2 employ qualitative methods to collect rich
data from subject matter experts within the RN. Stage 3 concerns the development of
the Automatic Radar Classification Simulation (ARCS) which was designed by the au-
thor of this thesis to provide academia with a high-fidelity microworld used to explore
automation usage decisions when performing a threat detection task.
Chapter 3 sought to qualitatively explore the decision stages to the air defence
task. To begin with is the introduction of the historical research on the air defence
task, specifically identifying two key studies on this task by Holt in 1988 and by the
TADMUS programme which began following the USS Vincennes incident. Vignette
questionnaires were completed by (N =7) RN personnel with the data being analysed
thematically to reveal three high-level stages to the air defence task: Observe; Identify
and Classify; and Decide and Act. Occurring iteratively, these stages can be facilitated
by effective communication and situational awareness but also hindered by cognitive
pressures, ambient situational factors such as uncertainty and by organisational con-
straints for example, ROE. The key finding is that the stages of the air defence task
have not significantly changed in the last 30 years. The areas identified that could
benefit from the introduction of automation systems remain the same. This brings into
question if systems have been employed and are used ineffectively by personnel, or if
systems that have been developed do not provide the support personnel require.
Chapter 4 presents the second stage of this thesis which sort to explore the cur-
rent state of automated systems and how they are used operationally by RN personnel.
Potential future use of automated systems as well as opinions of current RN personnel
towards the existing procurement process were also explored. A qualitative question-
naire was completed by (N =46) currently serving RN personnel and as with chapter
3, thematic analysis was conducted upon the data collected. It was highlighted that
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automation use in ubiquitous in daily operational environments, supporting the current
and future doctrine that cites the importance of automated systems. However, a criti-
cal concern was uncovered with the lack of engagement between personnel and system
designers, which results in systems not being built fit for purpose. The implications
of these findings are discussed alongside recommendations for how to bridge the gap
between personnel and system designers.
Chapter 5 describes how ARCS was initially tested with two pilot studies (N =6
and N =5 respectively). This chapter will present the adaptable features that have
been built into the ARCS microworld such as, the ability to edit the functionality of
the system, adapt the scenarios to test different research aims and the ability to in-
corporate questionnaire metrics into the task. The results of the pilot test confirm the
ability of ARCS to collect a vast amount of data on an individuals performance, their
use of the system and the rationales behind their decisions. This chapter will present
an overview of the data that can be collected using ARCS and how a holistic approach
to understanding human machine interaction is achieved by using this microworld.
Chapter 6 presents the findings from the student experiment conducted with
ARCS. Students from the University of Liverpool (N =42) took part in a two-stage
experiment to explore the motivational and cognitive factors that may influence the
uptake of an automated decision support system. This chapter explores the findings
from this study in relation to: i) the influence that prior information on the system
and experience with the system has upon uptake; ii) how workload and accountability
influence task performance and the decision to use the automated system; and iii) how
different cognitive processing styles may modulate automation uptake and use. Quan-
titative and qualitative analysis was conducted on the data collected. The main finding
of this chapter is that automation use does not always result in a significant benefit to
task performance and that capturing a complete picture of the factors that influence
automation uptakes requires research to take a mixed-methods approach.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by providing a summary of the findings presented
in each chapter. The key findings of this thesis are that a disconnect between end
user and system designer results in problems with the development and introduction
of new automated systems. For example, systems are not fit for purpose and/or do
not perform as expected which has negative repercussions on capability and financial
pressures. Therefore, a central recommendation of this thesis is for focus to be placed
on exploring ways to develop and maintain effective collaboration between and across
military organisations, academia and industry. A second finding from this thesis is
the value of utilising immersive environments to train and test new systems. However,
25
there is a paucity of such environments. Thus, a significant contribution of this thesis
is the development of ARCS, a novel microworld that simulates the initial stages of
the air defence task. This chapter also presents how some of the challenges associated
with naturalistic research were encountered and addressed, particularly in relation to
ethical consideration and access to specialist expert populations. The methodological
strengths and weaknesses are also discussed alongside interesting directions for future
research.
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Chapter 2
A methodological approach to
interdisciplinary research in
real-world and experimental
settings
2.1 Introduction
To achieve the aims of this thesis, the adoption of a mixed-method approach is proposed.
This approach provides the research with enough flexibility to include the strengths of
both qualitative and experimental approaches to research.
Drawing from the methodological literature and from the researcher’s experiences
of undertaking this thesis, this chapter will present some of the challenges characteristic
to mixed-method and interdisciplinary scholarship. This chapter will be divided into
three sections that will:
(i) Discuss the challenges characteristic to mixed-methods research and interdisci-
plinary scholarship
(a) Describe the framework of mixed-method design developed to provide trans-
parency of this thesis, as well as a framework that can be adopted and further
developed by future research.
(ii) Discuss how the paradigm of Naturalistic Decision Making provides a robust out-
look to take towards interdisciplinary research, for example by providing method-
ologies that facilitate collecting data from expert populations
(b) The Critical Decision Method will be discussed, and how key features of this
method were adapted into a vignette survey to accommodate to one of the
challenges to ‘real-world’ research: access to expert samples.
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(iii) Discuss Experimental Design and Development
(c) How the Automatic Radar and Classification System (ARCS) was designed
and developed to provide academia with a high-fidelity test bed for novel ways
to explore human automation interaction.
2.2 Challenges characteristic to mixed-methods research
and interdisciplinary scholarship
2.2.1 Methodologies
The researcher’s methodology prioritises and guides the development of the research
questions (Hesse-Biber, 2010), and may implicitly lead to the selection of certain meth-
ods. Therefore, it is prudent to be transparent about the researcher’s epistemology.
Primarily this thesis takes an interpretivist perspective, that is the view that mul-
tiple subjective realities exist through individuals construction and perception of their
own lived reality. The nature of this thesis and the area under study is interdisciplinary.
Therefore, one challenging aspect of this work is the requirement to incorporate multiple
methodologies to address the research questions. With this is mind, a mixed-methods
approach is deemed highly suitable for this work. A requirement of taking a mixed
methods approach involves the researcher to be open to alternative views and epis-
temology. As Greene et al. (2001) wrote “openness to other views and perspectives,
not just to rival explanatory hypotheses but more profoundly to rival ways of thinking
and valuing” (p32). Thus, positivistic and postmodern approaches are also incorpo-
rated into this work. Hesse-Biber in her textbook on mixed-methods research wrote the
method is but the tool; the methodology determines the way in which the tool is utilized
(Hesse-Biber, 2010, p. 17). This thesis uses a combination of methods to address the
research questions under exploration. Each method will be discussed in full within this
chapter. However, to begin with is a discussion on taking a mixed-methods approach
to this work and the reasons why this approach was taken.
2.2.2 Taking a mixed-methods approach
Within the literature several different terms have been used to denote the use of both
quantitative and qualitative methods and forms of analysis. For this thesis, the follow-
ing definition was applied:
“A mixed methods study involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative
and/or qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently
or sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or
more stages in the process of research” (Creswell et al., 2003, p. 165).
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Few guidelines exist on when, why and how to use mixed-methods (Bryman, 2006)
however commonly cited in the literature is Greene et al. (1989) five reasons researchers
adopt a mixed-methods approach to research: (1) Triangulation, (2) Complementarity,
(3) Development, (4) Initiation and (5) Expansion.
Triangulation, commonly viewed as the process of conducting “quantitative and
qualitative research [that] might be combined to triangulate findings in order that they
may be mutually corroborated” (Bryman, 2006, p. 105). Triangulation is employed
within the research design to look for convergence of data collected, enhancing the
credibility of research findings. Bryman (2006) reported that of the 80 articles that
were coded to have used a triangulation approach, only 19 articles had articulated
triangulation in their rational for employing mixed methods. However, 29 articles in-
cluded in the content analysis had stated their use of multi-methods for triangulation,
with only 19 of those articles being coded to have used multiple methods for the purpose
of corroborating their findings. The proposed research framework in this chapter iden-
tifies triangulation as an underpinning factor in adopting a mixed-methods approach.
This is both for the increased validity using similar methods can produce as well as
the increased depth of understanding gained from triangulating qualitative methods
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).
The second reason proposed by Greene et al. (1989) is that of complementarity.
Which, according to their 1989 article “seeks elaboration, enhancement, illustration,
clarification of the results from one method with the results from the other method”
(p.259). With this purpose in mind the adoption of mixed methods can allow the
researcher a holistic understanding of the research problem. It should be noted that
depending on the research problem under exploration, it may be that a complete holis-
tic understanding is not possible through a single mixed-methods study. It may be that
from the primary study springs further inquiry into the phenomena in question.
Development enables the results from one method to inform the other. This is ar-
gued to increase the validity of constructs identified through the research (Greene et al.,
1989). For example, this thesis begins with a qualitative study to explore the decision-
making stages Royal Navy (RN) operators go through to complete the air defence task.
The results of part 1 of this research have directly informed the development of the
microworld experiment (quantitative method) and survey (that encompasses both qual-
itative and quantitative measures).
Methods can inform each other, therefore, value from a mixed-method approach
can be gained via exploring the contractions or paradoxes that may emerge between
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methods. This is the fourth reason for adopting a mixed-methods approach, initiation.
The expected findings from the quantitative method may not fit with the findings from
a qualitative method. This will allow the researcher to take a new perspective towards
the findings, to explore the possible reasons behind the paradox or contradiction. This
fresh perspective will broaden the inquiry and the depth of analysis by the application
of multiple viewpoints onto the findings.
Finally, expansion, the use of multiple methods to “extend the breadth and range
of inquiry by using different methods for different inquiry components” (Greene et al.,
1989, p. 259). This reason is commonly utilised when evaluating programmes. Re-
searchers will adopt quantitative methods to assess program process via standardised
tests of validity and reliability. This will then be complemented by a qualitative method
to explore programme outcome through in-depth understanding of the results and/or
the real-world implications of the programme.
The field of human-machine-interaction is currently an important research area due
to the increased sociotechnical relationships that are developing across a wide range
of domains including the military, healthcare and emergency services. As highlighted
in the previous chapter, in the majority of the current research into human interac-
tion with automated decision support systems there is an emphasis from the view of
the system developer. For example, how can research better articulate to the system
developer’s features of the system to improve human machine interaction. Yet, there
remains a gap in this literature with looking more specifically at the humans using the
systems. Key exceptions do exist, i.e. (Beck et al., 2007; Skitka et al., 2000; Szalma and
Taylor, 2011) and the findings that have been presented produce a complex picture of
human-machine-interaction. Greene et al. (2001) argue that certain types of “complex,
multiply-determined, dynamic social phenomena- can be better addressed through the
multiple perspectives of diverse methods than through the limited lens of just one” (p27).
The field of human-machine-interaction is a highly complex, multiply-determined and
consistently dynamic environment within which operators are having to make increas-
ingly complex, time pressured decisions. Therefore, the adoption of mixed-methods is
argued to be highly suitable for this work. Mixed-methods work goes hand in hand
with the potential for unexpected findings (Bryman, 2006) and concerns have also been
raised with unintended consequences of adopting mixed-methods when a single method
would suffice. Similarly, the impact of the researchers or the research teams skill in the
use of certain methods (Hesse-Biber, 2010) could result in findings that do not con-
tribute to theoretical understanding. In order to mitigate against this, the framework
developed for this thesis is presented.
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The majority of research that has looked specifically at the philosophical stance
and value of multi-methods and/or mixed-methods research has stemmed from the
social inquiry literature. The current nature of psychological research presents as a
domain that is encouraging researchers to look beyond their boundary of a single re-
search area. For instance, naturalistic decision-making research which began following
the work of Gary Klein and colleagues in the 1980s is an ever-growing research com-
munity that values a multi-method way of thinking (Gore and Conway, 2016; Lipshitz
et al., 2001). It is this approach to conducting research, that has allowed inquiry into
complex multi-faceted interpersonal and sociotechnical decision-making environments
such as the military (Kaempf et al., 1993; Militello et al., 2015; Pascual and Henderson,
1997), medical (Patterson et al., 2009; Power, 2017), emergency services (Alison et al.,
2015), policy makers, economics (McAndrew and Gore, 2013) and sociotechnical teams
(Hutton et al., 2003). The Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) philosophy promotes
positivist research that aims to provide practitioners with practical recommendations
to support their operations (Gore and Conway, 2016; Klein, 2015). Additionally, in
their report on the 6,679 case studies within the 2014 Research Excellence Framework,
Kings College London highlighted that 87% of these cases were multidisciplinary and
led to 3,709 identified unique pathways for research to have an impact upon society
(King’s College London, 2015). This thesis draws on NDM philosophy in the approach
taken to exploring the research questions proposed.
2.2.3 Advantages of taking a mixed-methods approach to interdisci-
plinary scholarship
The value of conducting mixed methods research is widely recognised (Greene et al.,
2001; Hesse-Biber, 2010). Utilising multiple methods can strengthen the study by can-
celling out or neutralising the limitations a single method has was used alone (Jick,
1979). To ensure quality of data collection and analysis when adopting a mixed meth-
ods approach the researcher must explicitly be aware of and discuss the paradigms
each method stems from. Greene et al. (2001) write “good mixed-method practice is
achieved by thoughtful mixed-method planning” (p29). The primary aim of this chap-
ter is to present the planning and framework that underlies this thesis, and as such,
the creation of this chapter was iterative. At each stage of the research this chapter
was revisited and revised in order to ensure that the methodological framework that
grounds this work is made clear to the reader. The iterative creation of this chapter
mirrors the iterative nature of mixed-methods research.
Through the comprehensive literature review, presented in chapter 1, it is apparent
that the area of human-machine-interaction is a complex, multi-faceted domain. It is
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these types of research areas that benefit from the adoption of multiple methods to
bring depth and breadth to the research. Finally, to reduce the potential impact of
lack of skill with certain methods or forms of analysis, the framework has been devel-
oped with methods the researcher has experience of conducting. Where a novel form
of analysis or aspect of method design, for example, with the coding of the microworld
a computer programmer was consulted and collaborated with the building of the mi-
croworld used in stage 3 of this work.
2.2.4 Framework of the mixed-method approach developed for this
thesis
Stage 3
Stage 1
Stage 2
ResultsQualitative
• Vignette questionnaire • Microworld performance/decisions
• CFI
• NFC
• Assessment & Locomotion
• BIS-11
• Conscientiousness
• Propensity to Trust
Quantitative
• Self-report rational for automated 
tool use during task
• Self-report on performance during 
task
• Self-report current automated tool 
use
• Self-report opinions of future use of 
automated systems/tools
• Self-report opinions of consultation 
for the development and 
implementation of automated 
systems/tools
Qualitative
Qualitative
Figure 2.1: Visual Representation of Procedures
Figure 2.1 depicts the visual representation of procedures and the proposed mea-
sures used at each stage within this framework. A further consideration for planning
mixed-methods research is when integration between the methods will occur. The
framework developed for this research planned data integration at the problem/question
stage, data collection and interpretation stages (see Figure 2.2). This framework has
drawn from the commonly practiced use of a short qualitative measure as a pilot study
(Creswell et al., 2003). Stage 1 of this framework was designed to enable the researcher
to gain insight into the research problem and domain. A qualitative based survey was
developed to generate rich and in-depth conclusions from a small sample of Subject
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Problem 
Stage
• Qualitative (exploratory) hypotheses
• Quantitative (directive) hypotheses
Data 
Collection
• Vignette survey
• Qualitative questionnaire
• Micro-world 
• Post experiment questionnaire (Mixture of qualitative and quantitative questions)
Data Analysis
• Qualitative thematic analysis on qualitative data
• Inferential statistics on quantitative data - non-parametric were appropriate
• Bayesian analysis were appropriate
Interpretation 
Stage
• Comparison of qualitative and quantitative findings. Providing both generalisation and prediction 
based interpretation of theory and contextualisation of findings
Figure 2.2: Integration of methods at each stage of experiment 2 and 3
Matter Experts (SME) within the Royal Navy. The use of small, select samples is
a key feature of real-world research. Researchers face a challenge with balancing the
ability to access these small select sample groups (e.g. within the emergency services,
governments and military) and the ‘power’ of their studies. Stage 1, combined with
extensive conversations with experts, enabled the researcher to gain quasi-expert sta-
tus through immersion in the practitioners world (Pfadenhauer, 2009). This knowledge
directly fed into the development of stages 2 and 3.
Stages 2 and 3 were designed to answer the research hypotheses that stemmed from
stage 1, a comprehensive literature synthesis and from the researchers knowledge. To
improve the ‘power’ of the work the framework is divided at this stage to include a select
sample of SME (stage 2) and a student sample (stage 3). It is argued that by taking
this dual approach to data collection it is possible to maintain the representativeness
and the power of research findings to a generic population. Whilst, through stage 2,
providing a direct link between generic and specific populations. This approach also
mitigates the recurring issue with real-world research, one of access to experts and
practitioners.
2.2.5 Conclusions of the challenges typical to mixed-method and in-
terdisciplinary research
This chapter has, so far, outlined some of the typical critiques and challenges associated
with mixed-method and interdisciplinary research. The framework presented provides
transparency for how, and more critically, why certain methods were chosen at the onset
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of this work and at the data collection, data analysis and interpretation stages. This
framework addresses the common challenges associated with mixed-methods work; that
of the researcher identifying where methods integrate and how to achieve this robustly.
To continue this transparency, the next section of this chapter will specifically focus on
the methods adopted within this thesis.
2.3 Interdisciplinary Scholarships: why NDM provides a
robust approach to research
NDM methods have grown from research with the US Navy and Military (Schraagen
et al., 2008). Providing a methodological paradigm from which to conduct research into
complex sociotechnical environments and systems. This paradigm provides researchers
with a good grounding to conduct interdisciplinary research due to the development
of shared language and methods (Robertson et al., 2003). The development of this
paradigm suits the nature of interdisciplinary scholarship, providing adaptive and flex-
ible methods to explore complex realities. Research into human-machine-interaction
has taken many forms, from student samples (e.g. Osiurak et al., 2013; Rice and Mc-
Carley, 2011) to research with experts (e.g. De Greef et al., 2010; Kaplan et al., 2001;
St. John et al., 2005). Yet, there remains a call to explore new and different methods
of testing decision support systems (Todd and Benbasat, 1994) as challenges with how
tools are transferred from sterile research environments into the real-world without
falling into the camp of brittle technology remain. A key tenet of NDM research is to
explore choice implementation in the real-world (McAndrew and Gore, 2013), there-
fore, members of ergonomics and human factors communities have already begun to
identify the strengths of taking an NDM approach to human-machine-interaction, for
example adopting a decision centred design approach. NDM methodology promotes the
crucial role of situational awareness, dynamicity, uncertainty, and mental imagery in
how decisions are made in operational environments (Lipshitz et al., 2001). NDM takes
a positive approach, focusing on what practitioners and experts do well, “seek[ing] to
reduce mistakes and thereby seek to help decision makers perform skilfully and use their
experience and intuition effectively” (Gore and Conway, 2016, p. 332). The context of
this thesis focuses on above water maritime operations, a decision-making environment
conducted by experts in Naval services across the world. Taking an NDM approach
allows this thesis to explore and provide valuable recommendations for practitioners
operating in these environments.
A collection of NDM methods that have been used successfully in previous research
to explore decision making are cognitive task analysis methods. The primary aim of
cognitive task analysis methods are to yield information about goal structures and
cognitive processes that underlie observable task performance (Chipman et al., 2000).
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Flanagan (1954) argued that the critical incident technique provides researchers with
“a flexible set of principles which must be modified and adapted to meet the specific
situation at hand” (p336). Cognitive task analysis has been applied to a wide range
of domains and specific decision-making situations or tasks, evidenced by the develop-
ment of the Applied Cognitive Task Analysis method (ACTA). ACTA was developed
to translate cognitive task analysis methods from the research community to opera-
tional contexts (Militello and Hutton, 1998). The premise of NDM research is that to
improve operational environments or functioning the first step is to understand how
experts perform the task under observation (Klein et al., 1989). The variety of or-
ganisational domains that can be explored utilising NDM methods and the individual
challenges associated with each domain, and within that, each specific decision-making
point/sequence/task require researchers to adapt methods to suit the task at hand.
This thesis focuses on above water maritime operations, tasks that are carried out by a
limited number of experts within the UK. Additionally, access to these experts is hin-
dered due to their full-time requirement to the job that takes them all over the world.
Therefore, in order to facilitate the collection of data from this novel and restricted
group of experts, questionnaires were adapted from cognitive task analysis approaches.
2.3.1 Stage 1 - Adaptation of the critical decision method into a vi-
gnette scenario
The Critical Decision Method (CDM) interview aims to “identify the knowledge require-
ments, expertise and goal structures involved in performing a decision makers work”
(Wong, 2003, p. 327) and to generate relevant recommendations for supporting high
stakes decision making (Crandall et al., 2006). This interview method has been effec-
tively used by research exploring high stake decision making that spans domains such
as; emergency services (Klein et al., 2010; Power, 2015), medical staff (Crandall et al.,
2006) and the military (Shortland and Alison, 2015). This method enables practitioners
to “tell stories”, facilitating an incident-centric approach to identifying critical decision-
points. Drawing knowledge from expert samples is possible due to experts holding the
meta-cognitive abilities to describe their knowledge as well as to posses it (Klein and
Militello, 2005). Therefore, although there are additional challenges to the researcher
in terms of accessing experts, the development of interpersonal relationships and the
balancing of research aims with the practicalities of conducting research, access to even
small samples of experts can provide a wealth of highly rich and contextualised data
and knowledge.
The CDM interview begins with practitioners deciding on an incident they would
like to recall, one that would be suitable for the specific decision environment the
researcher is exploring. For example, if the research focus is on when decision inertia
35
may occur the participant would be asked to recall a situation in which they faced a very
difficult choice between two potentially bad outcomes. Following the initial recall of this
occasion, the researcher moves into the timeline and deepening stages of the interview.
These stages guide the practitioner to work through each stage of the decision process,
what information was available, what actions they took etc. Essentially, these stages
flesh out the key decision features and points. The researcher is then able to utilise
aid memoir prompts (examples in Table 2.1) to discuss the decision from different
perspectives, identifying goals and priorities and the experts overall opinions of the
decision-making process. For a full breakdown of the stages to the CDM interview see
(Crandall et al., 2006).
Table 2.1: Examples of aide memoir prompts that can be used within the CDM adapted
from Klein et al. (1989) and Shortland (2017)
Cues: What were you hearing/thinking/noticing during this situ-
ation?
Information: What information did you use in making a decision or judg-
ment?
What did you do with this information?
Goals and Priori-
ties:
What were your specific goals and objectives at this time?
What was the more important thing for you to accomplish
at this point?
Assessment: If you were asked to describe the situation to someone else
at that point, how would you describe it?
Due to the restrictions to accessing SME within the RN, a 4-section vignette sce-
nario questionnaire was developed to elicit similar knowledge to that extrapolated from
conducting CDM interviews. The limitations with conducting questionnaire based re-
search is acknowledged, particularly when compared to an in-depth knowledge elicita-
tion interview technique. However, due to the area under research within this thesis,
the limited access to SME time and the very nature of their job roles and locations,
the development of an online vignette questionnaire was deemed to be the next best
option to elicit this knowledge. The decision to develop vignette scenarios as the basis
of the questionnaire also aimed to improve the depth and quality of the qualitative
data gained from SME. Vignettes enable the exploration of normative issues in a way
in which reality, and the complexities associated with it, can be approximated (Finch,
1987).
Defined by Evans et al. (2015) as “a brief, carefully written description of a person
or situation designed to simulate key features of a real world scenario” (p.162), vignette
scenarios have been successfully used to explore and investigate decision making with
practitioners in settings that are difficult to assess experimentally. It is noted that, a
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long-standing concern of the use of vignettes is how realistic the scenarios presented
are. To mitigate this, and in order to develop realistic scenarios that are internally
valid, scenarios were developed in collaboration with a member of Dstl staff with a
Military Advisor (MA) role. Therefore, the terminology used for each scenario was
designed to be understood by SME, providing internal validity to the questions. The
initial five-part vignette scenario developed formed a pilot test. This pilot was sent, via
a gatekeeper at Dstl, to 3 SME. It is common practice for research with a small sample
of SME to gain the support of a individual within the same organisation as the SME
who acts as a gatekeeper and facilitates access to the SME. Following feedback from
this test, the vignette scenario was refined, creating a four-part scenario that was sent
out to the test group of SME (see Appendix One for complete vignette). Chapter 3
presents the phased-model of decision making specific to the air defence task that was
extrapolated from the data collected through this vignette
2.3.2 Stage 2 - Questionnaire development
Through the analysis of the data collected at stage 1 of this thesis it was highlighted
that our understanding of the operational use of automated systems by RN personnel
remains unclear. Therefore, several questions were formulated to explore how currently
serving personnel are interacting with automated systems, where these systems are
used and could be used in the future, and what personnel’s thoughts are on the existing
procurement process of these systems (see Table 2.2). Stage 2 of this thesis is presented
in full in Chapter 4 and the complete questionnaire can be found in Appendix Two.
Table 2.2: Qualitative questions included at Stage 2
1 In your opinion, do you see automated tools/systems having
a role in future naval operations?
2 If so, where do you see such tools/systems having the most
benefit and why?
3 During your time spent at sea or during training, how often
did you interact with and utilise automated tools or systems?
(i.e. daily, weekly, monthly, once etc.)
4 What were the tools you used and how did they aid your
operations?
5 Have you ever been consulted in the development of new
tools/systems prior to their release into operational use?
6 What are your views on the consultation of current and fu-
ture personnel during the design and development stages of
new automated tools/systems?
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2.3.3 Summary
This chapter has so far discussed Stages 1 and 2 of the mixed-methods framework devel-
oped; the adaptation of the CDM interview into a vignette scenario questionnaire, and
the development of the second qualitative questionnaire sent to SME. The qualitative
data collected at stage 1 provided the narrative of the air defence task which under-
pinned the development of the microworld- Automatic Radar Classification Simulation
(ARCS). The next section to this chapter will present Stage 3 of the mixed-method
framework, which involved designing, developing and testing a micro-world as well
as discussing the utility of microworlds for exploring complex decision-making envi-
ronments. The initial stages to the development of ARCS will be presented before
discussing the research hypotheses answered in this thesis.
2.4 Stage 3 - Microworld Design and Development
Defined as “a computer-generated environment that exists in laboratories. It is a sim-
plified, idealized model that adequately simulates the essential elements of a real-world
system.” (Chen and Bell, 2016, p. 187). The use of simulated microworlds to explore
human decision making and interaction with tools is a longstanding and continually
developing research methodology. Arguably microworld application has arisen in part
due to laboratory decision making tasks lacking important real-world influences (Alison
et al., 2013). Additionally, when researching complex decision-making environments
(characterised by time pressure, uncertainty and high stakes), simplistic experimental
tasks do not enable the exploration of the complex myriad of factors that influence de-
cision making in such environments. Microworlds embody crucial characteristics of the
reality under inquiry, enabling both observation and theory testing (Eyre et al., 2008b);
bridging the gap between field research and controlled laboratory studies (Brehmer and
Do¨rner, 1993). These characteristics include:
1. Complexity - a goal structure is present
2. Dynamicity - operating in real time
3. Opaqueness - aspects of the system are unknown to the participant; they must
make inferences and develop hypotheses on their previous experiences (Alison
et al., 2013; Brehmer and Do¨rner, 1993; Chen and Bell, 2016).
The design of an ecologically valid microworld requires domain knowledge of the area
under study. Although there is always some loss of ecological validity with abstraction
of reality to a virtual environment (Loomis et al., 1999), possessing domain knowledge
enables cognitive and situational demands to be woven into the system, resulting in a
microworld that embodies the vital characteristics of the real-world under observation
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(Gonzalez et al., 2005). The fidelity, i.e. the level of similarity between the simulation
and the real world (Alison et al., 2013, p. 257) of the microworld can be achieved through
interaction with SME. Further, the psychological fidelity of the simulation enables the
researcher to explore the underlying processes relevant to decision making performance
(Kozlowski and DeShon, 2004). With the need to ensure that new decision support
systems are robust and not just applicable to a single controlled scenario (Woods,
2016) utilising high fidelity microworlds can provide researchers the opportunity to
test systems, specifically human interaction with such systems, in psychologically and
environmentally authentic environments. Additionally, it is increasingly important for
academia to develop simulated environments that can remain open architectures, which
foster collaboration as opposed to the closed systems developed by industries. Thus, the
remainder of this chapter will detail the development of the micro-world the researcher
of this thesis designed and had developed.
2.5 Automatic Radar Classification Simulation (ARCS)
ARCS has been designed to explore human interaction with automated decision sup-
port systems, specifically relating to the maritime above water warfare domain. The
phased-decision model of the air defence task (Chapter 3) extrapolated from qualitative
research conducted with SME provided the foundations for the development of ARCS.
Identified from this model was the fundamental, yet often overlooked, initial stage of
the air defence task- development of the Recognised Air Picture (RAP). All other ac-
tions (e.g. Threat Evaluation and Weapon Allocation (TEWA)) and decisions made
are based on the RAP that is produced through this initial development of situational
awareness. The higher up the chain of command you travel the pressures faced by
decision makers (e.g. temporal, reputational, criticality of decision outcomes) increase.
Therefore, if the initial stages of the air defence task can be expedited the pressures
facing decision makers can be somewhat elevated. Further, the application of auto-
mated support tools during the initial stages of the air defence task would fit with the
literature that shows the beneficial effects on performance utilising automated systems
during data collection and analysis phases, as opposed to operating with automated
tools for more complex cognitive tasks (such as action implementation).
The process of developing ARCS involved 4 steps; (i) building knowledge of the
specifics of the research domain, (ii) designing the prototype interface and developing
task structure, (iii) piloting the system, and (iv) recruiting participants and utilising
ARCS
Building knowledge of the specifics of the research domain. Highlighted by
(Crandall et al., 2006) as a key requirement prior to conducting CDM is the researcher
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holding detailed knowledge around the research domain under exploration. The same
key requirement holds true for the development of micro-worlds. Terminology, work
processes and command structures must all be understood by the researcher in order to
enable the creation of a microworld that truly incorporates real world influences. Prior
to approaching the development of ARCS, the researcher of this thesis immersed them-
selves in the research domain. Primarily through attending meetings with SME and
maintaining informal interpersonal links with experts. Additionally, the researcher was
able to observe training events during which simulations of the air defence task were
observed. Additionally, the results of stage 1 of this thesis provided valuable insight
into the decision-making process that underpins the air defence task, further building
the knowledge based used to develop ARCS. Through developing this quasi-expert sta-
tus the researcher was able to build the three key characteristics of a microworld into
ARCS: complexity, dynamicity and opaqueness.
Designing the prototype interface and developing the task structure.
The key benefit to utilising microworlds is to explore real world influences in a more
controlled way compared to field research. The key objective was to develop a psy-
chologically immersive environment that replicates the real-world characteristics of the
air defence task. To achieve this the researcher utilised her knowledge on the research
domain to design an interface that replicates, as far as was possible, the combat man-
agement system RN personnel use. The design drawings created by the author of
this thesis were given to a computer programmer who then generated the java based
microworld. In terms of the task structure itself, as the experiment would be run ini-
tially on university students the air defence task was simplified. However, to maintain
ecological validity the key characteristics of the task, e.g. time pressure, mental and
attentional demand and decisional uncertainty were built into the task. Liebhaber
and Feher (2002) identified six critical cues air defence operators used to inform their
classification decisions; Origin of track, IFF mode, Intelligence Report, Altitude, Prox-
imity to airlane and EMS (Radar signature). For the purpose of this thesis and due to
classification restrictions, it was not possible to build all the critical cues identified by
Liebhaber and Feher (2002) into ARCS. Instead, publicly available data was utilised
providing participants with the Altitude, Velocity, Proximity to airlane, Platform type
and Baring as the information points from which to make their classification decisions.
However, the microworld itself is flexible enough to include additional data sources and
points if required at a later date. Figure 2.3 depicts the initial interface design drawing
for ARCS. All information relating to the tracks on screen appears in the top left box,
if a track is selected this information also shows on the top right hand side. If any track
appears to be hostile, the participant is required to click the inform command button,
the track information will then appear in the threat list box.
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Piloting the system. Psychological research commonly conducts pilot tests to
conduct manipulation checks. For the purpose of this thesis two pilot tests were con-
ducted to check the utility of ARCS. An overview of these pilot tests can be found
in Chapter 5. To summarise the findings, the first pilot highlighted that ARCS was
not manipulating workload sufficiently. Therefore, several alterations were made prior
to pilot 2 which showed the utility of ARCS as a tool to explore automation usage
decisions. For full details on the two pilot tests refer to Chapter 5 of this thesis.
Recruiting participants and utilising ARCS. ARCS has been designed to run
two scenarios; a training scenario and the main task scenario. In total both scenarios
take 45 minutes to run. However, these can be adapted and changed to suit the
research question(s) under exploration. For this thesis, a practice scenario of 15 minutes
and a single main task scenario of 30 minutes were designed to recreate features of a
naval working environment but also bearing in mind the practicality of running long
experiments with student samples. Most naval personnel involved in the air defence
task will be used to working long shifts, being constantly vigilant and at their station
for between 4-6 hours at a time. These time frames unfortunately couldn’t be applied
to the study presented in this thesis. However, ARCS can be programmed to run for
any length of time, therefore future research could take up the baton and explore the
effects of boredom or monotony upon automation usage decisions. Participants for the
studies presented in this thesis were volunteers responding to adverts placed around the
University of Liverpool campus, taking part in a repeated measures design experiment
in exchange for course credit or financial reimbursement (further details on sample
recruitment, the running of ARCS and the results from the experiment can be found
in Chapter 6).
2.6 Questionnaire battery designed to explore individual
differences and automation usage decisions
Chapter 1 highlighted the limited research into the potential influence individual dif-
ferences may have upon automation usage decisions. One aspect of this thesis aims
to contribute to this limited body of literature by exploring the possible relationship
between deciding to use a generic automated system and scores on several cognitive
trait scales. Therefore, to complement ARCS a questionnaire battery was developed in-
cluding several individual differences and cognitive trait questionnaires (see Table 6.4).
Morse and Niehaus (2009) argue that supplemental components to mixed methods re-
search enhance “description, understanding or explanation of the phenomenon under
investigation” (p19). Section B of this questionnaire consists of several qualitative ques-
tions designed to elicit rationales to contextualise system use and task performance.
There has however been criticism of arguing the use of mixed methods by including a
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single qualitative question to a quantitative questionnaire battery (Morse and Niehaus,
2009). The questionnaire developed for this thesis was designed to include both quanti-
tative and qualitative components that complement the microworld experimental task.
This results in a questionnaire that functions as a supplemental data collection method.
Further information on the choice of these measures can be found in Chapter 6 and the
complete questionnaire can be found in Appendix Five.
Table 2.3: Overview of the sections included in the questionnaire battery at Stage 2
Section A Demographics
Section B Qualitative feedback questions
Section C Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (Denis & Wander Val, 2010)
Section D Need for Closure (Kruglanski et al., 1993)
Section E Assessment & Locomotion (Kruglanski et al., 2000)
Section F BIS-11 (Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1995)
Section G Conscientiousness Scale (John & Srivastava, 1999)
Section H Propensity to Trust Scale (Merritt et al., 2013)
2.7 Measures collected and thesis hypothesis
To continue to provide a transparent view of this thesis, Table 2.4 presents all hypothe-
ses addressed and the measures used to examine each research question. Additionally,
the table provides the reader with directions to the relevant chapters where each hy-
potheses, analysis and discussion relating to the findings, are explained in more detail.
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2.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter presents the methodologies utilised within this thesis. In particular, this
thesis contributes to the literature on human-machine-interaction by presenting a mixed
methods approach that primarily draws upon the NDM philosophy. A fundamental crit-
icism of recent approaches to understanding human-machine-interaction, specifically to
testing new tools themselves, is the lack of ecological validity and brittleness to standard
experimental approaches (Jamieson and Skraaning, 2017; Woods, 2016). This thesis
will use a combination of methods, with each method informing and contextualise the
understanding of the research aims. Therefore, by using both qualitative and quantita-
tive methodologies this thesis provides a novel way in which human-machine-interaction
can be explored in operational settings. Additionally, the complexity, dynamicity and
opaqueness of ARCS provides the researcher with a highly realistic and flexible tool to
take an applied approach to the problem space. In summary, this thesis will employ
a mixed methods approach in order to: (i) present the decision making stages of the
air defence task; (ii) discuss how automated system are currently used in operational
settings and where they may be used in the future; (iii) discuss the existing procure-
ment process, highlighting the barriers to effective automation application; and (iv)
develop a high-fidelity microworld to explore individuals rationales of using a generic
automated system when performing a threat detection task.
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Chapter 3
Understanding the Air Defence
Task: A Descriptive Decision
Model from Perspectives of
Royal Navy personnel
3.1 Abstract
An initial stage of this thesis was to explore the decision-making process and challenges
faced by Royal Navy (RN) personnel. This was to develop an understanding of where
automated decision support systems may have the most benefit to operations. To be-
gin this process, this chapter describes the decision stages of the air defence task. The
Critical Decision Method interview, adapted into a vignette scenario questionnaire, was
completed by seven RN personnel. The results provide a high-level qualitative descrip-
tive model of the air defence task. Three stages were identified: Observe; Identify and
Classify; and Decide and Act. These stages occur iteratively with cognitive (overload
and inferring of intent), ambient (uncertainty and time pressure), and organisational
(capability and Rules of Engagement) factors potentially impeding the decision-making
process. Shared situational awareness attained through the development of the recog-
nised air picture underpins all decisions made within the air defence task. Therefore,
this chapter recommends focusing on understanding how automated decision support
systems could assist with the development of the recognised air picture.
3.2 Introduction
This thesis focuses on the air defence task, therefore, the first research question pro-
posed by the author is - What are the decision-making stages within the air defence
task conducted by RN personnel? To address this question an exhaustive review of the
literature on maritime decision making was undertaken. This illuminated several semi-
nal research projects and papers that had previously used Naturalistic Decision Making
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(NDM) methods to explore military naval decision making. Notable projects identified
via this review included Holt’s work in 1988 which looked at assessing the requirement
for decision support tools in the UK and the Tactical Decision Making Under Stress
(TADMUS) programme conducted in the US (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 1998). Both
explored and produced decision-making models of the air defence task conducted by
naval personnel. The aim of this chapter is to review models of decision making specific
to the air defence task, the purpose of which is twofold. Firstly, to produce a detailed
understanding of the problem space allowing the researcher to develop quasi-expert
status, and secondly, to highlight new areas where decision support systems could be
developed and implemented to support future RN operations. Therefore, this chapter
will:
(i) Introduce historical research on the air defence task - Identifying the requirement
to update our understanding of the air defence task performed by RN personnel
today
(ii) Present findings from RN personnel of the phases of the decision-making process;
and within this present the barriers and facilitators to effective decision making
(iii) Discuss implications of findings in terms of:
(a) The persisting complexities and barriers to effective decision making
(b) The paramount requirement to continue to extend RN capability
3.3 Historical literature on the air defence task
Teams are at the heart of all military operations (Brown, 2007), teams that are required
to process vast amounts of information during both times of peace and during conflict
- such as the example provided in Chapter 1. Figure 3.1 depicts the complex nature of
the air defence task identified by Holt through analysis of Command and Control (C2)
decisions RN personnel in Type 42 Destroyers made. Commonly, Threat Evaluation
(TE) has received the most interest from academia in terms of understanding the
process itself and developing tools that can support operators (Liebhaber and Feher,
2002; Roux and Van Vuuren, 2007). TE consists of identifying and prioritising objects
of interest in the immediate environment, box 1.1 in Figure 3.1. TE is a fluid process
with operators being required to constantly update their understanding of the current
threat tracks may present (Roy et al., 2002). Due to the vast amount of information that
is required in order to understand the environment and to make judgements of threat
levels, it is not surprising that automated decision support systems are being developed
to assist operators in this task. TE is however only one aspect of the air defence task,
the stages prior to and following TE form a complex interaction of decision stages
performed by all naval personnel daily. For example, TE can be followed by Weapons
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Allocation (WA), the assigning of appropriate resources to counter potential threats
(Helldin, 2014; Lo¨tter and Van Vuuren, 2014).
Figure 3.1: Taken from Holt 1988, p 76 - The air defence officer’s task (simplified)
Holt (1988) identified several areas where automated decision support systems
would be needed for successful operations. These areas include, aiding the alloca-
tion of ‘soft kill’ countermeasures, Force Threat Evaluation and Weapon Allocation
(TEWA), long range threat allocation, and performance monitoring of the air defence
team. Soft kill countermeasures are detailed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Force TEWA
refers to the defence of several ships that are operating as a Task Group as opposed to
individual units. For example, a Type 45 Destroyer (T45) may be escorting a valued
asset, the air defence task then incorporates the defence of the T45 but also the asset.
All TEWA decisions must be made taking into consideration the vulnerabilities and
capabilities of all vessels in the Task Group, and decision support systems have been
introduced to increase operational capabilities. However, it remains unclear whether
the areas identified by Holt are being supported by automated systems and therefore
if future research needs to focus on different aspects of the air defence task.
The TADMUS programme began in the US in 1990 following the USS Vincennes
incident. On 3rd July 1988, a US cruiser shot down a commercial aircraft killing
290 people over the Arabian Gulf (Hammond, 2017). The aims of TADMUS were to
increase the overall skill level of US Navy personnel through the development of stress-
exposure training and decision support tools, thereby enhancing critical thinking skills,
decision making and teamwork (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 1998; Cohen et al., 1997;
Driskell and Johnston, 1998; Johnston et al., 1998; Riffenburgh, 1991). The overall
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aim of TADMUS was to prevent errors in judgement that could result in the death of
innocent civilians or lead to fratricide incidents.
The decision stages of the air defence task are practically identical across nations
and take place within a highly complex military theatre (Foard, 2000). However, cer-
tain differences exist relating to Rules of Engagement (ROE) 1, number of personnel
and vessels in operation, as well as available sensor technology and weapon systems.
These differences will impact upon decision-making and where automated systems can
be introduced. Therefore, developing up to date descriptive models of the task under
exploration enables researchers to identify leverage points that can facilitate system de-
sign (Militello et al., 2015). Warfare has become increasingly ill-defined and complex,
increasing inherent uncertainty with military operations in times of peace and conflict
(as outlined in Chapter 1). Therefore, it is important to continually evaluate the deci-
sion stages of the air defence task to ensure that research and system development are
addressing the challenges current personnel face. This current project began in 2015
and although it is anticipated that the high-level stages of the task will remain the
same as identified by previous research: (i) Formation of Situation Awareness (SA);
(ii) TE; (iii) WA; and (iv) re-evaluation of the situation, the facilitators and barriers
to effectively achieving this task may have changed due to the increasing availability
of sophisticated automated decision support systems and the changes to the nature of
warfare.
3.4 Method
3.4.1 Participants
A total of N =7 Subject Matter Experts (SME) completed the online survey distributed
within the UK Ministry of Defence’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl).
Participants were required to have served or be serving in the RN with experience of
working within a ships operations room. Specifically, with experience of holding posi-
tions (such as Principal Warfare Officer), that would result in them being considered
experts in the air defence task (see Table 3.1 for breakdown of participant demograph-
ics). Research has recommended that when conducting critical incident interviews,
three - five SME usually exhausts the domain of analysis (Militello and Hutton, 1998).
Although this study utilised a vignette scenario method, the questions posed to SME
were based on those that would be asked if undertaking a critical incident interview.
However, it was expected that the amount of data, although not the richness of this
data, gained via a vignette scenario would be lower than if interviews were possible. The
1Rules of Engagement are the legal frameworks that define how and under what circumstances a
military can use force. Each country will have their own ROEs that their state forces must adhere to.
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limitations associated with this and the small sample size are therefore acknowledged
in the discussion.
Table 3.1: Demographic Information of RN personnel who completed the stage 1 ques-
tionnaire
N Gender Average number of
years’ experience
Ranks
Fully
completed
questionnaires
3 3x Male 12 years 1 month 1x Lieutenant,
1x Lieutenant
Commander,
1x Commander
Partially
completed
questionnaires
4 4x Male 10 years 0.5 month 2x Lieutenant
and
2x Lieutenant
Commander
3.4.2 Vignette Survey
The vignette survey was developed on Qualtrics, an online survey tool. This online
tool was used for ease of distribution to potential participants. Each scenario was short
and specific to operations involving a Type 45 Destroyer, for example (see Table 3.2):
Table 3.2: Example of vignette scenario and questions presented to SME
Situation 1- A number of active civil airways run either through or adja-
cent to the assigned sector of responsibility. A daily Air Tasking Order
is being issued for friendly military air traffic operating in the JOA. T45
tasked to monitor air activity over the designated hostile nation and in
particular any surveillance aircraft operating over the sea.
Q1 Explain your thought process and the information used to
develop shared situational awareness
Q2 Which information is most important to your decision mak-
ing process?
Q3 Please answer the following questions
i List your two key priorities in response to this situation
ii Please list the actions you will take to achieve each pri-
ority
iii Please indicate why these actions will achieve each spe-
cific priority
Following each part of the scenario a series of open ended questions were presented.
Question one was designed to elicit knowledge on what information is used to develop
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shared SA. With the introduction of automated systems that will be functioning as an
actor in the operations team, understanding what information will need to be shared
by the automated system is vital. Question two aimed to elicit key information and
data points that are used by personnel to form decisions. This information will be
fed directly into the development of the microworld - Automatic Radar Classification
Simulation (ARCS). Finally, question 3 was designed to extrapolate how priorities are
assigned, what plans are then formed to deal with these priorities and the rationales
behind these decisions and actions.
Due to the novel access to SME, several follow up questions (see Table 3.3) were
also included in the survey following the scenarios. These questions were adapted from
the Critical Decision Method (CDM) interview methodology that has been commonly
used to elicit exploratory information relating to decision making within complex en-
vironments. Additionally, the identification from personnel of the potential barriers to
effective operations will aid research twofold: firstly in identifying where automated
decision support systems are needed, and secondly to identify potential strategies al-
ready in use by personnel to manage uncertainty when making decisions. The survey
is presented in full in Appendix One of this thesis.
Table 3.3: Example of the supplementary questions presented to SME
Q5 What do you find are the most challenging aspects of work-
ing within an operations room and why?
Q6 At times when you have experienced uncertainty with a deci-
sion/action, how did you manage that uncertainty to ensure
a decision was reached?
Q7 How is information processed/presented from systems used
within the operations room?
3.4.3 Procedure
The initial survey was sent to a gatekeeper, in this instance, the Dstl Military Advisor
(MA) who helped develop the vignette scenarios. The gatekeeper was employed to
distribute the survey link to a test selection of SME who had experience of conducting
the air defence task. The gatekeeper had direct access to such SME as well as the
domain knowledge to ensure that those asked to complete the survey had the relevant
practical experience. Potential participants were emailed with the study information
and a link to the survey. If participants were happy to take part, they were asked to
provide consent through the online survey before being presented with the vignettes.
Each section to the vignette was presented individually (see Table 3.2) with each new
section increasing in complexity.
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SME were able to write in drop down text boxes, enabling them to elaborate on each
question as they saw fit. The questionnaire was kept online for three weeks to ensure
that as many SME could complete the vignettes as possible. In total 7 surveys were
completed by SME of which 3 were completed in their entirety taking on average 2 hours
and 22 minutes to complete. The average duration of a CDM interview is up to 2 hours
and it has been argued that questionnaires can provide a comparable level of detail
as an interview if participants answer conscientiously (Flanagan, 1954). Therefore,
although the length of time it took for SME to complete the survey resulted in a high
non-completion rate (57.14%) arguably the responses for each question provided rich
qualitative data. Accordingly, all responses, whether partially or fully completed are
included in the analysis.
3.4.4 Analysis
Thematic analysis has been defined as “a method for identifying, analysing and report-
ing patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79) and can, if rigor-
ously applied, provide an insightful method of analysis for research questions. Themes
emerge inductively from the data (Aronson, 1995). This results in themes that are
formed being produced by the words of practitioners, promoting the ecological validity
of the research. Thematic analysis was chosen over other qualitative methods as it is a
flexible analysis method that has been found to be useful for producing analyses suited
to informing policy development (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Themes form a holistic
picture of the collective experience of the people, groups or organisations under study
(Aronson, 1995).
A crucial consideration for conducting thematic analysis is the transparency of the
approach taken, which can impact upon the validity of the findings; defined as “the
credibility and accuracy of processes and outcomes associated with a research study”
(Guest et al., 2012, p. 7). Traditionally, the first step with a robust thematic analysis
is transcription of the data. A questionnaire was distributed online as opposed to con-
ducting interviews. Therefore, the process of transcription consisted of formatting each
respondent’s answers into a word document. Table 3.4 displays the guidelines produced
by (Braun and Clarke, 2006) that were taken to ensure a robust approach to thematic
analysis occurred.
QSR International’s NVivo 11 software is a commonly used computer-assisted qual-
itative data-analysis tool (Hoover and Koerber, 2011) that facilitates the management
and analysis of qualitative data (Bandara, 2006; Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). NVivo
does not conduct data analysis but assists the researcher with the organisation of
themes, categories and codes. This support with the management of data analysis
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not only aids efficiency of the analysis (Hoover and Koerber, 2011), but also enables
the researcher to explore diverse ways to extrapolate meaning from the data (Bazeley
and Jackson, 2013). NVivo can also support the transparency of qualitative analysis
through the use of memos that can record the researchers’ insights and be linked to
sources (Hoover and Koerber, 2011).
Table 3.4: Guidelines taken from Braun & Clarke (2006). Using thematic analysis in
psychology. P87.
Phase Description of the process
1. Familiarising yourself
with your data
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the
data, noting down initial ideas
2. Generate initial codes Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion
across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code
3. Searching for themes Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data rele-
vant to each potential theme
4. Reviewing themes Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts
(Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a the-
matic ‘map’ of the analysis
5. Defining and naming
themes
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the
overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and
names for each theme
6. Producing the report The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, com-
pelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, re-
lating back of the analysis to the research question and litera-
ture, producing a scholarly report of the analysis
NVivo 11 facilitated all stages of analysis, from generation of initial codes to re-
port creation. The interface is designed to support inductive qualitative research by
making the process of coding, theme creation and revision of themes more intuitive.
Firstly, all the RN SME questionnaire responses were formatted into word documents.
These documents were then imported into NVivo 11. This enabled the ‘select and drag’
feature to coding themes, or nodes as they are labelled in NVivo. Themes have been
defined as “units derived from patterns” (Aronson, 1995, p. 4), consisting of recurring
statements, conversation topics, expressions of feelings or opinions. Alone these units
may seem meaningless however when combined within a theme it is possible to view a
comprehensive picture of the area under exploration. Following the initial generation
of themes, the data was re-read to review each theme against the coded items and
the entire data set, making the analysis iterative in nature. Once the themes were
generated from the data and reviewed, existing literature and documentation available
to the author was interwoven into the findings to facilitate comprehension of the results.
The factors identified from the analysis are presented in order of occurrence within
the air defence task. Quotes from domain experts are presented alongside each factor
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to allow the reader to judge the veracity of analysis and to provide contextual under-
standing into the domain area.
3.5 Results
Figure 3.2: Overview of the three high-level stages of the Air Defence Task and the
factors that influence decision-making derived from the data analysis
3.5.1 Air defence task
Analysis of SME responses revealed three key stages and the factors (cognitive, ambient
and organisational) that impact upon each stage of the air defence task (depicted in
Figure 3.2). Each of these stages will now be discussed in more detail.
3.5.2 Observe
Table 3.2 depicts the decisional requirements for the first stage of the air defence task -
Observe. This stage is principally concerned with the fusion of data from the available
sensors (e.g. radar, sonar etc.) and feeds directly into Stage 2 - Identify and Classify.
It is only possible for Stage 2 to occur, if aircraft or objects (airbases etc.) are detected
within the vicinity of the ship/task group.
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Table 3.5: Decision requirements table for Stage 1 of the Air Defence Task (ADT)-
Observe (adapted from template provided in Militello and Klein (2013))
Decision
require-
ment
Why difficult /
procedural errors
Critical cues Expert strategies
Classify
tracks;
develop
RAP
i Information
avaliability
i Limitations of in-
formation sources
i Information
overload
i Information
ambiguity
i Civilian
traffic
patterns
(e.g.
location
of airlanes)
i Locations of
civilian and
military
aerodromes
i Daily mis-
sions flown
in vicinity
i “What will be the
daily missions
flows...including
locations of friendly
airbases and any
patrol areas or air
corridors”
i “Put in requests to
discover where air-
craft have been for-
ward deployed to re-
search aircraft flying
patterns”
i “The [information
overlay] is fine for
traditional informa-
tion (radar, ESM
etc) but poor for the
increasingly common
forms of written
intelligence”
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Fusion of data from multiple sources to build the Recognised Air Pic-
ture (RAP)
Operators are required to understand data from a number of sources (e.g. commercial
flight profiles, radar, and track characteristics) pushing their cognitive capacity to its
limits:
Range of factors are considered that may be important; track point of origin,
flight profile (e.g. heading, speed, altitude, rate of climb or descent), IFF
modes and codes, associated EM emissions, non/conformance with published
airlines (civ) ACMs (mil). By assessing these criteria most tracks will
likely be able to be identified, and any requiring further investigation quickly
flagged up.
The groundwork behind building the Recognised Air Picture (RAP) consists of the
effective fusion of these data sources (providing level 1 SA) to produce a valid air picture:
“We need to monitor all [aircraft] periodically to ensure nothing has changed”. It is from
this picture (developing levels 2 and 3 SA) that all operational and tactical decisions
are made: “Establishing [a] valid RAP requires all tracks within [the] Surveillance Area
to be investigated and classified - This allows Command to take further action against
potentially hostile tracks”. Resulting in the crucial requirement that this picture is
accurate:
“Understand own and (potential) enemy strategic and operation intent.
Understand sub-tactical factors: missile capabilities etc. Understand own
and enemy information gathering, management and communication abili-
ties. Understand patterns of life and neutral interests and habits. Ensure
robust RAP with shared understanding.”
However, the data made available to operators is not always perfect: “You inevitably
have too much information to deal with yet not enough good information”, resulting in
inaccurate, missing or too much information being presented. The continued reference
from SME to information that ‘should’ be readily available highlights the potential
that, at times, this information may be unavailable to or indeed be missed by operators
impeding the decision-making process. This would result in the RAP developed not
being accurate, which could have fatal consequences for the crew and/or an ambiguous
track that is engaged.
A further complicating factor with the fusion of information is that pieces of in-
formation are often distributed among the whole air defence team (Nguyen, 2002) an
element also highlighted by SME: “Obtain additional information to back up the thought
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process. It will be in the Ops rooms somewhere but not shared!” This raises the role of
effective communication as a further element to the air defence task.
Information ambiguity and uncertainty
Uncertainty is a hugely important factor that impacts upon the decision-making pro-
cesses of the Air Defence team. Vast amounts of information must be fused and verified
on a constantly updating basis, yet, this information is not always complete or available
to the operators. In fact, operators are dealing with all four types of uncertainty pro-
posed by (Klein, 1998); missing information, unreliable information (i.e. low confidence
in the source of that information), ambiguous information and complex information.
Therefore, operators are required to build the RAP whilst dealing with and allowing for
many forms of uncertainty: “Is this an exercise or indications for readiness to attack?
If the later, are we in the right place? Would we survive the attack, can we best achieve
our mission in another way? How can we attack them?”.
The consequences of making an error or deciding on a course of action based on
incorrect or incomplete data can be fatal, adding additional pressure (i.e. the influence
of potential regret or accountability concerns) onto the decision-making process: “Need
to have a completely clear picture in case of engagement- cluttered or inaccurate pic-
ture will cloud judgement and probably result in incorrect engagements- if even needed
anyway”.
When asked how to deal with uncertainty one SME wrote:
“Refer to supervisory role in practical- e.g. [Air Warfare Officer] or if un-
available [Commanding Officer]- in order to ensure correct course of action.
If impractical (time v availability of individual) results in judgement call-
weighing up relative cost/benefit of differing courses of action against Com-
mand Aim. Consider ability/cost of reversing course of action and ensure
that authority is not exceeded. Unless done positively no action is the wrong
answer!”
Highlighting the importance of active decision making even when faced with uncer-
tainty, time pressures and constraints imposed by adhering to C2.
One way in which this uncertainty has been mediated, to some extent, is by the
employment of technology to aid with the assimilation of incoming data. Low level
processes have been automated allowing the operator to view and make judgements on
already partially fused data sources. For example, the Combat Management System
(CMS), which displays digitally processed radar and sonar data. However, it should be
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noted that operators must still make a series of decisions to categorise tracks that appear
on the CMS screen, into friendly, hostile or neutral. This categorisation is based on the
available information and used to produce the RAP from which operational, tactical
and strategic decisions are made.
3.5.3 Identify and Classify
“Does this contact pose a threat to our unit? Would investigate the contact
and interrogate the contact for emitter/IFF etc. Would try and establish
communications with the contact. Would use the radar for height and track-
ing - All this information would be passed to the task force.”
Table 3.6: Decision requirements table for Stage 2 of the ADT- Identify and Classify
Decision
require-
ment
Why difficult/
procedural errors
Critical cues Expert strategies
Classification
of tracks
i Information overload
i Information
ambiguity
i Time criticality
i Communications
i Limitations of infor-
mation sources
i Too many dis-
plays “clutters your
workspace and lim-
its your ability to
monitor the main
console as you are
turn[ing] to your
right or left work-
ing on a seperate
laptop” from addi-
tional standalone
equipment
i Inferring intent
i Civilian
traffic
patterns
i Locations of
civilian and
military
aerodromes
i Flight pro-
file and
behaviour
(e.g. alti-
tude, speed,
heading
etc.)
i “weighing up rela-
tive cost/benefit of
differing courses
of action against
Command Aim”
i “training (re-
flexes and pattern
recognition) and
thought (pre-
conceptions,
analysis)”
i “rely on my
training and un-
derstanding of the
threat posed to
my unit and act
accordingly”
i “an element of
gut feeling which
comes with time
and experience.”
i “clear up the pic-
ture”
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Table 3.6 depicts the decisional requirements for Stage 2 - Identify and Classify.
Closely linked to the capability built from Stage 1, the information available to
operators must now be understood in order to develop levels 2 and 3 SA; comprehen-
sion of the information and understanding of potential future states of the environment
(Endsley, 2015b). The development of the RAP, a task that overlaps Stages 1 and 2 of
the air defence task shows the gradual and iterative attainment of SA:
“Speed, heading and lack of friend indicators (e.g. incorrect modes/codes) are
likely to be most immediate indicators of suspect activity and will be correlated with
behavioural information”
“Difficult to discern intent without good understanding of local patterns of life- is
this a known en[emy] tactic or is it likely to be a civ light aircraft?”
Intent
It is not only a fusion of information that builds the RAP but also the identification of
the intent of each track observed within the surrounding area. How intent is inferred
has long been a topic of research. Mathematically, intent can be inferred from past ac-
tions and future goals. Roy et al. (2002) argue that intent is formed of interest/desires,
capabilities, vulnerabilities and opportunities. These factors must be evaluated in order
to establish the strengths and weaknesses of a plan, with the rational that the intent
of an object will be in accordance with a plan that holds more advantages than disad-
vantages. For instance, the risks of a certain course of action are lower or acceptable
in relation to the potential gains from such action. Information available to operators,
such as flight profile and behaviour are used to aid the inferring of intent. These the-
ories are based on the assumption that our actions are always rational, however, the
increasing complexity of warfare, including the use of tactics designed to mislead the
opposing force (such as spoofing), may result in plans and intentions not adhering to
rational schools of thought. As one SME highlighted: “Depending on enemy potential
missile load, climbing to 5000 feet may be higher than required for missile launch, mak-
ing them suddenly less threatening. Equally, if they have missiles needing to be launched
from that height, then [the] threat remains”.
Therefore, inferring intent within this domain remains a complex: “Low/slow flyer
present difficult challenge- difficult to discern intent without good understanding of local
patterns of life- is this a known en[emy] tactic or is it likely to be a civ[ilian] light air-
craft?”; flexible “Indication of enemy intent, derived from their movements and wider
intelligence.” and intuitive “What is the [aircrafts] intention? Is it coming to us or
60
something in our vicinity?” cognitive process that requires further exploration.
Intent of the operator’s own ship is also a factor during this process. Although, not
providing a source of uncertainty, the intent of the ship itself, i.e. its mission objectives,
must also be taken into account when conducting the air defence task. Mission objec-
tives link into the current operating ROE and will determine what possible actions are
available to deal with the current situation, and therefore must be incorporated into
the engagement plans under operation.
Expertise
One possible factor that can facilitate the process of inferring intent is the application
of experience and expertise: “There is also an element of gut feeling which comes with
time and experience. Training, training, training but be [sic] able to think on ones feet.”
NDM research has shown how experience provides practitioners with a knowledge base
from which to draw from when experiencing uncertainty, for example the use of pattern
matching identified by the Recognition Primed Decision making (RPD) model (Klein
et al., 2010). This knowledge base provides resilience (Hoffman et al., 2013) and also
facilitates the quick recognition of potential problems occurring (e.g. the rapid iden-
tification of a suspicious track). It is this knowledge base that arguably provides the
operator with the cognitive flexibility required to notice when a track is ‘acting out
of the ordinary’ and support shared cognition to enable team co-ordination without
explicit communication (Entin and Serfaty, 1999):
“Profile would be coherent with an ASM launch profile, would require consideration
against en[emy] capabilities and tactics e.g. weapon range, launch profiles etc.”
“Turning away at 15 miles may indicate missile release achieved. I would be very
interested in the predicted performance of my radar so I knew whether or not I would
have detected missile release”
Previous research found that US naval personnel were using recognitional strategies
to aid their decision making in 95% of cases (Kaempf et al., 1996). Further supporting
the role of expertise in facilitating effective decision making in complex environments.
Additionally, training and expertise can also mitigate against the derailment that can
occur with decision inerta:
“You react based on training (reflexes and pattern recognition) and thought (pre-
conceptions, analysis), on the basis that any decision is better than no decision.”
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This ability to appropriately direct attention and resources could be the difference
between noticing and neutralising a threat, preventing a fratricide incident or being hit
by the enemy. However, due to the reduction of first hand combat experience newly
qualified operators are exposed to, greater attention must be directed towards explor-
ing novel ways in which to provide operators with the benefits experience can provide.
For instance, the benefits of training in immersive simulation environments or the de-
velopment of tools that can aid with directing attention to certain data points or with
scheduling tasks.
3.5.4 Decide and Act
Table 3.7 depicts the decision requirements for the final stage of the air defence task-
Decide and Act:
Ok, things are hotting up now but still need to act within ROE. Need to
ensure force disposition is suitable to match threat activity but do not neces-
sarily want to give away too much of own activity- Consider force movement
to reduce likelihood of simultaneous attack - give all units time to take each
threat in turn rather than fight all at once. Remain conscious of mission
and political task. Review force sector assignments and ensure protection
provided to high value assets.
Capability
Throughout the task operators must remain aware of their ships’ capability whilst
simultaneously continually updating the RAP and their own (and team) situational
awareness: “Have weapons been fired at me?... If weapons are fired they may not be
detected until at very close range, preparations should assume they have been fired and
be started at the earliest engagement opportunity”.
This capability will feed into the potential decisions available to the team depending
on the type of threat faced, for example using a helicopter as opposed to a fixed wing
aircraft to make contact with an unidentified track. However the SME also highlights
their awareness of the limited engagement capability this would leave them with should
the helicopter need to take such actions: “Difficult to achieve intercept with friendly
aircraft due to profile however should be attempted. Use of helicopter may be more
practical (although limited engagement options)”.
This shows that, in addition to their own capability, that of the enemy’s must also
be taken into consideration alongside any actions decided upon (e.g. what weapon
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Table 3.7: Decision requirements table for Stage 3 of the ADT- Decide and Act
Decision
require-
ment
Why difficult /
procedural errors
Critical cues Expert strategies
Classification
of tracks
i ROE
considerations
i Own
capabilities
(soft or hard
kill options)
i Enemy
capabilities
(if known)
i Pk and Ps val-
ues
i Political
Policy
Indicator
i Mission
Objectives
i Boundaries
of territorial
waters
/airspace
i
Communication
with Task
Group
Comman-
der/Headquarters
i “Potentially call aircraft
on radio if permitted”
i “Robust application
of ROE will require
good understanding
of force disposition-
e.g. which airfract are
weapon carriers, what
range weapons can be
launched, what targeting
is required for different
weapon systems”
i “Robust comms and
passing of SA to other
units key, need to en-
sure they feel confident
T45 can conduct rapid
engagement without risk
to force if necessary”
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system may the enemy be carrying, what range, number of missiles etc.). The Prob-
ability of Success (Ps) and Probability of Kill (Pk) values have long been referred to
within the literature in relation to optimising automated threat assessment systems
(Bard, 1981). Each engagement plan must take into consideration these variables in
order to develop the plan which allows the greatest likelihood of mission success and
probability of escaping harm. When facing multiple threats, this probability may not
equal 100%, therefore the Command Team are, again, acting under uncertainty with
the added stress of facing a potentially fatal situation. Understanding the enemy’s and
their own capabilities is vital to help reduce some of this uncertainty as is the require-
ment for operators to be cognitively flexible: “[As] full an understanding as possible of
en[emy] forces and disposition, e.g. number of units and weapons carried- allocation of
sufficient weapons to defend against threat”.
Constant re-evaluation of the situation is still required once an action is taken in
order to evaluate that action and re-form a plan based upon that evaluation. If an
action fails the first time (e.g. the soft-kill action failed to deceive the enemy or the
missile misses the target) the team must decide whether to fire again, to try a different
manoeuver or to double check that the track is indeed an enemy missile or aircraft:
“Minimise weapon expenditure- need to be here a while? Ensures safety of own and
civil aircraft”.
Rules of Engagement (ROE)
Although some low-level processes have been successfully automated, facilitating deci-
sions made within the air defence task and the operators’ daily tasks, there remains
reticence to move automated functions up the chain of command. This reticence is
potentially due to accountability concerns and the ability to ensure ROE are satisfied
and adhered too:
“To determine if an engagement may be warranted in order to defend the force. ROE
may require positive (visual) ID, additionally friendly aircraft may deter aggressors.
ROE owner will require full narrative to enable decisions/delegation of ROE as re-
quired.”
“Robust application of ROE will require good understanding of force disposition- e.g.
which aircraft are weapon carriers, what range weapons can be launched, what targeting
is required for different weapon systems”.
These concerns may also underpin the reticence of the operators themselves to
utilise the systems they currently have available to them. However, there is also an
opposing drive to continue to utilise automated systems due to the benefit and support
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they can, when utilised effectively, provide the operator.
Better use could be made of automated systems to apply e.g. ID CRIT, with
machine learning used to enhance accuracy. E.g. rather than classifying
tracks manually, the system could suggest IDs for the operator to approve
or veto and the system could refine its algorithms based on this feedback.
Similar automation could be applied to identifying potentially suspect tracks,
Would require operator supervisions due to ROE issues.
It should be noted that no responses suggested a move towards complete automa-
tion at any stage of the air defence task. Arguably, such a complex task in which ROE
are paramount, will always require a human element.
3.6 Discussion
This research presents detailed accounts from domain experts of the air defence task
conducted by RN personnel in Type 45 Destroyers operating in littoral environments.
As the spectrum of threats and the range of enemy tactics increase in complexity, the
capability of our forces must continue to be extended, arguably through the synergistic
collaboration between man and machine. The principles of NDM have been applied
with this research to elicit detailed understanding of the current cognitive, ambient and
organisational factors behind decision making during the air defence task. A descriptive
phased model of decision making is presented providing the groundwork to explore the
potential for new automated systems to be adopted.
The three stages of the air defence task are presented: Observe; Identify and Clas-
sify; and Decide and Act. It should however, be noted that the phases are not linear
but iterative, with each phase building upon the previous. Conceptually, the task is
cyclical in nature, with operations occurring at each stage simultaneously (see Figure
3.3), mirroring the SAFE-T model of decision making proposed by van den Heuvel
et al. (2012). For instance, building the RAP is a continual process that occurs as
SA (Situation Assessment phase) is passed throughout the crew and up the chain of
command. Command will then make decisions (Plan Formation phase, F) and order
actions (Plan Execution phase, E) based on the continually updating the RAP. Follow-
ing each decision and action the cycle returns to the beginning, re-evaluating the new
current state of play (Team Learning phase, T).
Derailments from this decision process occur, primarily due to the sheer volume of
information that operators must process and which places RN personnel under extreme
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cognitive load. The difficulty of a task is driven by the volume of information needed to
be processed, not necessarily the complexity of that information (Sweller et al., 2011).
However, air defence operators are not only dealing with large volumes of information,
but also with the complexity of that information (i.e. the ambiguous nature of the
available information and uncertainty surrounding inferring intent). Nevertheless, it
should be noted that RN operators have been performing this complex task for decades
and the ability of a well-trained and experienced operator to perform this task is not
in question. What is of concern is that with the increasingly complex threats that our
military face in terms of new enemy tactics and weaponry, the amount of information
present during theatre is rapidly increasing and at times moves beyond the ability of
any human to process in the required time available (Benaskeur et al., 2008).
Fusion of 
data 
sources
SA 
(development 
of RAP)
Plan Formation
(what are the ROE, what 
are the standard operating 
procedures, what are the 
ships’ current capabilities)
Plan 
Execution
(Select 
prioritise and 
execute tactics)
Team 
Learning
Pattern 
Recognition
Pattern 
Matching
Effects of 
actions
Pattern 
Matching
Pattern 
Recognition
Consequences
Effects of 
consequences 
new dynamics
Contacts 
tracking in 
vicinity
Investigation 
& 
Interrogation 
Figure 3.3: SAFE-T Model of decision making adapted to the air defence task (basic
model structure from van den Heuval, Alison & Crego, 2012)
Similarly, to the findings of Kaempf et al. (1996), the research described here indi-
cates that operators are working within constantly shifting environments, requiring the
updating of SA, achieved primarily through gathering and sensemaking of information
available within the operations room. Arguably, the main task conducted within air
defence operations is the building of the RAP. Decisions made beyond this stage (e.g.
should a threat be engaged? how should such engagement take place?) are procedural
in nature since ROE and standard operating procedures must be followed. Personnel
highlighted the importance of transparency of decision making rationales in order for
ROE to be complied with, systems that play a role in decisions that must adhere to
ROE will therefore need to function in a transparent manner.
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Do Holt’s recommendations remain relevant today?
As mentioned in the introduction Holt identified four areas that would benefit from
the application of automated decision support systems. These areas include, aiding the
allocation of ‘soft kill’ countermeasures, force TEWA, long range threat allocation and
performance monitoring of the air defence team. The responses from SME presented
in this chapter highlight that these areas are still of importance for modern naval op-
erations. The formulation of engagement plans must take into consideration the use of
‘soft kill’ countermeasures and ‘hard kill’ weapons, for instance, how many resources
are on the ship and what is the knock-on impact of using a countermeasure. When
travelling as a Force, these engagement plans must account for the movements and
capabilities of all vessels in that force, for instance, would releasing a ‘soft-kill’ coun-
termeasure to protect the asset move the threat onto another vessel? Communication
between individuals and teams (at Force level) can if effective facilitate the development
of SA or if ineffective become a barrier to the development of distributed SA thereby
impacting upon decisions made. Research has been focusing on how automated sys-
tems can support these areas, for example CORALS (Benaskeur et al., 2011). However,
how operators interact with and how these systems support personnel in operational
environments requires further attention from research.
Limitations
Due to the limited access to SME it was decided to adapt the CDM interview to a
questionnaire format. Interview methods are subjective, and although there is a semi-
structured plan with CDM, no two interviews will be exactly the same. Therefore,
adapting the CDM interview into a vignette survey produced a standardised data col-
lection method for this study. The application of an online vignette survey also removed
the influence of interviewer bias, therefore all responses were driven from participants
and were not influenced by having an interviewer present. It is however acknowledged
that survey responses may not elicit as much detailed information as an interview
would, nor would allow for elaboration on any salient points that are raised within
responses. Nonetheless, as the aim of this study was to explore and elicit knowledge
from domain experts (and with restricted access to such experts) it was deemed that
an online survey was a suitable method from which to gain valuable insight from SME.
NDM applications enable depth of understanding from small samples. However, the
small sample of this work is acknowledged as a limitation. This limitation is somewhat
mitigated by the level of detail provided by each expert providing a small, yet rich, data
set. The limited availability of experts in this field was a further barrier to collecting a
larger sample size for this study.
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Although rich qualitative data was gained from SME it is acknowledged that ques-
tionnaire responses may not completely reflect operations when personal are at sea, and
critically within hostile environments. It may be that, like van den Heuvel et al. (2012)
discovered, in practice the decision phases do not occur in a linear cycle, stages are
sometimes skipped or those stages occur in a differing order. It is therefore proposed
that this study provides a starting point from which further research (utilising obser-
vational and live simulation data) can build upon. Future research should also explore
if the phase-decision model presented here holds true during both times of peace and
of war.
Finally, with hindsight it is acknowledged that thematic analysis may not have been
the most appropriate method of analysis for this study. As the findings strongly support
prior models that have been developed to depict the air defence task and due to the
author having an awareness of these models during the data collection and analysis,
it is not possible to pull apart if the analysis was discovering an artefact of previous
literature or a truism. With all research there is a balance that must be struck between
using the most appropriate analysis method for the data whilst also considering the
experience and skills the researcher has. As discussed in Chapter 2 utilising mixed-
methods requires the researcher to draw on prior experience with certain methods
to reduce the potential impact lack of skill with certain forms of method or analysis
may have. The author of this thesis had primarily used thematic analysis in prior
research and applied this analysis method to this study, however if this study were to
be conducted again it is suggested that an alternative data analysis method be used,
for example content analysis.
3.6.1 Conclusions
This chapter sort to explore the decision stages of the air defence task that serving
personnel experienced. Presented is a detailed overview of the air defence task, up-
dating historic research and confirming that the high-level stages of the air defence
task (Observe, Identify and Classify, Decide and Act) remain. Naval personnel are still
operating in highly complicated, time pressured and critical environments. The intro-
duction of automated systems at low levels, for example personnel no longer observing
raw radar and sonar data, has reduced some of the technical pressure of the task but
arguably has not reduced the volume of information that personnel must process as
individuals and teams in order to make effective air defence decisions. The findings
from this chapter fed directly into the development of ARCS, providing the researcher
with domain specific knowledge that was crucial in informing the design of ARCS to
be ecologically valid.
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Principally, the same areas that Holt identified in 1988 that could benefit from
automation remain the same. Which raises questions on the focus and impact of au-
tomated decision support development and procurement. Is it that systems have been
developed and are not used appropriately, thereby not providing the support to per-
sonnel? Or are the systems that have been developed not fit for purpose and therefore
do not support personnel in these key areas? The following chapter presented in this
thesis provides answers to these questions.
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Chapter 4
On the bridges: insight into the
current and future use of
automated systems as seen by
Royal Navy personnel.
4.1 Abstract
This chapter explores the current state of automated systems and how they are used in
the Royal Navy (RN), as well as exploring where personnel view systems would have
the most benefit to their day-to-day operations in the future. Additionally, personnel’s
views on the current consultation process for new systems are presented. Currently
serving RN personnel (N =46) completed an online questionnaire distributed at the
Maritime Warfare School. Thematic analysis was conducted on the 5125 words that
were generated by personnel. Results show that RN personnel understand the require-
ment to utilise automated systems in order to maintain capability in the increasingly
complex environments they face. This requirement will increase as future warfare con-
tinues to change and increasingly sophisticated threats are faced. However, it was
highlighted that current consultation and procurement procedures often result in new
automated systems that are not fit for purpose at time of release. This has nega-
tive consequences on operator tasks, for example by increasing workload, and reducing
appropriate system use, as well as increasing financial costs associated with the new
systems. It is recommended that an increase in communication and collaboration be-
tween currently serving personnel and system designers may result in preventing the
release of systems that are not fit for purpose.
4.2 Introduction
This chapter builds upon the previous, presenting unique insights from currently serv-
ing RN personnel. This section explores where automated systems are currently in use
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by RN personnel when at sea and where current personnel view future developments to
progress. Additionally, this chapter presents an understanding of the level of involve-
ment between system designers and current personnel, answering the question of if
RN personnel are included in the consultation and development stages of new systems.
Therefore, the aims of this chapter are as follows:
(i) Present the literature on current use of automated systems in military contexts
(ii) Outline the future visions of the RN for 2025 and 2045
(iii) Present qualitative findings on where automation is currently in use, how RN
personnel view this use to evolve in future operations and the level of involvement
current RN personnel have with system development
(iv) Discuss the results with reference to the literature and current doctrine, and to
provide recommendations
Recently, an increase in use of automated systems within the RN has been seen
(Royal Navy, nd). This is due to increasing operational complexity across all military
environments (Benaskeur et al., 2011), combined with a decrease in available man-
power. A wealth of literature already exists exploring the ways in which automated
systems can increase operational capabilities for example see, Dzindolet et al. (2001);
Ro¨ttger et al. (2009); St. John et al. (2005). However, in their review on the social,
cognitive and motivational factors that influence automation reliance, Dzindolet et al.
(2010) found that highly reliable automation does not always lead to performance im-
provements. This suggests that socio-technical systems, where humans and machines
work collaboratively (Hoffman and Militello, 2012), are highly complex and require
researchers to explore multiple factors that underpin the efficiency of such systems.
In the July Task Force Report published by the Department of Defence (Murphy
and Shields, 2012), automated systems are argued to extend and complement human
capability, not to replace it. Similarly, one vital aspect of RN Rules of Engagement
(ROE) is that a human remains in the decision-making loop. Therefore, personnel
across all military platforms are having to adapt their roles to become supervisors to
automated systems. Research has shown the derailments that can occur with this job
role transition; namely loss of situational awareness, ‘out-of-the-loop’ phenomena (End-
sley and Kiris, 1995) and loss of manual skill (Casner et al., 2014). The introduction
of adaptive automated systems is posited to prevent these derailments from occurring
(Parasuraman and Wickens, 2008). However, of vital importance for the development of
appropriate adaptive automated systems is to fully understand the job role or decision
process that the automated system will become a part of. The Tactical Decision Mak-
ing Under Stress (TADMUS) programme is one example of a comprehensive research
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project that aimed to develop decision making aids for low-intensity conflict (Cannon-
Bowers and Salas, 1998; Cohen et al., 1997; Driskell and Johnston, 1998; Johnston
et al., 1998; Riffenburgh, 1991). Decision centred design has also provided researchers
with a repository of methods that can be used to elicit knowledge and domain under-
standing from expert practitioners (Crandall et al., 2006). This knowledge can then
be leveraged to develop adaptive and effective automated systems that operate along-
side their human counterparts. As Militello and Klein (2013) argue “design approaches
that are insensitive to expertise run the risk of creating designs that interfere with the
development and application of skills” (p261).
4.2.1 Current doctrine around automated systems
The Navy is a versatile force, reflected in the domains the RN is required to operate
in: above water, underwater, mine countermeasures and land and littoral manoeuvres.
There are three core roles that the RN fulfils, war-fighting, maritime security and inter-
national engagement (Ministry of Defence, 2011). War-fighting consists of being ready
for engagement at sea or from the sea, maritime security encompasses protection of
the lawful and safe use of the sea where UK prosperity and security is concerned, and
international engagement relates to the promotion of UK interests through the develop-
ment of international partnerships. Open source British Maritime Doctrine (Ministry
of Defence, 2011) does not specifically mention the use of automated systems to support
the RN in performing its functions. However, looking specifically at decision making
within the UK military, caution is voiced about the failure of automated systems and
that automation cannot make decisions based on intuition and empathy. The doctrine
cites that, “Human involvement in the analysis process is thus an enduring require-
ment” (Ministry of Defence, 2010, p. 1-5). The 5th edition of British Maritime Doctrine
has been recently published and therefore with the increasing speed of technological
development it is highly likely that the use of automated systems within the maritime
environment is discussed within.
Good decision making is required to succeed in combat, and information superior-
ity is necessary to making good decisions. This superiority can be achieved by timely
and accurate information (Ministry of Defence, 2011), appropriate strategy develop-
ment and prosecution, well-trained and calibrated teams, and facilities that are fit for
purpose (Larken, 2002). Automated systems are now inherently part of the facilities
that support good decision making. However, a recent review highlighted that current
automated systems can provide more capabilities than operators can understand or
use (Strauch, 2017). This can result in increasing operator workload if automation
performs unexpectedly (Kaber et al., 2006) - coined as “automation surprises” (Sarter
et al., 1997) which have been associated with decreasing acceptance of automated sys-
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tems (Ghazizadeh et al., 2012; Woods, 2016). Therefore, one way in which to extend
operators understanding of the functionality of automated systems is to include them
in the design and development process. The Athena project in the US is a forum de-
signed to facilitate sailors in the US Navy to put forward their ideas to improve Navy
operations and Command. This form of open communication between Navy person-
nel, academics and industrial partners is argued to create forward thinking sailors for
the “Fleet of tomorrow” (“The Athena Project”, 2013). However, this organisational
support for open communication is not common globally (Elgafoss et al., 2009).
4.2.2 Future visions of 2025 and 2045
Increasing use of automated and unmanned systems is occurring and will continue as
technology develops and becomes cheaper. However, military decision making is pro-
posed to remain the remit of human personnel, primarily for ethical reasons (Ministry
of Defence, 2014). The financial investments required to develop new automated and
unmanned systems or robots combined with the defence budget restrictions will mean
that most developments will occur in commercial settings (Ministry of Defence, 2014).
In the next 10 years the RN is intending to bring into service new Wildcat and Merlin
helicopters, a second Queen Elizabeth class carrier and Type 26 Global combat ships.
However, there are concerns around the length of time required for these new platforms
to be fully operational (Newson, 2016).
Additionally, the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review pledged to increase
the RN/Royal Marines (RM) manpower to 30,450 by 2020. At the time of this pledge
the RN/RM manpower stood at 29,710 (Newson, 2016). This number has steadily
declined since then, with the Ministry of Defence statistics of 1st October 2017 show-
ing 29,280 RN/RM personnel in service (Ministry of Defence, 2017). This deficit in
manpower results in the greater need for automated systems to fill the gap, working
collaboratively with personnel in increasingly technical socio-technical systems.
The highest ranked country for military expenditure is the USA, in 2016 investing
$611 billion (Tian et al., 2017). This relatively sustained level of funding has allowed
the United States to invest in large scale research projects, for example TADMUS,
allowing close collaborative working relationships to develop between academic organi-
sations and branches of the military. This collaboration is also seen across the aviation
industry, with the Federal Aviation Authority including human factors research into
their national plan (Johnston and McDonald, 2017). However, identified by Krueger
(2012) is the requirement for the US to “master the correct mix of manpower staffing
and personnel skills required for development of the new generation of naval vessels
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that envision operating with significantly reduced manning rosters” (p238). Therefore,
although the RN could explore developing concepts created in the US, for example the
Athena Project, the US could also learn from the RN who have been operating with
limited manpower for several years.
It is therefore important to explore the current state of automated systems and how
they are used in the RN, as well as to explore where personnel view systems would have
the most benefit to their day-to-day operations in the future. Additionally, this chapter
explores if current RN personnel are consulted in the procurement of new systems, what
their views are on the current consultation process and the impact this has (if any) on
their daily use of automated systems.
4.3 Method
4.3.1 Participants
Data was collected from N =46 Royal Navy personnel via a gatekeeper at Dstl sec-
onded to the Maritime Warfare Center (MWC). MWC operates at HMS Collingwood,
the Royal Navy’s largest training establishment. The Maritime Warfare School (MWS)
delivers training on all operational areas covered by the RN, for example in weapon
engineering, sea survival and chemical biological radiation nuclear and damage control.
MWS is part of the Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) organisation and aims “to train
Officers and Ratings for the Fleet who are ready to fight and win.” (Royal Navy., nd).
A range of training courses for personnel at various stages of their careers are held
throughout the year at MWS. This is reflected in the sample of RN personnel who
completed the questionnaire. The variation between participants in their previous job
roles, their current roles and the amount of time spent at sea provides a comprehensive
picture of the opinions of RN personnel at various stages of their careers. Access to
this data was enabled by the author developing a close working relationship with the
gatekeepers at Dstl. Following previous collaboration (see previous chapter), several
meetings were held to present the planned research as well as making sure all appro-
priate channels were observed. For instance, the study received ethical approval from
the University of Liverpool and MoDREC (Protocol No: 785/MoDREC/16). With the
gatekeeper on board with the project it was then possible to get approval from the
appropriate persons at MWC and MWS to ensure that the questionnaire was passed
out to all relevant SMEs.
4.3.2 Materials
Prospective participants were given the questionnaire pack (Appendix Two) which
contained the information sheet explaining the purpose of the study, the consent form
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and all sections of the questionnaire (see Table 4.1). This method of distribution
allowed each participant to take 24 hours before deciding to take part in the study. To
acknowledge their consent each participant was asked to sign the consent form before
completing the questionnaire. Section A asked participants to provide basic descriptive
details on age, sex, current job role, previous job roles and time spent at each, length
of time spent at sea during their career and how long it has been since they were
last at sea. Section B consisted of 6 open-ended questions designed to identify where
automated or semi-automated systems are currently being used in service (questions 3
& 4), where current personnel see automated systems being used in future operations
(questions 1 & 2), and their level of involvement in the procurement of new systems or
tools (questions 5 & 6). Table 4.2 displays each question included in full.
Table 4.1: Sections included in the questionnaire pack for Stage 2
Section A Demographics
Section B Qualitative questions
Table 4.2: Qualitative questions included in RN personnel questionnaire battery in
Stage 2
1 In your opinion, do you see automated tools/systems having a role in
future naval operations?
2 If so, where do you see such tools/systems having the most benefit and
why?
3 During your time spent at sea or during training, how often did you
interact with and utilise automated tools or systems? (i.e. daily, weekly,
monthly, once etc.)
4 What were the tools you used and how did they aid your operations?
5 Have you ever been consulted in the development of new tools/systems
prior to their release into operational use?
6 What are your views on the consultation of current and future per-
sonnel during the design and development stages of new automated
tools/systems?
4.3.3 Analysis
Thematic analysis was conducted upon the data, supported by using NVivo 11 soft-
ware. Chapter 3 describes the stages of analysis in full. However, in brief all the data
was read and re-read to generate initial codes. These codes were then collated into
potential themes. The next stage involved reviewing these themes in relation to the
coded extracts and the entire data set to judge their veracity. Each theme was then
defined and named before creating the final report of the analysis.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Participants
A total of N =46 RN Subject Matter Experts (SME) completed the questionnaire. One
SME requested to withdraw from the study, leaving n=45. The majority of participants
were aged between 25-34 years, ranging from 24 to 54 years. Most of the sample were
males (n= 38) and two SME declined to provide their age or gender. Number of years
of service ranged from 32 years to 4 years 5 months, on average SME had 11 years’
experience. Time spent at sea also ranged between SME, from 480 days to 17 years.
Time since last at sea on average was 19 months (excepting the two SME who had
more recently been at sea, 2 days and 10 days prior to completing the questionnaire),
and ranged from 2 days to 15 years. Table 4.3 presents a selection of SME current and
previous job roles.
Table 4.3: Examples of SME current job roles and previously held roles within RN
Examples of Current Job Roles Examples of Previous Job Roles
Officer in charge of Advanced Warfare
Training
Engineering Officer
Warfare Officer Officer of the Watch
Principal Warfare Officer Training Stu-
dent
Navigator
Electronic Warfare Specialist Gunnery Officer
Fighter Controller Commanding Officer
N.B to preserve anonymity of participants the current job roles presented do not match to
the previous roles presented.
4.4.2 Within subject differences
Chi-squared analysis revealed no significant associations between age, gender, time in
RN, time since last at sea and the number of coded references for each theme that
emerged from the data. Conceptualising the level of detail provided by each expert
by the number of words included in the coded references it was possible to explore
the similarities between experts that provided the most details. Taking the top five
contributors to each theme, 4 of the 5 were aged between 25-34 years, with three of
those four having had 10-15 years’ experience in the RN and had been at sea in the
last 6-12 months.
4.4.3 Questionnaire
A total of 5125 words were generated by SME for the six questions contained in Section
B of the questionnaire pack. Initial line by line coding created 272 nodes. These nodes
were then analysed using thematic analysis in NVivo11 to identify emerging themes.
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Themes were articulated around the four research questions: 1) What are the current
areas of operation that utilise automation/semi-automated systems, 2) Where do RN
personnel view automated systems being used in future operational environments, 3)
to explore the level of engagement between practitioners and system developers, and 4)
to explore current RN personnel opinions of the consultation process. Quotes presented
throughout the results are taken directly from SME responses to allow the reader to
judge the veracity of the themes that emerged. Where words are underlined this reflects
the emphasis placed by the SME on certain words or phrases. Where text was illegible
[. . . ] will symbolise the omitted words.
4.4.4 Results summary
Figure 4.1: Superordinate view of current use of automated systems in RN derived
from the data analysis
Figure 4.1 depicts a superordinate view of the themes that emerged from thematic
analysis of the data. Themes are shown articulated around the identified positives and
negatives of automated system use and how the consultation process impacts upon
this. Overall SME were positive towards the use of automation citing the increase in
capability that is obtained through system use. Further, currently serving RN per-
sonnel highlighted the increasing requirement to utilise automated systems across all
domains of the RN. Future operations will inherently involve increasingly technical
socio-technical teams. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that new systems are
developed to be fit for purpose at time of release into service. However, the current
lack of consultation of SME results in automated systems that are not fit for purpose
at time of release. This negatively impacts upon the ability for systems to support
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personnel and increase capability, instead the introduction of these systems increases
the workload of personnel. Additionally, further financial costs are then endured to
fix the operational problems with the system. SME highlighted the values of including
current serving personnel in the consultation and procurement process. Collaboration
and the knowledge transfer that ensues would enable systems to be built fit for purpose
at release date thus increasing capability as they are designed with the current needs
of personnel in mind.
4.4.5 Inter-rater reliability
A commonly used statistical method to analyse inter-rater reliability is Cohen’s kappa,
which determines the level of agreement between the primary and secondary coder. The
secondary coder was blind to all research questions and was given 10% of the coded
references to categorise. There were eight categories that the coder could classify a
quote into and a single quote could belong to multiple categories. Therefore, kappa
statistic was run for each category providing a range of inter-rater reliability scores.
It is commonly cited that kappa statistics of 0.00-0.20 indicate slight agreement, 0.21-
0.40 indicate fair agreement, 0.41-0.60 indicate moderate agreement, 0.61-0.80 indicate
substantial agreement and 0.81-1.00 indicate almost perfect agreement (Landis and
Koch, 1977). Figure 4.2 presents the inter-rater reliability for each identified theme.
Theme Subtheme Kappa statistic Level of agreement
Capability
Sensor
κ = .052 (95% CI, 0.13 to 0.44), p < .793
Slight agreement
Personnel
κ = .182 (95% CI, -0.14 to 0.49), p < .269
Tactical decision making
κ = .505 (95% CI, 0.14 to 0.87), p < .013
Moderate agreementWeapons systems
κ = .466 (95% CI, 0.08 to 0.85), p < .021
Safety
Navigation
κ = .582 (95% CI, 0.16 to 1.00), p < .006
Caution
κ = .792 (95% CI, 0.52 to 1.06), p < .000
Substantial agreementFinancial
κ = .773 (95% CI, 0.48 to 1.07), p < .000
System Design
κ = .645 (95% CI, 0.01 to 1.28), p < .001
Figure 4.2: Inter-rater reliability for each theme
4.4.6 Current operational use of automated systems
A total of 223 nodes (consisting of approximately 4,120 words) emerged from the data
when exploring research questions one and two. Current use accounted for 25.6% of
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the total quotes identified, future use accounted for 54.3%. From the two questions
discussing current tool use two themes emerged, capability (16.6% of total quotes)
and safety (8.5%). Within future use four themes emerged from the data, capability
(32.3%), safety (11.2%), financial (6.3%) and system design (4.5%).
It emerged from the data that automated systems are currently in operation across
all aspects of the maritime operational environment, as one expert wrote automated
systems are “inherent to operating/living on a ship”. This is in line with the current re-
quirement to better understand how humans interact with varying levels of automated
systems. SME identified currently used operational tools that increase RN capability
across all four of the domains covered by RN operations; above water, underwater,
mine countermeasures and land and littoral manoeuvre. Therefore, the main theme
to emerge from the data related to increasing capability. For example, NAUTIS the
name of the Command and Control (C2) system that controls equipment and combat
systems that enable mine countermeasure missions to be conducted with increased ac-
curacy and reduced risk to RN personnel. One such autonomous underwater vehicle
mentioned by participants is Remus 100, which is a “survey system [that] identified bot-
tom contacts for investigation by divers removing requirement to risk ship proceeding
through hazard area to conduct mine countermeasures”; “The vehicle would transit to a
contact unaided by the operator saving battery time and achieving more accurate assess-
ment of underwater contacts”. Additionally, sensor capabilities currently support the
development of situational awareness, as one expert wrote they “improved our under-
standing of a theatre”, across both underwater and above water domains, “Automated
picture compilation on radar systems, Computer aided classification system on sonars”.
However, the data also highlighted how several of these systems are not currently
used to their full capacity. Referring to the command system in use in the operations
room one SME wrote that the command system “Also has many automated response
functions that are not currently used”. Another SME wrote about the lack of trust
in certain systems, “we therefore double our workload by continuing to do everything
manually as well”. These comments suggest that the human-automation interaction
that exists requires further exploration to continue to develop trust in available sys-
tems, as well as develop an understanding into how to more effectively utilise current
operational systems to their full extent. It is also worth noting the reference made by
SME to the continual adaptation of operators themselves when new systems are intro-
duced. Referring to mine countermeasure operations one SME stated that “once aware
of nuancey operators evolved their ability to employ the system”, another stated “The
art is knowing when to adjust these systems”. Suggesting that personnel are required to
continually adapt and expand their knowledge on the functioning of new systems after
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they have been introduced. This brings into consideration the training that personnel
receive prior to their deployment and, perhaps more importantly, continued training
whilst on tour, especially if a new system has been brought into service and is expected
to be used operationally at sea.
A second, smaller theme that emerged from the data centres around safety, of per-
sonnel and vessel(s). Most commonly mentioned was the use of automated navigation
systems, cited by 17 of the SME. Current navigation systems perform a range of func-
tions from “auto-pilot (heading keeping tool) on the bridge” to “WECDIS 1 Navigation
system- auto displays ships position and reduces chartwork burden”. Hazard warning
systems play a key role in the current makeup of automated systems in use. These
warning systems prevent collision of vessels, via the navigation components, and aid
with the maintenance of the ship(s). For example, “Automated damage controls system:
allow for greater situational awareness when fire & floods occur”.
Improved safety to personnel and vessel(s) arguably is a perceived benefit of adopt-
ing automated systems. Further benefits were identified by participants in their re-
sponses. For example reducing workload: “Combat management systems- reduce oper-
ator workload in managing the tactical picture”; aiding situation awareness: “Autopilot
on ship’s helm reduces helmsman steering burden to enhance visual outlook, AIS (Au-
tomatic Identification System) aided situational awareness with information displayed
on WECDIS navigation system automatically”; coping with reduced manpower: “Ma-
chinery controls systems- aided by reducing manpower requirements & safeguarding
equipment”; reducing time consuming tasks: “ECPINS 2 - massive reduction in time
spend fixing the ship, Radar- automated systems to automatically hook & track contacts
improves reaction time, especially in the air environment”; and supporting effective de-
cision making: “Automated ID of tracks within Command System. Currently increases
efficiency”.
4.4.7 Future operational use of automated systems
Participants identified increasing capability as the key theme when discussing future op-
erational use of automated systems. Four sub-themes emerged within this theme: sen-
sor capability, capability relating to personnel, tactical decision capability and weapon
system capability.
The increasing use of automated systems in future maritime operations will allow
the RN to “have the greatest operational & strategic effect on global influence”. Across
1Warship Electronic Chart Display & Information System
2A computerised navigational aid
81
the data set all participants referred to the critical role automation will continue to play
in RN operations; increasing capability in a number of ways. For example increasing
the speed at which tactical decisions can be made: “The speed of reactions required to
combat modern threats (esp missiles) is such that an automated system is likely to have
a better chance of defeating them in the future”; “in order to speed up processes and/or
reduce risk to personnel”; “Command systems and weapon systems require a degree of
automation otherwise the speed of response would not be sufficient to defeat threats”;
“Clausewitz said “A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a
greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is uncertain” - automation will allow
vast quantities of information to be presented for the average [human] to understand
in a rapid time frame”; reducing workload of personnel: “The capabilities of modern
weapon systems, and the numbers in which they can be deployed, creates an environ-
ment and threat profile that the human mind may be unable to process. We alone,
assess, classify, target, engage, as required, repeatedly over a prolonged period.”; “The
complexity of modern naval warfare can be made easier to exploit by utilising automated
systems to remove time consuming tasks away from individuals and allowing more time
for thought & decision making”; “In any part of the job as help for the operator in
order to reduce the workload by using such tools/systems to execute simple & repetitive
tasks”; increasing sensor capabilities: “the ability of our sensors to associate what may
appear to be background ‘noise’ to a human operator with a threat”; “Data manipu-
lation and processing in order to populate Command Systems with operational data”;
“To allow the operator the thinking time to make decisions on the information rather
than process it”, and greater automation within weapon systems: “Multiple drones vs
a single shipborne helicopter”; “Radars and weapon systems: more effective and poten-
tially make process quicker”; “Automated systems will play an essential role in future
warfare when it comes to kinetic action and self defence”.
Woven into discussions of capability is the second theme of safety. This theme in-
corporated the safety of the vessel: “Automated systems for navigation, for example,
are of great value to a bridge-watchkeeper- it allows them more time to think, act and
surveil”; “In peacetime, for maintaining safety at sea is of paramount importance in my
opinion using the example of WECDIS”; as well as safety with regards to personnel:
“automation is free from crew fatigue, can operate multiple systems from one platform
creating cost efficiency and reduce risk to personnel”; “Offboard systems enable com-
manders to de-risk operations by reducing the hazard to human force elements”; “Areas
where it is difficult for a human to work, such as underwater. A replacement for hu-
mans that are required for dangerous jobs or where a human cannot work fast enough
to complete the job”. Additionally, SME showed an awareness of the caution that must
be applied with the use of automated systems. As one SME wrote, “Of course there
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is danger in relying heavily on technology”. Other experts referred to the requirement
that automated systems be “properly tested to ensure that accuracy is maintained and
trusted”, as well as the fundamental need for “the human [to have] the final veto” to
ensure that current ROE are observed; “I do not believe that we will remove the ‘human
factor’ in any of our lethal/non-lethal strike options until AI is much more advanced”;
“there will still need to be a human decision maker in the chain (particularly the ‘kill-
chain’)”; “There will always be a requirement for human-interface when judgement is
required. i.e. we could kill the enemy but should we?”.
A smaller theme to emerge from the data set were comments relating to system
design. SME referred to automated systems “accuracy is improving all the time” and
showed acknowledgement of the prevalence of “more sophisticated systems increasing”.
However, it was again highlighted by the SME that caution should be taken with util-
ising automated systems. As one SME wrote, “they can simplify highly complex sets
of options to provide a smaller selection. They can process a lot of information quickly
& present useful results. They can also remove too much information e.g. genuine
contacts on radar not displayed due to automated processing”. Suggesting a level of
awareness from SME of the capacity and limitations of current technology. Addition-
ally, for newly developing automated systems to be utilised in the field effectively the
reliability of the systems needs to improve, as well as training around what the system
is capable of, how it functions and how the operators can supervise the functionalities
of the system.
A second smaller theme also emerged from the data with comments relating to
financial pressures on the RN. SME are highly aware of the current reduction in man-
power, “The overarching intent in the naval service of automation is to reduce the
manpower overhead resulting in shrinking organisational mass”; “the significant man-
power issues being experienced, automated tools and systems provide options for lean
manning in the future”;“[automated systems] can process large quantities of informa-
tion & cannot be killed, nevermind, are cheaper than the wage bill”; “with the lack of
manpower in the RN, I am sure a greater reliability will be on automated services”,
and the impact this has on the requirement to employ automated systems to maintain
operational capability.
4.4.8 Exploration of the level of engagement between practitioners
and system designers in the development of new automated
systems
Of the total number of SME included in this study (N =45), only eight had been
consulted in the development of a new system during their career. Table 4.4 presents the
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eight SME experiences in the consultation process. Highlighting the range of systems
SME were consulted on to improve the capability of RN operations. For example,
communication systems, mine countermeasures and navigational systems. This reflects
the range in experience SME who took part in this study had.
Table 4.4: Comments provided by the eight SME who had experience of being consulted
in the development of new systems. [. . . ] indicates where text was illegible
SME 2 “Most systems are not focused around the operator because they are pro-
cured by support branches (me/we). When I have been consulted the
translation of this feedback into changes have often been selective and
greater reflect the opinion of those procuring them. When I have had
the opportunity to procure kit myself to support operations the impact is
transient as the tactical development achieved cannot easily be fed back
into the organisation. The organisation has considerable change inertia
issues.”
SME 8 “Yes. I was a very small contributor to the ECPINS/NAV system for
HMS Queen Elizabeth Class in its very early stages of development.
Given my currency & previous experience as a navigator”
SME 13 “I tested the comms for the QE ”
SME 21 “Development of MCM Expert”
SME 31 “Yes, but not often- as an operator usually hardware is pre-purchased.
Occasionally I have had input into software developments based on user
feedback”
SME 35 “Yes, NAUTIS replacement”
SME 40 “Once but it received no feedback. It was for the new MCMU [. . . ]
Indicator”
SME 41 “Yes. I was consulted by EIPT from BAE with regards to the new
UK/FR MCM System. Whilst serving as the XO in HMS Cattistock. I
was also consulted on the installation of the Remms 600 RUV platform
onto Hunt MCMVs.”
QE HMS Queen Elizabeth
MCM Mine Countermeasures
MCMU Mine Countermeasures Unmanned
EIPT Equipment Integrated Project Team
XO Executive Officer
MCMVs Mine Countermeasures Vessels
4.4.9 Exploration of the opinions of RN personnel of the current con-
sultation process
Three themes emerged through exploring SME views on the consultation of current and
future personnel during the design and development stages of new automated systems
(consisting of 49 nodes and approximately 1,189 words); Collaboration (36.7% of total
nodes), Knowledge transfer (28.6%) and Fit for purpose (34.7%).
84
Emerging from the data is a clear desire from current personnel to be consulted
in the design and development stages of new automated systems. As one SME wrote
“How can anyone design an automated system without consulting the people who will
use it?”. The concept of collaboration between personnel and software engineers ap-
pears to stem from an awareness from SME of the requirement that “to develop kit
you need to use operator knowledge as well as technical officers to develop new system”.
The collaboration and the transfer of knowledge that results from this communication
ensures that systems are built fit for purpose: “It is very important that users are
consulted in the design process in order to ensure that the final product is user friendly
and fit for purpose”.
However, the data also highlights that this collaboration seldom occurs: “Consul-
tation seems to take place engineer to engineer & not include the operator/end user”;
“The end user is rarely consulted for requirements & during development pieces”; “Ter-
rible. Only those within teams are consulted and they become an echo chamber of ideas.
The only people who should be asked for input at the design stage and in the testing
phase are the operators”. This lack of collaboration results in systems that are not fit for
purpose, “many current tools are not fit for purpose as there was no operator input in
the design”; “Kit designed and built by engineers having never been employed in a mar-
itime environment always has problems”. A key function identified from SME and the
wider literature of introducing more automation into military operational environments
is to improve capability. However, if systems are not being designed in collaboration
with the personnel who will be using them daily, this results in the likelihood that new
systems won’t be used to their full capacity: “It is essential that those who are going to
actually use these tools or systems are consulted as then the system/tool will actually
be usable, rather than being overly complicated”.
This disconnect impacts upon the capability new systems can provide RN per-
sonnel and can have temporal and financial implications: “Too often once we get to
use new equipment it quickly becomes clear that one or two main details that if better
thought out could have made an enormous difference. Such is the nature of equip-
ment programmes that it is incredibly hard/slow to change such things once in service”;
“Generally poor integration of change programmes into operator domain. Contractor
buoyancy and drive often overrides operator concerns. Once accepted into service these
issues endure. Often the timeframe for installation does not support rigorous change
process especially when a limited number of platforms prevent full tactical development
and testing prior to operational employment”. Part of this disconnect may be due to
lean manning of current RN operations. As the previous quote highlights, if designers
are unable to test their systems in ecologically valid environments, for example on the
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platforms they will eventually be used on, it is easy to see how tools may not be fit for
purpose when first released.
Although challenges exist for system designers to test their product in ecologically
valid environments this should not prevent the engagement of current personnel in the
planning and initial concept design phases: “You must consult the operator of equip-
ment (at varying levels) to determine gaps in technology that need to be improved and
then to put possible amendments of fixes to the system forward for expert, and current,
opinions on those improvements”. It is common for contractors to consult their own
in-house experts when designing new systems however as one SME in this study pointed
out, “Whilst people may have had previous experience to contribute, it may have been
some time since they had been at sea as an “end-user” with other advances in technol-
ogy or a full understanding of the needs/requirements”.
Collaboration is crucial to developing new systems that are fit for purpose. The
knowledge transfer that must occur to enable this is not just from operator to engineer
but it is also important for operators to learn the capacity that current and emerging
technology has: “current serving personnel have very little experience beyond their cur-
rent equipment and rarely have much knowledge of current/emerging technology. Thus
the current community is often not well placed to advise on new automated systems
and tools when they have little exposure or experience of them”. An awareness of these
limits to their knowledge was shown by several SME, eight of whom omitted to answer
this question: for example, “This is not my professional field; currently I am of the
operator level of tools/systems”. One way in which operators may be more willing to
comment on what features of systems would be useful to their job roles is through
training: “Training will be needed”. Alternatively, if collaboration becomes common-
place within the organisation, the transfer of knowledge this will allow will result in
both operators and engineers developing a common language (Robertson et al., 2003).
This will facilitate understanding of each others domains of expertise.
4.5 Discussion
Data was collected from N =45 experienced RN personnel to explore the current use
of automated systems, where automated systems may be used in the future and the
consultation between system designers and current personnel. The data also revealed a
desire from SME to be involved in the design and development stages of new systems.
However, there exists a lack of collaboration and knowledge exchange which currently
results in systems not always being built fit for purpose.
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SME identified the use of automated systems across all aspects of operations on-
board RN vessels. This is in line with current literature that posits the increased occur-
rence of socio-technical systems within military environments, for example see Ministry
of Defence (2011) and Ministry of Defence (2014). SME also provided a comprehensive
picture of where automated systems may play increasing roles in future operations. The
nature of warfare will change as automated systems and the use of unmanned vehicles
increases. It has been argued that as humans may have less front-line involvement with
combat this may change public and political opinion towards combat, which could in-
crease the likelihood it occurs (Ministry of Defence, 2014). It is therefore of paramount
importance that all automated systems and unmanned systems are developed fit for
purpose. The data presented shows that this is not currently always the case.
Automated systems are required to perform alongside individuals and teams in
complex environments. Field research has highlighted how individuals and teams self-
organise and continuously adapt to their current situation - at times diverting from
standard operating procedures (Bigley and Roberts, 2001). Therefore, as highlighted
by Naikar (2018), systems designed according to normative procedures may hinder the
ability for sociotechnical teams to self-organise when faced with complex, dynamic and
time constrained environments. The inability for systems to adapt increases the op-
erators cognitive burden as they will have to adapt not only to the situation but also
to the constraints of the system. This requirement was highlighted by experts in this
study. Therefore, it could be that personnel viewed systems as not fit for purpose as
the systems were unable to adapt to the challenging environments the sociotechnical
team faced.
The percentages of quotes covering current automation use (25.6%) and future use
(54.3%) suggest that current personnel have a wealth of ideas that could be tapped
into by system developers. Personnel also showed great awareness of the capabilities
of technology, where systems will have the most benefit to their day to day operations
but also the caution that must be taken when using these systems. However, the data
highlighted the limited number of current personnel (n=8) who had been previously
consulted in the development of new systems. Where consultation has occurred, it
is questionable how the input from practitioners was received and if it was taken on
board by the system designers. RN personnel are of course not experts in software
development, the SME showed an awareness of this, however, they are on the front line
using the systems that are developed. The data also showed that when systems are
brought in that they do not function as expected or are not trusted by the personnel
or their commanders, this results in increased workload for RN personnel. To facilitate
improved future collaboration between personnel, industry and academia adopting an
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approach like the Athena project may provide an open environment where ideas and
knowledge can be exchanged.
Increasing the reliability of new automated systems has been a key feature of human
factors and ergonomics research. A wealth of literature highlights the importance of
operators’ awareness of the reliability of systems to ensure appropriate use and facilitate
trust in the system (Hoff and Bashir, 2015; Madhavan et al., 2006; Parasuraman et al.,
2012). This body of literature has also shown how trust in automation is influenced by
a complex combination of factors, for example individual differences in working memory
(Parasuraman et al., 2012). Therefore, trust is not formed solely based on the features
of the system (Hoff and Bashir, 2015). Research has also shown how reduction in trust
due to reliability errors can be mitigated if the operators are provided with informa-
tion as to why the system may err (Dzindolet et al., 2003). RN personnel could gain
this information through being involved in the development process of new systems via
communicating with system developers.
The data further showed how current personnel voiced caution towards over-relying
on automation. Recent collisions involving US naval vessels and merchant ships have
highlighted the dangers of over-relying on automated navigation systems (Forcast Inter-
national, 2017; Fraher, 2017). A complete overhaul of traditional navigation procedures
in favour for automated systems has led to crews being insufficiently skilled in basic
navigational procedures. Which has led to a reduction in their vigilance of the sur-
roundings, relying instead on the automated system to navigate their path. Caution
voiced by RN personnel in this study is well founded. Additionally, with the UK’s
current ROE a human will always remain in the decision-making loop. Therefore, per-
sonnel are continually adapting to their new roles as fully trained and capable naval
officers as well as supervisors to increasingly sophisticated systems.
SME also highlighted the limited number of platforms that are available and the
limited routes by which new systems can be tested prior to their release into service.
One way in which academia could provide support for this problem is through the con-
tinued development of immersive and ecologically valid test-beds that generate domain
specific challenges (Jenvald and Morin, 2004). The value of training personnel within
immersive environments has been shown in several fields, from the military (Jean,
2008), to emergency services (Alison and Crego, 2008), to medical practice (Kirkman
et al., 2014). Further, by providing personnel with safe-to-fail environments (Rouse,
1991), cognitive learning can be facilitated (Klein and Baxter, 2006). The application
of immersive environments for testing new automated systems can provide a way in
which systems can be robustly tested to ensure they translate across into the oper-
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ational environments. Additionally, the dual-purpose approach to training personnel
and testing new systems could be enabled by combining these two goals into one im-
mersive environment. The data generated by SME who took part in this study suggests
that an innovative approach to system procurement is needed to ensure that capability
is maintained across RN operations.
Combining training of personnel with testing of new systems would provide an en-
vironment that fosters collaboration and knowledge exchange between practitioner and
designer. There are of course challenges associated with the development of immersive
realistic test-beds for military operations, for example security concerns. To address
these challenges current industrial partners, hold the capabilities to test new systems
in highly secure immersive environments with high-fidelity scenarios. However, such
test-beds are currently not easily accessible to academia or other industries who may be
researching and developing new systems. Additionally, there is little ability to quickly
bolt on new systems or amendments to current systems to perform quick tests of their
functionality and how operators interact with them. Personnel are also restricted on
their availability to take part in test research due to the reduced manpower the RN
currently operates with. Therefore, building stronger links to academic partners who
currently have test-bed capabilities, for example The Command Teamwork Experimen-
tal Test-bed (ComTET). 3 could provide an alternative route to system development
within academia. Immersive simulations can elicit how systems are interacted with
during operations, showing their flaws and strengths. Personnel will also develop an
understanding on how the systems function, their capacity and reliability through tak-
ing part in training. This understanding can facilitate more accurate system use and
mitigate against misuse, disuse or abuse (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997). An additional
benefit to academic links is the ability for university students to be initial participants
in studies, providing larger sample sizes to test initial developments on. These initial
development studies will allow features to be statistically explored prior to running
experiments with expert personnel.
Limitations
A potential weakness of using a questionnaire based method is that it was not possible
to probe upon answers provided by participants. However, the findings from this study
can be used to formulate topics to cover if researchers have greater access to SME
to conduct more comprehensive interview techniques, such as the Critical Decision
Method (CDM). It is also acknowledged the shortcomings of qualitative research to
provide generalisable conclusions. The uniqueness and size of the sample arguably
3ComTET was designed to explore how information flows within socio-technical command and
control teams (Roberts et al., 2015)
89
mitigates this limitation. The (N 45) RN personnel who completed the questionnaire
encapsulate a range of experience covering both underwater and above water job roles.
Although organisational cultural norms may arguably influence the responses provided,
it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this. However, it would be of great
interest for future work to explore the influence cultural frames can have upon responses
(Klein, 2004). Additionally, research that draws upon eliciting knowledge from experts
is often considered vulnerable to bias in interpretation of the data (McAndrew and
Gore, 2013). However, the use of inductive data analysis techniques such as Thematic
analysis, applied using a transparent framework can reduce this vulnerability.
Implications for findings
This chapter presents unique insight into currently serving RN personnel’s views of the
existing and future state of automated systems and the present situation surrounding
the procurement of new systems. The privileged access to this sample population is
a rarity and combined with the range of experience provided by each SME and the
size of the sample (N =45) provides a singularly exclusive window into a hotly dis-
cussed research topic. Alison et al. (2015) argued for the importance of credibility
and transferability of conclusions gained from naturalistic research as a way to judge
research. The quotes provided by experts woven into the analysis presented, pro-
vide strong grounds for highlighting the credibility of this research. Although looking
specifically at RN operations, the recommendations provided by SME arguably pro-
vide transferable conclusions. Globally the decisions made within naval operations are
similar, with additional factors of fleet capacity, manpower and available technology in-
fluencing standard operating procedures. Research into human-machine-interaction has
highlighted the facilitators and barriers to appropriate automation usage; these often
transcend operational environments and cultures. Therefore, the results presented in
this chapter can provide avenues for future research to explore with naval organisations
globally.
Conclusions
Currently a disconnect exists between RN personnel and system designers. This results
in new systems not always being fit for purpose which can negatively impact upon RN
operations across all domains. For example, by increasing the workload of personnel
who are already balancing time pressures, uncertain information and the criticality of
the environment. To overcome this, greater communication and knowledge exchange
should be promoted between currently serving RN personnel and system designers.
One way in which this could be achieved is through open forums where personnel could
suggest new systems that would support and improve their operations. For example,
a forum similar to the Athena project. Additionally, to ensure personnel have an un-
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derstanding of current and emerging technology, system designers could also present
their ideas at this open forum. A collaborative environment such as this would enable
knowledge exchange and promote the development of systems that are fit for purpose
at time of release. It is worth remembering that “war is ultimately a human endeavour.
It will be humans who choose to go to war, it will be humans who can stop wars and it
will be humans who suffer the consequences of war” (Ministry of Defence, 2014, p. 96).
Therefore, the humans on the front line should be consulted in the way developments
are made.
The next step of this thesis is to present the development and testing of the mi-
croworld Automatic Radar Classification Simulation (ARCS). Accordingly, the next
chapter discusses the pilot tests conducted to check the usability and validity of ARCS
followed by Chapter 6 which presents the mixed-design student experiment.
4.5.1 Acknowledgements
The quotes provided to support the analysis are the views and opinions of the personnel
who completed the questionnaire. They do not necessarily reflect the official policy or
position of the Royal Navy or Ministry of Defence.
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Chapter 5
The design and development of
ARCS
5.1 Abstract
This chapter describes how the Automatic Radar Classification Simulation (ARCS)
was developed and tested with two small pilot studies. Pilot 1 (N =6) and Pilot 2
(N =5) were conducted at the University of Liverpool with PhD students taking part
as participants. ARCS has been designed with several adaptable features, for example
the ability to edit and create scenarios, edit the functionality of the automated system,
and incorporate additional questions or surveys into the task. The pilot tests showed
that the required performance metrics; total number of correct and incorrect classifi-
cation decisions, selection of system, and workload ratings were all collected by ARCS.
Additionally, the targeted workload dimensions (mental and temporal demand) were
elicited by the scenario. However, several recommendations were produced through
these tests, for example, to provide participants with a longer and more detailed train-
ing brief. These recommendations were then implemented prior to the main experiment.
Overall, ARCS was found to be a fully functional microworld that can be edited and
adapted to meet the requirements of the researcher.
5.2 Introduction
The previous chapter illuminated the ubiquitous use of automated systems across all
operational aspects of the Royal Navy (RN), for instance from navigation to the identi-
fication of hostile threats. Automated systems are proposed to support decision making
and ensure that RN personnel complete tasks effectively. However, there is a clear dis-
connect between those designing and building systems with the personnel on the front
line who will be required to use them. Additionally, clear concern has been identified
with the regularity of new systems being brought into service that are not fit for pur-
pose. One way in which this disconnect can be bridged is through closer collaboration
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between RN personnel and system designers. This human-human collaboration, when
designing and developing automated systems can be supported by academia. Aca-
demics are well placed to develop open architecture high-fidelity testbeds that new
systems can be robustly tested with prior to their release. Utilising immersive envi-
ronments will allow RN personnel to be included in the testing phases ensuring the
systems are fit for purpose at time of release and throughout their lifecycle to ensure
continued operational support to front line personnel. Accordingly, the next section of
this thesis describes the development of a novel microworld test-bed that was designed
by the author of this thesis and developed in collaboration with a software engineer to
explore automation usage decisions in a naturalistic way. This chapter aims to:
(i) Provide a brief review of the testbed development and experimental approach
(ii) Describe the adaptable features of ARCS
(iii) Present the findings from the pilot studies and the changes made prior to the
main experiment
Researchers continue to face the challenge of maintaining experimental control when
exploring complex real-world problems. A constant trade-off between ecological validity
and experimental control has to be made when designing a research approach (Loomis
et al., 1999). When researching complex environments, such as military command
and control decisions, there is increased difficulty in maintaining experimental control
(Do¨rner and Funke, 2017). One way in which to manage this trade-off is with the use
of virtual simulated computer environments. Employing naturalistic research methods
such as the critical incident technique (outlined in Chapter 2) allows the researcher to
develop complex scenarios that can then be utilised within simulated computer envi-
ronments (Reuschenbach, 2008, cited in Do¨rner and Funke (2017)). One example of
the application of a virtual simulated computer environment is in exploring submarine
command team functionality (Stanton and Roberts, 2017).
In line with this, ARCS was developed by the researcher to provide a simulated
computer environment that mimics the operational environment of the development
of the recognised air picture. Compilation of an accurate recognised air picture is
crucial to enabling the predication of engagement outcomes as valid (Foard, 2000). As
previously discussed in Chapter 2, the process of developing ARCS involved 4 steps;
(i) building knowledge of the specifics of the research domain, (ii) designing prototype
interface and developing task structure, (iii) piloting the system, and (iv) recruiting
participants and utilising ARCS. This chapter addresses step three, piloting the system.
Pilot tests are a common methodology employed to conduct manipulation checks on
a new experimental design or testbed (van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001). As ARCS
was developed specifically for the research presented in this thesis, two pilot tests
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were conducted to determine the validity and utility of ARCS as a microworld, a brief
overview of each pilot test will now be discussed.
5.3 ARCS Development
5.3.1 Materials
ARCS was developed by the author with collaboration from a computer programmer as
a Java run high fidelity testbed. The open architecture of ARCS enables the test-bed
to be adapted to test a variety of research questions. The adaptable features of ARCS
will each be discussed.
Scenarios
The scenarios presented during the training and main task phases can be edited and
changed. For example, this study explores development of the recognised air picture
in a littoral environment. However, the geographic map depicted within the main task
is a fully configurable .jpeg file and therefore can be changed to depict any location
desired by the researcher. The speed at which the scenario runs can be increased or
decreased depending on the research aims. For this study the scenario was run in real
time to promote the realism of the task. However, task difficultly could be raised by
increasing the speed at which the scenario runs.
To facilitate psychological immersion in the task it is possible to play an audio track
alongside each scenario such as air traffic control chatter. For this study, the audio track
did not relate to the track movements on screen, this was due to time constraints with
setting up the experiments. However, future research should look to utilise the audio
feature to match the scenarios further increasing psychological immersion.
Currently ARCS runs as a standalone test-bed, the scenario generated is designed
to explore how an individual would perform when classifying all radar tracks on screen.
However, within the RN the recognised air picture is developed by a team of operators.
Therefore, although not working together, participants of the study presented were
run in groups to simulate the working environment in a Type 45 Destroyer operations
room. Future versions of ARCS could be developed to perform specific aspects of this
classification task, enabling teams of participants to complete the task together.
Track generation
The tracks incorporated into ARCS can be loaded through ADS-B collected data on
location, altitude and speed or the researcher can manually generate tracks. This fea-
ture makes ARCS highly adaptable and allows the creation of real-world track profiles.
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As ARCS has been developed using the ADS-B standard it allows the micro-world to
potentially be deployed in a live operational environment. For the study included in
this thesis, a combination of the two was used. All neutral tracks, i.e. commercial air-
craft, were real flight patterns collected from freely available ADS-B data from websites
such as flight tracker 1. All friendly and hostile tracks were generated by the researcher
who had gained an understanding of the flight profiles associated with friendly or hos-
tile tracks from undertaking the research presented in Chapter 3 and through informal
conversations with experts.
Automated system
The automatic classification system can also be edited in several ways. The number of
times a participant is able to select the system can be set at the start of the experiment.
The length of time it takes to classify a single track and how long it will run for when
selected can also be set. The automated system used in this study only classified
neutral tracks and worked alphabetically down the list of tracks included in the scenario.
However, ARCS is capable of handling bolted on systems in order to test sophisticated
classification algorithms.
Additional measures
Integrated into ARCS is the ability to pause the current scenario to present partici-
pants with questions. This study utilised the NASA TLX (Hart and Staveland, 1988)
to provide accurate workload ratings throughout the experiment. The NASA TLX is
a commonly used assessment tool to collect workload ratings across six dimensions:
Mental demand, Temporal demand, Physical demand, Frustration, Performance and
Effort. Defined as “a term that represents the cost of accomplishing mission require-
ments for the human operator” (Hart, 2006, p. 904), understanding operator workload
is a crucial factor when designing automated systems.
The open architecture of ARCS enables any form of ratings or questions to be
incorporated into the main task depending on the research aims. The timing of when
these ratings will be shown and how often can also be edited.
5.3.2 Data collection
ARCS records all mouse clicks made by participants. This enables a wealth of quanti-
tative data to be collected. For example, it is possible to collect:
 All classification decisions made by participants and the accuracy of those deci-
sions
 The time between a track appearing on screen and it being classified
1https://www.flightstats.com/v2/flight-tracker/search
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 The location of each track when it is classified
 The number of times the automated system is selected and how many classifica-
tions it makes
 A second by second tracking of all track movements on screen
 A second by second analysis of decisions made by participants. For example,
what strategies were used to approach classifying all tracks on the screen, did
participants start on tracks located closer to their vessel and work away from
their ship?
5.3.3 Procedure
The experiment consisted of 3 stages: (1) the Training Session, (2) the Main Task, and
(3) the Focus Group. Each stage will now be discussed in more detail.
(1) The Training Session
Following obtaining informed consent, participants were taken through the 25-minute
training session which consisted of a pencil and paper exercise followed by a familiari-
sation task. Participants were shown the iconography used within ARCS and provided
with a worksheet to fill in the meaning of each symbol (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). This
worksheet could be referred to by participants throughout the experiment to ensure
comprehension of each symbol. Participants were also provided with information to
aid the classification task, for example, a commercial fixed wing aircraft could be as-
sumed to travel at an altitude between 20,000-40,000 feet and at a speed of up to 500
knots; unknown to participants all commercial tracks were neutral (see Table 5.1). Fi-
nally, participants were provided with definitions for the NASA TLX workload ratings,
as is recommended practice for using this workload measure. All information sheets
provided to participants can be found in Appendix Four.
Table 5.1: Information provided to participants to aid their classification decisions
Platform Altitude Speed
Commercial Fixed
Wing
20,000-40,000 ft Up to 500 knots
Commercial Rotary
Wing
Up to 8,000 ft 100-200 knots
Military Fixed Wing 14,000-25,000 ft Up to 800 knots
Military Rotary Wing Up to 10,000 ft 100-135 knots
If information relating to a track meets these criteria you can assume the relevant platform
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Figure 5.1: Slide taken from the training presentation depicting the symbology used in
the simulation (The symbology was taken from NATO Standarsization Agency (2011))
Figure 5.2: Section of the training sheet participants completed
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Figure 5.3: Screenshot of the training session with ARCS
Next participants completed a 15-minute familiarisation task with ARCS (see Figure
5.3). During these 15 minutes participants were asked to classify all tracks (icons) on
the radar picture into friendly, neutral or hostile. Open source information (such as
ADS-B data- including altitude, velocity, heading, proximity to airlane etc.) relating to
each track was presented to the participants to aid their decision-making process. The
training section took 15 minutes to complete, with participants experiencing a range
of difficulty levels (e.g. a range in number of radar tracks) to ensure that participants
became comfortable with the task itself and the testbed interface.
(2) The Main Task
Following the training session participants were given the opportunity to ask the re-
searcher any questions before re-viewing the ‘Daily Tasking Orders’ in front of them (a
paper based inject, highlighting their own responsibility (high accountability) or dif-
fusing the responsibility (low accountability) for any incorrect classification decisions).
Participants then completed a single scenario that ran for 30 minutes (see Figure 5.4).
During which time participants were required to classify all tracks on the radar screen
into friendly, neutral or hostile. If any tracks were deemed as potentially hostile, the
participants were required to click the ‘Inform Command’ button to flag those specific
tracks. At any point in time the participants could also opt to employ the automated
classification tool. For Pilot 1, passing control to the tool could be handed over and
taken back by the participant wherever and as many times as they saw appropriate.
For Pilot 2 participants could only select the automated system twice and the system
would run for 10 seconds before giving control back to the participant. This change
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in system operation was based on feedback collected at Pilot 1. At 5-minute intervals
the scenario was frozen and the NASA TLX ratings were presented to participants (see
Figure 5.5). Following the completion of the ratings the simulation would unfreeze and
participants continued with the main classification task.
Figure 5.4: Screenshot of Pilot 2 the main task within ARCS
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(3) Focus Group
Having completed the main task participants were asked to complete six questions (see
Table 5.2) to provide feedback on perceived performance and rational behind decisions
made. Specifically, the rationale behind when and why participants employed the
automated support tool. Participants were also asked to complete six cognitive trait
measures: Cognitive flexibility inventory, Need for closure, Assessment & Locomotion,
BIS-11, Conscientiousness, and Propensity to trust (Chapter 7 discusses the selection
of these measures in more detail). Finally, a focus group was held to delve into the
participants’ feedback. Each stage of the experiment was discussed giving participants
the opportunity to raise any issues or positive feedback regarding the experimental
design and the task itself.
Table 5.2: Questions participants completed following the main task
1 From 1-10 how would you rate your performance? (1=poor, 10=perfect)
2 On a scale of 1-10 how accountable did you feel towards the decisions
you made? (1=not accountable, 10= very accountable)
3 Did you choose to use the decision support system at any point(s) during
the scenario? YES/NO
4 Reflecting on your performance, where there any occasions that you
think you should have used the decision support system but did not and
why?
5 Reflecting on the scenario, where there any occasions that you felt you
could have use the decision support system earlier but did not?
6 What made you not choose the system at an earlier point?
7 If you could perform the scenario again, is there anything you would do
differently?
Prior to this pilot test, ARCS was shown to the Military Advisor (MA) and Subject
Matter Experts (SME) at Dstl. The demonstration consisted of the researcher going
through ARCS in detail with a SME. Providing comments and feedback on the fidelity,
both ecologically and psychologically, of the system interface and the task participants
would be required to complete. Detailed notes of this meeting were taken by the
researcher and will be woven into the results and discussion.
5.3.4 Pilot Study Participants
N =8 participants took part in the pilot studies (see Table 5.3 for breakdown of partic-
ipant characteristics). n=3 participants took part in both pilot studies with 11 weeks
between each pilot test. This allowed the researcher to explore the effect the changes
made to ARCS following Pilot 1 had upon participant experience and performance.
Having both experienced and novel participants in Pilot 2 enabled an understanding of
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how both groups of participants interacted with ARCS and their overall performance
at the task. Ideally, more participants would have been recruited for these two pilot
tests, however, due to time constraints small sample size numbers were accepted with
an understanding of the limitations upon data analysis.
Table 5.3: Breakdown of participant characteristics across both pilot studies
Pilot 1 Pilot 2
N = 6 N = 5
3 = Male, 3 = Female 2 = Male, 3 = Female
5.4 Analysis
As already mentioned the sample size of both pilot tests does not allow an in-depth
analysis on task performance. However, the purpose of these pilot tests was to prove
the utility of ARCS as a research microworld. Therefore, the results section of this
chapter will focus on what data is collected through using ARCS.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Use of tool
Five of the six participants in Pilot 1 used the support tool to check or confirm their
classification decisions (see Table 5.4). Arguably the collective appraisal errors made
by participants were due to a lack of understanding relating to the system itself, i.e.
that the tool would not check classifications the participants made. Participants were
not informed about how the system worked or given examples of when to use it, thereby
forcing participants to assume the system function.
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Of the 5 participants in Pilot 2, 4 utilised the tool and 1 did not. Pilot 2 comments
from participants related to the number of times the system could be used, “I wish I
had more than 2 Decision Support System (DSS) tokens. As once one was used (to test
its ability) with only one remaining it was difficult to decide if the difficulty was worth
enduring, thinking there may be a more opportune moment in the future”. Across both
pilot tests participants stated that the first use of the automated system was to test its
capability.
Table 5.4: Quotes from participants when asked why they chose to use the decision
support tool
“I felt unsure about what I was doing”
“Concern that all tracks were classified as neutral, wanted “support” from system
to confirm”
“To see how the decision support would decide in order to understand decision
criteria and validate choices”
“To see if/how it helped and to see if it amended any of my decisions”
“I wasn’t 100% sure if I was adequately classifying so wanted to make sure I was on
the right lines. It also provided an opportunity to look at the bigger picture more
easily”
5.5.2 Workload
Analysis of the NASA-TLX ratings taken at 6 time points within the main task re-
vealed that participants perceived workload remained relatively stable throughout the
task (see Figure 5.6). Mirroring the observed plateauing of actions 10 minutes into the
30 minute scenario. Analysis of the weightings given to each workload aspect globally,
revealed that mental and temporal demands contribute more to overall workload, sug-
gesting that the task did elicit the desired cognitive load (see Figure 5.7). However, as
the workload ratings did not fluctuate, alterations to the scenario will be made in order
to elicit a greater level of workload during the critical time point. Table 5.5 displays
the global workload rating for each participant across the 30-minute scenario. Data
was lost for 3 participants due to technical problems with ARCS. However, this was
fixed before Pilot 2 to ensure that all workload ratings were collected.
NASA-TLX ratings collected during Pilot test 2 show more varied workload through-
out the 30-minute task (see Figure 5.8). The global weighting of temporal demand was
lower compared to Pilot 1, however mental demand was still rated as the highest con-
tributing factor to workload (see Figure 5.9). Further alternations will be made to
increase the workload during the critical event of the main task.
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Due to the limited number of participants it was not possible to run full statistical
analysis on the influence workload may have had upon tool use. However, it was
possible to look at the descriptives of workload and tool use across the six phases
of the experiment (see Table 5.6). The workload scores were collected at the end
of each phase. Therefore, it is possible to view the change in workload potentially
attributable to the use of the automated system. Participant 2 for example, reported
high workload during phase 3 when they had also selected aid from the system, their
workload increased again in phase 4 and reduced in phase 5 following utilising the tool
for a second time. Although cause and effect cannot be ascertained from this data
alone, with more data collected a trend between workload and tool use may be elicited.
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Figure 5.6: Global workload ratings from participants in Pilot 1. Missing data resulted
due to technical problems with the recording of data during Pilot 1
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Figure 5.7: The weighting given to each workload measure by participants in Pilot 1
Table 5.5: Descriptives of self-perceived workload during Pilot 1 across the experiment
as measured by NASA-TLX
ID No. Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6
(0-
5mins)
(5-
10mins)
(10-
15mins)
(15-
20mins)
(20-
25mins)
(25-
30mins)
1 5.3* 5.1 5.2 4 4.3 3.3
2 6.6 6.3 6.2 6.3*
3 5.5* 5.8* 5.5 5.8* 5.8
4 4.4 4.2 4 4.4* 4.2*
5 5.8* 5.3* 5.3* 5* 5.4* 5.2*
6 6.3 5.8 6.5 7 6.4 6.3
* = used the automated decision support system
Table 5.6: Descriptives of self-perceived workload during Pilot 2 across the experiment
as measured by NASA-TLX
ID No. Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6
(0-
5mins)
(5-
10mins)
(10-
15mins)
(15-
20mins)
(20-
25mins)
(25-
30mins)
1 7.9 7.5 7.8 5.9* 8* 5.6
2 7.4 7.8 6.7 7.5 5.7* 7.4
3** 6.3* 6.4 6.1 5.9 5.7 6.2
4** 7.4 6.4 5.8 5.5 4.4 3.8
5** 5.3 5.1 6* 7.4 5.8* 6.6
* = used the automated decision support system
** = had prior experience with the task and system
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Figure 5.8: Global workload ratings from participants in Pilot 2
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Figure 5.9: The weighting given to each workload measure by participants in Pilot 2
107
5.5.3 Task Performance
No explicit performance measures were collected during Pilot 1 as this pilot test was
primarily concerned with exploring if and when participants used the decision support
tool. However, several participants raised queries about the purpose of their classifica-
tions and the consequences should they make errors. Therefore, to increase the realism
of the task the purpose of the classification decisions participants will be asked to make
will be made explicit during the training session. This will be achieved by including an
immersion aspect to the training which will set the context of operations on board a
RN vessel. Additionally, participants will be made aware of the consequences of making
classification errors, i.e. an incorrect decision could result in a fratricide incident.
There were 142 decisions that needed to be made to classify all tracks over the
course of the scenario in Pilot 2. Correct classifications made by participants ranged
from 40 - 89. Table 5.7 depicts the total number of classification decisions made by
each participant, the number of correct decisions made, the number of errors and the
number of omitted decisions. These descriptives show the challenging nature of the
task with all participants making errors and failing to correctly classify all tracks.
Table 5.7: Descriptives of decisions made during Pilot 2
ID No. Number of total
decisions made
Number of errors
made
Number of omit-
ted decisions
Number of
classifications
automated
system made
1 66 15 46 20
2 58 22 54 10
3** 95 6 17 10
4** 89 14 23 0
5** 56 16 56 20
** = had prior experience with the task and system
5.5.4 Experience
During Pilot 2, the two participants who had not taken part in the first pilot test
utilised the DSS in phases 4 and 5 of the experiment compared to the participants who
had taken part in the first pilot. As one participant wrote in the qualitative feedback
following the task: “After the first 10 second burst of the DSS and noticing that it
did not perform as many classifications as I had anticipated therefore I was saving the
second DSS usage ‘for a rainy day’ where the workload increased which didn’t happen
again during the remainder of the experiment”. From prior experience on the task this
participant decided to use the support tool only when they knew they could not com-
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plete the required number of classification decisions themselves in the time allocated.
Supporting the literature that posits that confidence in ones’ own ability to complete
a task is a factor behind deciding to use an automated system or not (Lee and Moray,
1992).
It is possible that the two novice participants utilised the tool during the late phases
as they spent phases 1-3 trying to get to grips with understanding how to do the task
manually. One participant when asked why they did not choose to use the system at
an earlier point responded, “[I] was too busy trying to classify I did not think of it”.
Although there were 11 weeks between Pilot 1 and Pilot 2 the results tentatively
suggest that experience may lead to improved performance. Two of the three partici-
pants who performed in both pilot tests showed the best performance making 79 and 75
correct decisions in Pilot 2. Therefore, it may be expected to see an overall improvement
in participant performance between the two-time trials of the main experiment.
5.6 Discussion
This chapter has discussed the development and initial testing of ARCS. ARCS has
been designed to incorporate adaptable functions to provide researchers with a flexible
micro-world. This flexibility facilitates research into how individuals interact with an
automated system in near to operational environments. Although the limited num-
bers of participants at both pilot studies restricts the statistical analysis of the data
collected, the main aim of testing the utility of ARCS was achieved. The majority
of participants found the scenario challenging enough to warrant using the automated
system and they provided a range of rationales for their decision to use the automated
system or not. The elicitation of these rationales is a crucial, and yet often overlooked
feature of exploring how individuals interact with automated systems. ARCS has been
developed alongside a questionnaire based measure to ensure that these rationales are
captured and incorporated into the analysis to provide contextual richness to any sta-
tistical findings.
Using immersive simulation environments increases the ecological validity of the re-
search whist also maintaining experimental control (Brehmer and Do¨rner, 1993). The
development of simulated computer environments in academia can provide an alterna-
tive way in which new systems can be developed and tested in collaboration with serving
personnel. Although industrial partners do currently have the capabilities to develop
and maintain simulated computer environments, for example, a complete replica of the
Combat Management System (CMS) in use by RN personnel today, there are often
competition and financial barriers to the collaborative use of these test environments
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between industrial and academic partners. Highlighted by the findings from the previ-
ous chapter, open architecture training environments are required and are paramount
to developing automated systems which support operations in the field. Academia is
uniquely placed to provide open architecture environments that are designed to pro-
mote collaboration and knowledge sharing as academic institutions are less constrained
by commercial competition, ARCS is one such environment.
5.6.1 Recommended task changes/ARCS changes
From the two pilot tests several recommendations were highlighted to further increase
the immersion of the task and the likeness to reality. Each recommendation will be
presented below alongside how it was addressed for the main experiment:
(i) Increase the task complexity - the number of tracks presented to participants was
increased from 53 in Pilot 1 to 142 in Pilot 2 and will be over 200 in the main
experiment. Additionally, the number of hostile tracks will be raised from 8 to
10 during the critical time point. These changes will increase the complexity of
the task and should be reflected in the workload scores provided by participants
during the experiment.
(ii) Provide participants with a longer, more detailed brief prior to the training session
- A short immersion feature will be built into the training session to aid the
psychological immersion of participants into the task, increasing the realism of
the task. Further information relating to the system itself will be provided to
participants to mitigate against participants making appraisal errors. All slides
included in the training brief can be found in Appendix Four.
(iii) Include graphical icons for the locations of airport and bases - introduction of
further graphical features onto the main map will further support the realism of
the task. Additionally, the graphical icons will provide participants with more
information points with which to make their classification decisions.
(iv) Provide participants with a greater number of times they can select the automated
system - in response to participants first use of the system to test its capability it
was decided that participants will be able to select the system three times in the
main experiment. Three was decided upon as it is expected that participants will
use the system the first time to see how it operates. The second two selections,
if chosen, may then highlight additional motivations behind automation uptake,
for example as a way to reduce high levels of workload.
(v) Questionnaire adapted to electronic version - to improve ease of completion and
prevent missing data the questionnaire given to participants will be transferred to
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Qualtrics. Participants will be told to follow a link and complete the questionnaire
online after they have completed the main task.
5.6.2 Conclusions of the development of ARCS and the benefit to
research
The development of ARCS is one of the ways in which new automated decision support
systems can be tested in near-to-real conditions. The flexibility of the simulation en-
ables the replication of real-life challenges and conditions in which to robustly test the
capabilities of new tools. The use of high-fidelity simulation testbeds and microworlds
in the validation of newly developed automated tools and support systems is an under-
utilised methodology. However is an approach that could hold the key to how tools are
transferred from sterile research environments into the ‘real-world’ without falling into
the camp of ‘brittle technology’ (Woods, 2016). Additionally, developing highly real-
istic test-bed environments will support collaboration between personnel and system
designers. The next chapter will present the findings from the full ARCS experiment.
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Chapter 6
Using ARCS to explore
automation usage decisions
6.1 Abstract
This chapter presents the Automatic Radar Classification Simulation (ARCS) experi-
ment which aimed to explore the motivational and cognitive factors that may influence
uptake of an automated decision support system. Students from the University of Liv-
erpool (N =42) took part in two trials of the ARCS microworld experiment in return for
course credit or reimbursement. Interesting results were observed as a high percentage
of participants selected to use the automated system at both trials, and training effects
were observed with task performance improving across all conditions at trial 2. Of
particular interest is the finding that there were no significant differences in task per-
formance with or without access to the decision support system. Similarly, workload
was not quantitatively found to influence the uptake of the decision support system
but was qualitatively referred to by participants as a factor in their decision-making
process. Additionally, no clear associations between several cognitive traits and uptake
of the automated system were observed. The findings from this experiment have sev-
eral interesting implications in relation to the importance of training, transparency of
system functionality and the need to maintain a sense of agency over task completion.
6.2 Introduction
This chapter explores how several factors, motivational and cognitive, interact with
the decision to use an automated system or not and task performance. This chapter
presents the findings from the student experiments conducted with ARCS and therefore
will:
(i) Summarise how automation use can impact on task performance, in terms of the
influence of:
(a) Information provided about the automated system
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(b) Experience of task and system
(ii) Describe how automation uptake and use can be influenced by two motivational
factors:
(a) Workload
(b) Accountability
(iii) Describe how individual differences in cognitive processing styles may modulate
automation uptake and use through discussing six cognitive processing styles:
(a) Cognitive Flexibility
(b) Need for closure
(c) Self-regulation processes of Assessment and Locomotion
(d) Impulsivity
(e) Conscientiousness
(f) Propensity to Trust
(iv) Present findings from the ARCS mixed-design experiment conducted with stu-
dents
(v) Discuss implications of the findings
6.2.1 How automation use can impact on task performance
Research has highlighted the benefits automation use can have upon task performance
across a variety of domains (Moray et al., 2000; Parasuraman et al., 2012; Schraagen
and van de Ven, 2008; St. John et al., 2005). However, automated systems can result
in derailments of performance such as automation complacency (Beck et al., 2007) and
loss of situational awareness (Endsley, 1987), see Chapter 2. It is interesting that au-
tomation use is often posited as the solution to dealing with increasingly complicated
and dynamic military environments. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 4, the application of
automated systems into operational environments does not necessarily result in imme-
diate improvements to task performance, especially if the tools are not fit for purpose.
The introduction to this thesis discussed the crucial factor of system reliability
and the impact this has upon trust in a system. Trust is commonly linked to sys-
tem use (Lee and See, 2004) and research has suggested that providing users with
meta-information of the automated system can improve trust calibration (McGuirl and
Sarter, 2006; Seong and Bisantz, 2008; Wang et al., 2009). This is due to developing
the users’ cognitive understanding of the system; both in terms of what it can and can’t
do and why. Lee and Moray (1992) posit that trust towards machines is transient over
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time and heavily influenced by the reliability of the system, therefore experience of the
system will influence current trust of that system. Training also aids the development
of learned trust (Hoff and Bashir, 2015) which facilitates better calibration of trust
towards the automated system thereby supporting appropriate automation usage deci-
sions. This assertion was supported by Beck et al. (2007) who found that with feedback
and training on a target detection task, disuse of the automated system reduced to 27%
as opposed to the 55% that was observed without training and feedback. Trust in a
system has also been associated to the anthropomorphic features of the system (Han-
cock et al., 2011). In fact, individuals have a tendency to anthropomorphise technology
even if no human-like features are built into the system (Nass et al., 1995), suggesting
a desire to comprehend and approach working with a system in the same way as we
comprehend working with other people.
A crucial factor in taking a decision-centred approach to designing automated sys-
tems is instilling a sense of agency in the operator. Forming a fundamental aspect of an
individual’s self-awareness (Gallagher, 2002), a sense of agency promotes self-efficacy.
A recent review by Limerick et al. (2014) explored the limited number of studies that
have explicitly looked at the ways in which sense of agency was influenced by interac-
tions with automation. As expected, the Level of Automation (LOA) directly impacts
upon an individual’s locus of control. That is, as the LOA increases the perceived
control over the task declines. Limerick et al. (2014) argue that identifying the tipping
point to when users no longer feel a sense of agency over the task will inform future
design and development of collaborative systems. This concept is crucial to ensure
that human-machine interaction and collaboration functions as an effective team dyad.
Bekier et al. (2012) explored this tipping point for air traffic controllers, collecting 500
responses to an on-line survey. Their findings argue the importance for locus of control
to remain with the operator, as air traffic controllers cited a shift away from utilising
automated tools when they perceived a shift in locus of control away from themselves.
Further, Kaplan et al. (2001) found that the illusion of control created by task involve-
ment lead to increased reliance on a statistically valid decision aid to complete financial
prediction decisions. It should be noted however that the preferred aid of the Subject
Matter Experts (SME) (N =91) and business masters’ students (N =61) who took part
in this study was not the most useful aid but the more interactive one.
Drawing also from the organisational and social psychology domains, the link be-
tween perceived controllability over a task and effort has been well established; the
lower the perceived controllability the lower the effort (Litt, 1988). Perceiving organi-
sational functioning as influenceable, promotes resiliency of self-efficacy (Bandura and
Wood, 1989), self-efficacy in turn promotes the likelihood of task success. Additionally,
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feelings of investment in a task (i.e. goal setting) can facilitate task completion (Yearta
et al., 1995) therefore, allowing operators to decide when, and if, to use an automated
system may increase their perceived control and investment in the task as they have the
final decision on how to approach completing that task. Maintaining a sense of agency
over the task may also reduce the occurrence of automation complacency errors. If the
operator remains engaged in the task, due to perceiving the importance of their role,
that engagement may mitigate against automation complacency, via maintained effort.
How confident an individual is in their own skill at a task has also been associated
with automation uptake and use (Lee and Moray, 1992). Individuals compare percep-
tions of their own abilities to the perceived utility of the decision aid (Powell, 1991).
When trust in the system is greater than an individuals’ self-confidence in their own
skill, then the automated system is used (Lewandowsky et al., 2000). Conversely, if an
individual is confident in their ability to complete the task manually they will be less
inclined to utilise a decision support tool. Therefore, it is hypothesised that,
 H1: Individuals with access to the Decision Support System (DSS) during the
task (Groups B & C) will perform better (i.e. correctly classify more tracks-
classify all hostile tracks) compared to the control group who do not have access
to the DSS.
 H2: Individuals who are provided with information that describes the automated
system in relation to a human operator (low automation condition) will select
the DSS more times than individuals who are provided with information that
describes the automated system in relation to current technological capabilities
(high automation condition).
6.2.2 Motivational influences on automation usage decisions
The most commonly explored performance metric when looking at the influence auto-
mated systems can have upon task performance is workload. In general, the application
of automated systems has been found to decrease operator workload (for example see
Balfe et al. (2015); Ro¨ttger et al. (2009)). However, automation applied to the stages of
information analysis and decision making has been found to degrade performance and
increase workload (Kaber et al., 2005). Additionally, in operational settings practition-
ers have reported that workload can be increased when utilising automated systems (see
findings from Chapter 4). If using an automated system increases workload the sys-
tem will be disused (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997), it therefore remains of interest for
researchers to understand the impact automated systems have upon operator workload.
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A second user assessment measure that has been linked to automation usage de-
cisions is accountability. Accountability can lead to avoidance of responsibility for
decisions (Eyre et al., 2008a) and is posited to influence an operator’s motivation to
utilise an automated system. The legal precedents for the use of automated weapons
and systems in warfare are still being established as technology is continuing to break
boundaries; changing the way in which warfare is fundamentally fought. Currently,
the main concern from an international law perspective, and ethically, is whether the
rules of distinction and discrimination are still followed when utilising advanced warfare
capabilities, such as remote attack systems (Boothby, 2014). The principal concern is
who is liable if an error were to be made: would the operator be personally liable for
the erroneous attack even though they are technically miles away from the impact site?
In an experimental navigation and gage monitoring task, accountability was ma-
nipulated to explore the impact perceived accountably had upon the occurrence of
commission and omission errors of automation use. Skitka et al. (2000) manipulated
accountability by informing participants that their performance was being recorded and
they would be required to explain their strategies used to meet the task performance
requirements. They found that increased personal accountability reduced automation
bias, via increasing verification behaviour. Moreover, in an industrial plant task experi-
ment it was found that participants who made task errors when cooperating with a com-
puter experienced reduced self-confidence, however, in the same task when cooperating
with two other individuals, task errors did not influence self-confidence (Lewandowsky
et al., 2000). The authors posit that a diffusion of responsibility occurred when coop-
erating with other individuals but not when cooperating with a computer. What this
means is that individuals were holding themselves more accountable when working with
an automated system as opposed to when they were working with other people. The
presented research above used experimental designs were automation was incorporated
into the task as opposed to allowing participants the choice of using the system or
completing the task manually. To the authors knowledge, at the time of writing this
thesis, no research has been conducted to explore the possible influence accountability
has upon the choice to use an automated system. Considering this literature this study
hypothesises that,
 H3: Individuals will use DSS when task demands exceed cognitive capacity (when
workload is high).
 H4: Individuals in low accountability condition will select DSS (more times)
compared to individuals in high accountability condition.
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6.2.3 Cognitive processing styles and how they may modulate au-
tomation uptake and use
Historically research on human-machine-interaction has focused on the attributes of the
automated system and how they impact upon use. However, recently there has been
a move towards focusing on features of the human operators of these systems. Does
a relationship between certain cognitive processing styles and automation use exist?
There is limited literature from the human-machine-interaction domain, however there
is a wealth of research that has been conducted exploring cognitive processing styles
and decision making in uncertain, time pressured and critical environments (see Chap-
ter 2). The use of automation is posited to aid human operations in such environments
therefore Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) literature will be drawn from to explore
the potential relationships between six cognitive processing styles and automation use.
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory
Defined as “the ability to switch cognitive sets to adapt to changing environmental stim-
uli” (Dennis and Vander Wal, 2010, p. 242), Cognitive Flexibility (CF) is a cognitive
processing style that has been linked to the ability to make decisions under uncertainty.
CF has also been associated with supporting adaptive expertise, which is argued to be
crucial in sociotechnical environments (Hoffman et al., 2013). CF is measured along two
subscales, CF-control and CF-alternatives. CF- control is associated with a disposition
towards perceiving challenging situations as controllable and has been associated with
reducing task based uncertainty (Power, 2015). Whereas CF- alternatives has been
related to the tendency to perceive multiple solutions to difficult problems (Dennis and
Vander Wal, 2010) and has been associated with increasing outcome based uncertainty
(Power, 2015). It is therefore anticipated that individuals high on CF will utilise the de-
cision support system later compared to individuals scoring low on this measure. This
is due to individuals high on CF being adaptive when processing complex environments
(Martin and Anderson, 1998).
Need for closure
The Need for closure (NFC) scale assesses the trait desire towards definite answers as
opposed to ambiguity or confusion (Kruglanski, 1989) and has been found to affect
the extent of information searching and processing required to reach a judgement.
That is to say, contextual factors such as time pressures or mental fatigue can lead
to extended information searching to be viewed subjectively as costly, therefore this
stage of decision making is swiftly closed in order to reach a decision and gain closure
on this subject and/or task (Jost et al., 2003). Therefore, Kruglanski et al. (2010)
highlight that NFC underpins the tendency to ’seize’ on early information/evidence
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and ’freeze’ upon the decision such evidence supports. Accordingly, it is anticipated
that individuals scoring high on NFC will utilise the decision support system earlier,
as a consequence of subjective workload, in order to facilitate the rapid closure of the
decision task.
Assessment & Locomotion
Classically conceived as aspects of the self-regulatory system, assessment and locomo-
tion are involved in the ability to desire, achieve and maintain end states and/or goals.
Assessment encompasses the analytical process of critically evaluating states, goals and
means to judge relative quality, whereas locomotion concerns the movement between
states (Kruglanski et al., 2007). Therefore, it is anticipated that individuals high (vs.
low) on locomotion will utilise the decision support system earlier in the task. Not only
in order to achieve the desired state of movement towards a new state (i.e. task com-
pletion) but also due to possessing greater flexibility towards task changes. Whereas,
individuals high (vs. low) on assessment are anticipated to utilise the decision support
system later in the task due to focusing greater attention on analytically understanding
the situation and task itself before making the decision to use the tool or complete the
task manually.
Impulsivity
The Barrett Impulsivity Scale (BIS)-11 is the most commonly used assessment for
impulsivity in both research and clinical settings. The scale measures 3 aspects of
impulsiveness: (i) Attentional impulsiveness - concerns the ability or inability to focus
or concentrate attention; (ii) Motor impulsiveness - concerns acting without thinking;
and (iii) Non-planning impulsiveness - concerns the tendency to lack forethought or plan
for the future (Barratt, 1985). Subtypes of impulsivity are related to different aspects
of executive control of working memory (Whitney et al., 2004). Although a complex
relationship, it has been posited that impulsivity may be displayed due to individuals
lacking working memory resources which prevents them from assessing multiple options
when faced with complex decisions (Hinson et al., 2002). Impulsivity has also been
linked to attention lapses and/or distractibility (Levine et al., 2007), which could have a
detrimental impact on task performance. Accordingly, it is anticipated that individuals
scoring high on the BIS are more likely to utilise the automated tool early in the
task compared to individuals who score low on the BIS. Additionally, individuals who
score highly on attentional impulsiveness scale may perform more poorly compared to
individuals who score low on this subscale.
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Conscientiousness
Conscientiousness, agreeableness, neuroticism, extraversion and openness comprise the
Five Factor model of personality. Specifically, conscientiousness is concerned with an
individual’s active self-regulation of behaviour; primarily to achieve goals, organise,
plan and complete tasks (Costa Jr and McCrae, 1992). In a threat detection study
where participants were required to identify if an image (or block of images) contained
a hostile person or not conscientiousness was found to be positively associated with task
performance (Szalma and Taylor, 2011). Further, Barrick and Mount (1991) found that
conscientiousness was one of the strongest predictors of job performance. It has been
posited that individuals who score high on conscientiousness would be less susceptible
to automation complacency as they will continue to engage in order to achieve their
task goals (Szalma and Taylor, 2011). However, counterintuitively high personal in-
vestment in a task has been linked to increased disuse of an automated system, even
though the participants were aware that the system outperformed them in the task
(Beck et al., 2009). These findings suggest that a tipping point may exist with enough
conscientiousness, and therefore investment in a task, facilitating the appropriate ap-
plication of an automated system to help achieve task goals. However, too high a
level of conscientiousness, and therefore investment in a task, may link into perceived
accountability and therefore result in disuse of the automated system.
Propensity to trust
The propensity to trust scale was designed to gain a measure of how positive one
feels towards automation (Merritt, 2011) and has been associated with patterns of
trust towards automated systems over time. Merritt et al. (2009) found that when
operating with a system that had transparent functionality, propensity to trust scores
were significantly associated to trust in the system, however if the system functionality
was ambiguous implicit attitudes towards automation were associated with trust in
that system. To date no study has explored if high scores on the propensity to trust
scale are associated to system use in a high-fidelity maritime scenario.
6.2.4 Summary
Sociotechnical systems are influenced by a number of factors and research has shown
that the application of automated systems can support and/or hinder task performance.
The literature highlights that a range of factors feed into what underlies effective use
of automated systems and equally can result in the overuse or complete disuse of these
systems. However, there has been a tendency to focus specifically on features of the
system and not on the cognitive traits of the human operators. Therefore, it is im-
portant to extend the understanding into human-machine-interaction by exploring the
cognitive traits that have yet to be looked at in relation to their potential influence
120
behind automation usage decisions. Therefore, the final two hypotheses addressed in
this chapter are:
 H5: To explore the relationship between scores on each cognitive trait and au-
tomation use.
 H6: To explore the relationship between scores on each cognitive trait and task
performance.
6.3 Method
In total N =42 participants took part in the experimental task. All participants were
undergraduate, masters, PhD or postdoctoral researchers from the University of Liv-
erpool. Participants were split into three conditions: A (n=13), B (n=13), and C
(n=12). Three participants, two from condition B and one from condition C, dropped
out. One participant from condition A was removed due to technical problems with
the task at trial 1. This resulted in a final sample of N =38; 15 males and 23 females.
A non-significant chi squared analysis showed there was no difference in gender
between the conditions (X2(2)= 6.877, p =.032). A one way analysis of variance re-
vealed a significant difference between age and condition (F (2,35) = 11.378, p = .000).
Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed a significant difference between
conditions A (M = 24.23, SD = 1.79) and B (M = 19.62, SD = 1.98), p=.000 and con-
ditions B and C (M = 23.83, SD = 3.97), p = .001. However, no statistically significant
difference was found between conditions A and C (p = 1.000). Table 6.1 Provides full
breakdown of the participant demographics. The study received ethical approval from
the University of Liverpool and MoDREC (Protocol No: 785/MoDREC/16).
Table 6.1: Demographic breakdown of age of participants across conditions
Condition
A B C
N 13 13 12
Gender Male 5 2 8
Female 8 11 4
Age Mean SD 24.23 (1.79) 19.62 (1.98) 23.83 (3.97)
Range (yrs) 22-28 18-24 18.29
Median 24 19 24.50
Due to the small sample size, median scores are provided alongside
mean and standard deviations
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6.3.1 Experimental Procedure
A mixed design was used (see Table 6.2) with participants taking part in the experi-
ment in groups (5 or more, depending on practicality and availability of participants) to
replicate working with other personnel around. Each participant took part in the study
twice, with at least a 2 week break in-between experiments. Participants were allocated
into one of three groups (A, B or C), they completed the experiment within the same
automation background condition, and experienced both the high and low accountabil-
ity conditions. The accountability condition was therefore counterbalanced, half the
group experienced low accountability at study time 1 and high accountability at study
time 2. For the other half of the group this was reversed- high accountability at study
time 1 and low accountability at study time 2. The accountability prime was a paper
based inject that was given to participants following the training presentation and the
automation background conditions divided participants based on the information they
received about the automated system, all materials used can be found in Appendices
Three - Six.
Prior to data collection an ideal sample size was computed using GPower 3.1. (Faul
et al., 2007) with parameters of a medium effect size (0.25), p=0.05 and alpha level 0.8.
This power calculation led to a sample size of 69 participants being required to ensure
appropriate experimental power. However, due to the design of the experiment and the
length of time it took to complete the task a final sample of N =38 were recruited, the
limitations of this are discussed.
Table 6.2: Experimental Design
Automation Background (between-participants)
Control (A) Low (B) High (C)
Accountability Low (L) AL (n=13 ) BL (n=13 ) CL (n=12 )
(within-
participants)
High (H) AH (n=13 ) BH (n=13 ) CH (n=12 )
6.3.2 The Training Session
Table 6.3 provides a brief overview of the stages to the training session (all material used
in study 1 and study 2 is included in Appendices Three, Four and Five). Following the
training session participants were briefly reminded of their task instructions and handed
the paper based accountability prime before beginning the main session. The second
time participants completed the task the immersion videos were not played again but
were discussed alongside stills taken from the videos. The 15-minute training session for
participants to understand where the information would be on the screen and how to
122
complete the task was also optional. These slight changes to the training session for the
second trial were deemed a way to mitigate against participants cognitive disengaging
from the task prior to the main scenario as the information had been covered previously.
6.3.3 The Main Task
The task of the participant was to classify each radar track into hostile, neutral or
friendly. To complete the experiment, the participant must remain vigilant to the
radar tracks currently on screen, ensuring that all tracks are correctly classified and
any radar tracks that are deemed hostile are highlighted to command. For the main
task scenario, conditions B and C had the option to defer to the automated tool if they
felt it was appropriate. Participants could defer to the system three times throughout
the 30-minute scenario. Participants in condition A were the control group who did
not have access to the automated system, these participants were required to complete
the task manually.
The main task ran for 30 minutes, see Figure 6.1. Participants were tasked with
classifying all the tracks on the screen as accurately as possible. At 10-minute intervals,
the radar screen froze and participants completed NASA TLX ratings (see Appendix
Four for the NASA TLX measure). This was intended to provide a continued gauge
of participant workload throughout the task. Two scenarios were developed as partic-
ipants would take part in the experiment twice, Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 display the
total number of tracks on screen for each scenario. For scenario 1 participants had 207
tracks to classify and for scenario 2 there were 209 tracks to classify. Presentation of
the scenarios was counterbalanced across conditions. To replicate daily operations on
a ship it was important that both scenarios were of similar difficulty to simulate the
day to day situations operators face, a Fisher’s exact test confirmed that workload was
found to not significantly differ between scenarios 1 and 2 at trial 1, p = .495 or trial
2, p = 1.000 suggesting that both scenarios were of a similar difficulty.
6.3.4 The Questionnaire Battery
Having completed the scenario participants were asked to complete the questionnaire
battery (see Table 6.4). This consisted of 7 sections (A - H), including demographic
questions, qualitative feedback questions (see Table 6.5) and the six cognitive trait
questionnaires to explore if a relationship between these traits and automation usage
decisions exists. The control group were only shown questions 1, 2, 7 and 8 of Table
6.5. The complete questionnaire battery is provided in Appendix Five.
Following completion of both trials participants received course credit or £10 for
their time.
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Table 6.3: The stages of the training brief given to participants
Training procedure for ARCS
1 Participants were immersed in the task via video and audio footage of
when high profile erroneous automated usage decisions have been made
in recent history. Additionally, a short video was played to participants
to inform them of the operational environment the air defence task is
conducted in.
2 The main task was then explained to participants, highlighting the re-
quirement for their classification decisions to be as accurate as possible.
The division of the experimental task was also explained to participants,
that they would first have 15 minutes to get used to the interface and how
the classification process worked before beginning the main 30 minute
task. Participants were shown what the interface looks like, where the
key information is located and how to interact with the simulation.
3 Next, participants were shown the iconography they can expect to see
throughout the task. For example, what airports will look like on the
radar picture. It is at this stage that participants are asked to complete
the symbology sheet in front of them, allowing them to label each sym-
bol. This symbology sheet remained with them throughout the task-
forming a reference point for the symbology on screen.
4 The participants were then provided with examples of behaviour that
they might expect to see during the task. A table of given speeds and
altitudes was provided to each participant, again as a reference sheet
they can use throughout the task. As the sample population are novices
to the air defence task, certain behaviours that would infer a potentially
hostile track were explained.
5 Following this, the NASA TLX questions were explained to participants.
Definitions of each of the NASA TLX workloads were also given as a
reference sheet.
6 For the automation conditions (conditions B & C) the characteristics of
the automated decision support system were explained. For instance,
that participants could use the system three times (for 10 seconds at
a time) throughout the 30 minutes. Participants in condition B were
informed that “The tool is as reliable as a well-trained experienced op-
erator”, and condition C were informed that “The tool is as reliable as
current technology can be”. This difference in information was used to
explore if a difference in automation use would be observed depending
on what information was provided to participants about the system.
7 Finally, participants were asked to read the ‘Daily Tasking Orders’ in
front of them. These orders reminded participants on their task and
were also the inject for manipulating accountability.
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Figure 6.1: Screenshot of the main task screen within ARCS
Figure 6.2: Number of tracks on screen per second for scenario 1
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Figure 6.3: Number of tracks on screen per second for scenario 2
Table 6.4: Overview of the sections included in the questionnaire battery at Stage 2
Section A Demographics
Section B Qualitative feedback questions
Section C Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (Dennis and Vander Wal
(2010))
Section D Need for Closure (Kruglanski et al. (1993))
Section E Assessment & Locomotion (Kruglanski et al. (2000))
Section F BIS-11 (Patton et al. (1995))
Section G Conscientiousness Scale (John and Srivastava (1999))
Section H Propensity to Trust Scale (Merritt et al. (2013))
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Table 6.5: Qualitative questions included in questionnaire battery
1 From 1-10 how would you rate your performance? (1= poor,
10= perfect)
2 On a scale of 1-10 how accountable did you feel towards the
decisions you made? (1=not accountable, 10= very account-
able)
3 Did you choose to use the decision support system at any
point(s) during the scenario? (YES/NO) (a) Why did you
choose to use the decision support system?
4 Reflecting on your performance, where there any occasions
that you think you should have used the decision support
system but did not and why?
5 Reflecting on the scenario, where there any occasions that
you felt you could have use the decision support system ear-
lier but did not?
6 What made you not choose the system at an earlier point?
7 Did you recheck tracks once you made a classification deci-
sion? (a) If Yes, how often did you recheck and why?
8 If you could perform the scenario again, is there anything
you would do differently?
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Summary
The six hypotheses and summary findings are outlined in Table 6.6. Opposing the
hypothesised benefit of having access to the DSS no significant differences were found
between the conditions on the performance metrics collected. No associations were
found between subjective feelings of workload, accountability and the information par-
ticipants received about the DSS and their subsequent selection to use the system or
not. However, it was shown that participants across all conditions significantly im-
proved at the task during trial 2, reflected in the total number of correct decisions
made, the reduction in incorrect decisions and lower subjective workload ratings. No
clear interactions between the cognitive traits measured and system use or task perfor-
mance were observed. However, interesting lines for future research are discussed and
these findings have interesting implications for further research into perceived perfor-
mance benefits of using automated systems.
A vast amount of data was collected by ARCS and only analysis relating to the six
hypotheses presented in Table 6.6 is included in this chapter. Appendix Seven provides
examples of the ways in which analysis can be conducted on the data ARCS collects.
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Table 6.6: Summary table of findings from hypotheses
Hypothesis Findings
H1: Individuals with access to DSS during
task (Groups B & C) will perform better
(i.e. correctly classify more tracks- clas-
sify all hostile tracks) compared to control
group
Contrary to H1 it was found that there
were no significant differences between
conditions. Whilst not significant the con-
trol group overall made fewer mistakes
and more correct decisions compared to
the conditions with access to the DSS.
H2: Individuals in low automation condi-
tion will select DSS more than individuals
in the high automation conditions
No significant differences were found be-
tween automation conditions and selection
of DSS.
H3: Individuals will use DSS when task
demands exceed cognitive capacity (when
workload is high)
Workload was not related to participants
selection of DSS. However, workload was
found to significantly reduce at trial 2
compared to levels at trial 1 across all con-
ditions.
H4: Individuals in low accountability con-
dition will select DSS (more times) com-
pared to individuals in high accountability
condition
Accountability was found to be an inter-
nally generated construct as opposed to
being externally manipulated and was not
related to participants selection of DSS.
H5: Explore the relationship between
scores on each cognitive trait and automa-
tion use
No clear associations between scores on
each cognitive trait and automation use
were found.
H6: Explore the relationship between
scores on each cognitive trait and task per-
formance
No clear associations between scores on
each cognitive trait and task performance
were found.
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6.4.2 H1: Individuals with access to DSS during task (Groups B & C)
will perform better (i.e. correctly classify more tracks- classify
all hostile tracks) compared to control group
Total correct classifications made
A 2x3 mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate the impact of participant condi-
tion on the number of correct classification decisions made. There were no significant
outliers, data was normally distributed and homogeneity of variance was present as
assessed by Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance (p A .05). There was also homo-
geneity of covariances, as assessed by Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices (p
A .910). Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not required as there were only two within-
subject factors. There was no statistically significant interaction between condition
and the number of correct decisions made, F (2,35) = 1.448, p = .249, partial η2 =
.076. The main effect of condition was found to be not statistically significant, F (2,35)
= 1.870, p = .169, η2 = .097. However, a main effect of trial showed a statistically
significant difference in mean total correct classifications at trial 1 and trial 2, F (1,35)
= 19.663, p = .001, partial η2 = .360. There was an increase in the number of correct
classifications made at trial 2 (M = 194.79, SD = 9.84) compared to trial 1 (M =
142.03, SD = 11.28), this was a statistically significant mean difference of 52.76 correct
decisions, 95% CI [28.61, 76.91], p = .001. Further, a Bayesian statistical analysis also
revealed very strong evidence for the statistically important differences between groups
(BF = 228.8). Therefore, we can accept the alternative hypothesis - there is a differ-
ence between the total number of correct classifications at each trial. This analysis
is further supported by an increase in participants stating that they were happy with
their performance following completing the task the second time around.
Total correct neutral classifications made
A 2x3 mixed ANOVA was performed and revealed a non- significant interaction be-
tween condition and trial on total number of correctly identified neutral tracks, F (2,35)
= 1.283, p = .290, partial η2 =.068. No significant main effect of condition was found,
however, a significant main effect of trial was revealed, F (1,35) = 18.524, p = .001,
partial η2 = .346. Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that on average
participants correctly classified 50.89 more neutral tracks during trial 2 compared to
trial 1 , 95% CI [26.87, 74.86],p = .001.
Total correct friendly classifications made
A 2x3 mixed ANOVA was performed to investigate the impact of participant condition
on the number of correctly classified friendly tracks. A significant interaction between
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condition and trial on total number of correctly identified friendly tracks, F (2,35) =
6.176, p = .005, partial η2 =.261 was found. There was a statistically significant effect of
trial on total correctly classified friendly tracks for the control group, F (1,12)= 12.844,
p = .004, partial η2 =.517, and for the high automation group F (1,11)= 26.400, p =
.001, partial η2 =.706, but not for the low automation group F (1,12)= .081, p = .781,
partial η2 =.007. Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correction revealed that participants
in the control group (M = 3.69, SE = 1.601, p = .020) and high automation group
(M = 3.67, SE = 1.61, p = .001) significantly correctly classified more friendly tracks
during trial 2 compared to trial 1. Table 6.7 displays the mean and standard deviations
for each condition across both trials.
Table 6.7: Mean and standard deviations of correctly identified friendly tracks
Trial 1 Trial 2
Condition M SD M SD
Control (A) 2.38 1.19 3.69 1.60
Low Automation (B) 2.54 1.71 2.38 1.45
High Automation (C) 1.67 1.56 3.67 1.61
Total correct hostile classifications made
A 2x3 mixed ANOVA was performed, there was no statistically significant interaction
between condition and trial F (2,35)= 1.290, p = .288, partial η2 = .069. There was
also no statistically significant main effect of trial F (1, 35)= 2.778, p = .105, partial η2
= .074. Table 6.8 displays the means and standard deviations of the total number of
correctly identified hostile tracks by each condition across both trials. No participant
correctly identified all 10 tracks in both scenarios.
Table 6.8: Mean and standard deviations of correctly identified hostile tracks
Trial 1 Trial 2
Condition M SD M SD
Control (A) 5.85 3.87 5.77 3.11
Low Automation (B) 5.31 3.38 6.00 3.87
High Automation (C) 5.08 2.81 7.00 2.70
When looking at just the conditions with access to DSS, independent t-tests were
performed to assess the differences between those who selected the system and those
who did not and the total number of correct hostile decisions made. At trial 1 this was
found to be not significant t(23)= .086, p = .932 and at trial 2 just significant t(23)=
-2.083, p = .049. Participants who used the tool on average classified 7.21 hostile tracks
correctly (SD = 3.03), compared to those who did not (M = 4.17 SD = 3.43). Further
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a Bayesian statistical analysis showed anecdotal evidence that there was a difference
between groups (BF = 1.708). However, independent t-tests performed on the total
number of correct neutral and friendly classifications made were all non-significant.
Correct decisions made across each 5-minute phase
ARCS recorded all performance metrics across the 30-minute task in 5-minute phases
this allowed the breakdown of the performance data across each phase to enable a
sequence analysis to be conducted. As the data was not normally distributed and
contained several outliers (Figure 6.4), Friedman’s test was computed to look at the
differences between the distributions of correct decisions made by participants at each
phase. A non-statistically significant difference between phase distributions was found
at trial 1, X(5)= 8.511, p = .130. However, a statistically significant difference between
the distributions of correct classification decisions between the 6 phases of the scenario
was found at trial 2, X(5)= 11.279, p = .046, see Table 6.9. Pairwise comparisons were
performed with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, with this correction
significance was lost.
Table 6.9: Descriptives of correct classification decisions made each phase at trial 1 and
trial 2
Trial 1 Trial 2
Phase M SD Med M SD Med
1 23.82 24.51 13.50 47.61 37.21 35.50
2 25.53 23.98 15.50 38.32 23.48 31.50
3 26.21 18.24 21.00 34.74 19.62 31.50
4 22.95 12.80 22.00 28.00 12.13 26.00
5 22.18 13.98 20.00 23.66 14.05 18.50
6 22.26 16.80 17.50 22.76 13.11 16.00
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Incorrect decisions made across each 5-minute phase
A Friedman’s test was computed due to the data violating assumptions of normality
and containing several outliers (see Figure 6.5). The analysis revealed a statistically
significant difference between the distribution of incorrect classification decisions made
at each phase at trial 2, X(5)= 12.412, p = .030. Pairwise comparisons were performed
with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons and significance was lost. At
trial 1 the analysis was found to be not significant, X(5)= 7.297, p = .199, see Table
6.10.
Table 6.10: Descriptives of incorrect classification decisions made each phase at trial 1
and trial 2
Trial 1 Trial 2
Phase M SD Med M SD Med
1 7.34 10.67 3.00 5.68 10.70 2.00
2 8.18 11.77 2.50 6.87 10.93 2.50
3 8.76 12.94 3.00 5.37 7.32 2.50
4 7.05 9.14 3.50 5.61 6.50 4.00
5 7.82 10.04 3.00 4.87 6.00 3.00
6 6.97 9.35 2.00 4.03 5.35 1.50
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Associations between number of changed decisions and task perfor-
mance
Pearson’s correlation showed a significant positive association between the total num-
ber of correct changes to decisions and overall total number of correct decisions at trial
1, r = .457, p = .004, however significance was not found at trial 2, r = .229, p = .167.
Pearson’s correlation showed no significant association between the total number of
incorrect changes to decisions and overall total number of incorrect decisions at trial 1,
r = .205, p = .217, however, significance was found at trial 2, r = .600, p = .001.
6.4.3 H2: Individuals in low automation condition will select DSS
more than individuals in the high automation conditions
Chi-squared test for association was conducted between condition and selection of DSS.
Two cell frequencies were lower than 5 therefore Fisher’s exact test was read and found
to be not significant at trial 1 (p = .550) or trial 2 (p = .363). Suggesting that there
was no association between participant condition and selection of DSS (see Table 6.11).
Table 6.11: Percentage of participants who selected to use the DSS across trials 1 and
2
Condition trial 1 Trial 2
Low Automation (B) 69% (n = 9) 69% ( n = 9)
High Automation (C) 75% (n = 9) 83.3% (n = 10)
Selection of DSS at trial 1 and trial 2
Looking at only the data from conditions with access to the DSS (conditions B and
C) an exact McNemar’s test determined that the difference in the proportion of low or
high use at trial 1 and trial 2 was not statistically significant, p = 1.000.
Table 6.12: Percentage of high and low automated system use across trials 1 and 2
Trial 1 Trial 2
Low use High use Low use High use
44% (n = 11) 56% (n = 14) 48% (n = 12) 52% (n = 13)
With this data transformation, chi-squared test for association was conducted be-
tween conditions. A non-significant association between condition and use of DSS at
trial 1, X(1)= .051, p = .821 and trial 2, X(1)= 1.989, p = .158 was found (see Table
6.12).
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6.4.4 H3: Individuals will use DSS when task demands exceed cogni-
tive capacity (when workload is high)
In total 25 participants had the option to use the DSS during the task. At trial 1, 18
opted to use the tool at least once during the task. For those who opted to use the tool,
10 (55.5%) reported high global workload, for those who did not opt to use the tool,
6 (85.7%) reported low global workload. At trial 2 this increased to 19 participants
opting to use the tool at least once during the task. For those who opted to use the
tool, 7 (36.8%) reported high global workload, for those who did not opt to use the tool,
1 (16.7%) reported low global workload. Global workload scores attained via NASA
TLX were converted into either Low or High based on the median scores for the sample.
This allowed a Fisher’s exact test to explore if a relationship between use of DSS and
workload was observed. The analysis found no significant relationship between these
two variables at trial 1 (p = .090) or at trial 2 (p = .073).
H2b Global workload will be lower at trial 2 compared to trial 1
Workload was found to significantly decrease at trial 2 (5.071.85) compared to trial
1 (5.971.30); t(37)= 3.681, p = .001 (see Figure 6.6). This difference is possibly
due to practice at the task decreasing the subjective experience of workload. Further,
a Bayesian statistical analysis also revealed very strong evidence for the statistically
important differences between groups (BF = 40.73), therefore we can accept the alter-
native hypothesis that there is a difference between groups (see Figure 6.7).
Figure 6.6: Bar chart depicting average global workload
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Trial 1 1st Phase 2nd Phase 3rd Phase 4th Phase 5th Phase 6th Phase
A 6.60±1.08 6.32±1.03 6.20±0.99 6.24±0.88 6.07±1.07 6.16±1.02
B 4.95±1.42 5.27±1.43 5.31±1.55 5.54±1.40 5.73±1.72 5.81±1.88
C 6.17±1.11 6.16±1.55 6.19±1.71 6.25±1.61 6.35±1.38 6.22±1.59
All 5.90±1.38 5.91±1.39 5.89±1.46 6.01±1.33 6.04±1.40 6.06±1.51
Trial 2 1st Phase 2nd Phase 3rd Phase 4th Phase 5th Phase 6th Phase
A 5.65±1.74 5.72±1.90 5.62±1.87 5.63±1.76 5.47±1.77 5.44±1.91
B 4.01±1.83 4.17±1.97 4.21±2.17 4.03±2.09 4.27±2.22 4.26±1.88
C 5.61±1.54 5.68±1.69 5.77±1.43 5.44±1.61 5.34±1.79 5.21±1.86
All 5.08±1.84 5.18±1.95 5.19±1.94 5.02±1.93 5.02±1.97 4.96±1.90
Figure 6.7: Mean and SD Global NASA-TLX workload ratings across all conditions
and each phase
Workload and total number of changed decisions
Independent t-tests were conducted to explore if a difference between the mean number
of changed decisions and workload exists. At trial 1 no significant difference between
means was observed t(36)= .269, p = .790. However, there were significant mean dif-
ferences at trial 2, t(25.812)= 2.318, p = .029, Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance
was significant therefore equal variances not assumed is reported. On average partici-
pants who reported low workload changed their decisions more (M = 30.53 SD = 26.88)
than participants who reported high workload (M = 14.68, SD = 12.84), 95% CI [1.787,
29.897].
Further independent t-tests conducted to explore if a difference between mean num-
ber of changed decisions to either correct or incorrect decisions at trial 2 were found to
be not significant (p = .094). Table 6.13 provides the mean and standard deviations of
changed decisions at trial 2 across reported low and high workload.
Table 6.13: Means and SD of the number of changed decisions to correct or incorrect
at trial 2
Decisions changed to correct Decisions changed to incorrect
Mean SD Mean SD
Low workload 11.89 11.19 2.95 3.47
High workload 6.74 6.78 1.47 1.38
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Weightings of workload dimensions
Spearman’s Rho correlations showed significant association between weightings given
by participants at trial 1 and trial 2 across all subscales of their NASA-TLX responses:
mental demand (rs= .530, p = .001), Physical demand (rs= .673, p = .000), Temporal
demand (rs= .626, p = .000), Performance (rs= .612, p = .000), Effort (rs= .565, p
= -.000) and Frustration (rs= .499, p = .001). This suggests that participants were
experiencing the designed workload pressures (i.e. mental demand) similarly across
both scenarios (see Table 6.14).
Table 6.14: Mean and SD of NASA-TLX weightings across both trials
Mental Physical Temporal Performance Effort Frustration
Demand Demand Demand
Trial 1 4.16  0.86 0.55  1.06 2.97  1.42 2.74  1.41 2.29  1.06 2.26  1.54
Trial 2 4.11  1.13 0.45  1.16 3.08  1.28 2.71  1.31 2.37  1.15 2.32  1.49
6.4.5 H4: Individuals in low accountability condition will select DSS
(more times) compared to individuals in high accountability
condition
A Kruskell Wallis analysis showed no significant relationship between the accountabil-
ity condition of the participant or their subsequent accountability rating at the end of
the task; in trial 1, X2(1)= 1.455, p = .228 (mean rank scores Low = 17.22 and High
= 21.55) and trial 2, X2(1)= .022, p = .883 (mean rank scores Low = 19.75, and High
= 19.22), suggesting that accountability was internally generated as opposed to being
externally manipulated by the prime at the start of the experiment. This is confirmed
by a significant relationship between self-reported accountability scores at trial 1 and
trial 2 across all conditions, rs = .675, p = .000.
Due to all cell counts being less than 5, the number of times the DSS was selected
was dichotomised into high use (as 2-3 times selected) and low use (as 0-1 times se-
lected). Accountability was transformed using the median split (Mdn = 6.00 for both
trials). This enabled a Chi-squared test for association to be conducted between ac-
countability rating and use of DSS. There were no statistically significant associations
between variables at trial 1, Fisher’s Exact test p = .689 or trial 2 X2(2)= .987, p = .320.
Accountability was also explored in its potential relationship to task performance.
Pearson correlations showed no significant association between self-reported account-
ability scores and total number of correctly classified tracks at trial 1, r(38)= .300,
p = .067 or trial 2, r(38) = .142, p =.396. Equivalent non-parametric confirmed no
association between self-reported accountability scores and total number of correctly
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identified tracks at trial 1 (rs = .311, p = .0.58) or trial 2 (rs = .228, p = .168).
Pearson correlations showed a significant moderate negative correlation between
self-reported accountability scores and total number of incorrectly classified tracks at
trial 1, r(38)= -.480, p = .002, but no association at trial 2, r(38)= -.076, p = .649.
Further a Bayesian statistical analysis showed very strong evidence that there was a
negative correlation at trial 1 (BF = 35.69).
Independent t-tests found no significant differences between high or low account-
ability and total number of changes to decisions made at trial 1 (p = .285) or trial 2
(p = .765).
6.4.6 H5: Explore the relationship between scores on each cognitive
trait and automation use
Automation use was dichotomised into early (selected in phases 1-3) or late (selected
in phases 4-6) and each cognitive trait was dichotomised into high or low based on
median split. Chi-squared tests were conducted however all cell counts were less than
5 due to the small sample size. Therefore, automation use was dichotomised into high
(2-3 times selected) or low (0-1 times selected). This data transformation enabled chi-
squared tests to be conducted to explore if an association between each cognitive trait
score and automation use exists. None of the analyses were significant (p A .05) which
suggests that scores on each of the six cognitive traits did not influence the decision to
use the automated system or not.
6.4.7 H6: Explore the relationship between scores on each cognitive
trait and task performance
Pearsons correlations were performed to assess if an association between the total num-
ber of correct decisions and each cognitive trait existed - all correlations were found to
be not significant (p A .05). Focusing on the BIS-attentional subscale scores indepen-
dent t-tests showed a weak mean difference between individuals who scored low on the
subscale compared to high and the total number of correct decisions made at trial 1,
t(36)= 1.974, p = .056. Individuals who scored low on average classified a total of 164
tracks correctly (SD = 64.19) compared to individuals who scored high on the scale
who on average classified a total of 199.56 tracks correctly (SD = 74.58). However, this
near significance was lost at trial 2 (p = .645).
Similar findings were observed when looking at the total number of incorrect de-
cisions, except for scores on CF, and specifically CF-Alternative scale. At trial 1 CF
139
was found to negatively correlate with incorrect decisions, r = -.419, p = .009, CF-
Alternative, r = -.482, p = .002, however no significant association was found at trial
2 (p = .140).
Looking specifically at the identification of hostile tracks, Pearsons correlations
revealed no significant associations between the cognitive traits and total number of
correctly classified hostile tracks at trial 1. However, at trial 2 a negative correlation
was found between NFC and correctly identified hostile tracks, r = -.515, p = .002.
6.4.8 Supplementary Data
Six themes emerged from the analysis of the questions relating to use of the system.
Figure 6.8 display these themes and a selection of quotes from participant responses at
trial 1. The most common theme to emerge was that of using the system to understand
how it functions, followed by using the system to help deal with uncertainty relating
to the decisions that needed to be made. Themes were related, for example;
I chose to use the decision support system when I became the most unsure about
the classifications that I had made, also when I felt overwhelmed by the amount of un-
classified icons on the screen. I chose to use it at these points due to being informed
that it was as reliable as a well trained experienced operator, therefore I tried to use
it as a method of backing up the decisions that I made. I also tried to use it at even
spaced intervals throughout the task. I also sometimes, found it difficult to remember
when it was necessary to classify an icon as neutral or friendly, so I decided to use the
decision support tool when the uncertainty of this was highest. Toward the end of the
task it became more overwhelming as I had classified most of the icons closest to the
base. However, I then became unsure of the decisions I had made and started to doubt
them, so I decided to use the decision support tool then.
This participant referred to the uncertainty felt around making classification de-
cisions, opting to use the system to support their decision making and improve task
performance. They selected the tool when they felt their workload and uncertainty
increasing. This use of the system was expected; individuals could lean on the system
when faced with high-levels of task-based uncertainty (endogenous uncertainty).
Although participants were informed that the system would not check their classifi-
cations a common rational written about selecting the system was to check the decisions
they had already made. This suggests that participants did not fully understand the
system functionality following a single training session. When introducing new systems
to individuals it is vital that they comprehend the functionality so that the system will
140
be used appropriately. The comments from participants suggest that a single, although
clear, training session is not enough for full comprehension of a basic system.
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Figure 6.9 displays these themes and a selection of quotes from participant responses
at trial 2. Although the same six themes emerged from analysis of the data the most
common theme to emerge at trial 2 was using the system to help reduce workload fol-
lowed by a preference to complete the task manually.
Workload remained a cited factor behind participants use of the decision support
system even though average workload ratings reduced at trial 2 compared to trial 1.
This highlights that workload remains a valuable performance metric to analyse when
exploring the uptake of automated systems.
Fewer participants referred to using the system to “see what it does” due to hav-
ing previous experience of the system from trial 1. However, several participants still
referred to using the system to check their decisions, even though they were informed
again in the training brief that the system does not check decisions already made. This
suggests that a combination of training and experience with the system is required by
individuals in order to fully understand how a system functions (Stanton and Ashleigh,
2000). Additionally, an increase in preference for manual control was cited by partic-
ipants at trial 2. This supports the literature that posits that self-confidence in ones’
own ability at the task will lower use of an automated system (Lee and Moray, 1992;
Powell, 1991). Uncertainty remained a factor underpinning the participants’ decision
to use the automated system. Participants would complete as much of the task as
they were comfortable with and defer to the system when facing uncertainty with their
decisions, “use the automated system in moments where I was more unsure about how
to classify them”.
Three themes emerged from participants responses to what they would do differ-
ently if they could perform the task again. Comments related to how they would use
the system, their decision process or that they would not change anything as they
were happy with their performance. There appeared to be a shift between trials with
a greater reference to deferring to the system decisions that remained uncertain to
the participants at trial 2. This corroborates the tendency towards manual preference
voiced by participants at trial 2 as participants would only defer to the system if they
felt they could not make the decision thereby avoiding making the decisions under un-
certainty that they found difficult.
Additionally, participants were potentially making inferences about the system
based on their ideas of how they would like and think the system should function, even
after two training sessions and previous experience of using the system. For example,
“If there was a military craft and I couldn’t see if it had originated from a friendly
143
airport I would have used the decision system to make the decision”. This highlights
that aspects of how the microworld was designed remained unknown to the participants
supporting the opaqueness of ARCS and is also in line with the concept that individuals
hold an automation schema which influences their expectations towards the system. It
is suggested that a preconceived automation schema can influence what information is
retained during training on system functionality which has important implications for
training on the functionalities of automation systems.
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6.5 Discussion
This chapter presents the six hypotheses relating to possible motivational and cognitive
factors behind using an automated decision support system (see Figure 6.6). The
analysis of the data raises interesting questions that will now be discussed.
6.5.1 H1: Individuals with access to DSS during task (Groups B & C)
will perform better (i.e. correctly classify more tracks- classify
all hostile tracks) compared to control group (A)
In opposition to H1, it was found that performance did not improve significantly for par-
ticipants with access to the DSS. These findings support the smaller body of literature
that posits that automated systems do not always mean task performance improve-
ments (Beck et al., 2007). As there were no conclusive benefits of using the system
these findings have important implications for how future research should approach
exploring the use of automated decision support systems. As Osiurak et al. found
(Navarro and Osiurak, 2015; Osiurak et al., 2013) individuals prefer manual control
if the system cannot improve upon task speed. A similar rhetoric was revealed from
participants at trial 2 with a greater number of comments relating to their disuse of the
system due to feeling confident in their own ability to complete the task. These findings
support the literature that has shown how individuals compare their abilities to that
of the system when making a judgement on whether to use an automated system or
not (Powell, 1991). Therefore, these findings highlight the importance of making the
value of the system transparent to the operators.
A significant improvement in task performance from trial 1 to trial 2 (on the neu-
tral and total classifications correctly made) was found. This could be a result of
participants prior experience of the task leading them to assume similarities between
the scenarios in the number of expected neutral tracks they would observe, thereby
classifying more neutral tracks the second time they completed the task. However,
improvement in correctly identifying more friendly tracks was only observed in the
control and high automation group and across all conditions there was not a significant
improvement in the number of correctly identified hostile classifications. This is in line
with literature that shows how individuals can improve in their decision making when
dealing with expected observations but do not improve in performance when making
decisions on unexpected observations (Baron, 1993). That is to say, participants were
expecting a high number of neutral tracks when they completed the task a second time
as they had experienced a high number of neutral tracks previously. This is supported
by the analysis of the number of neutral tracks classified each phase where at trial 2
on average more neutral tracks were classified in the first 5 minutes of the experiment
compared to the later stages of the scenario. However, as the number of hostile and
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friendly tracks made up 5% and 2-3% respectively of each scenario, these types of tracks
were not expected - mirroring reality. Therefore, although friendly track identification
did improve in two groups, possibly due to participants in those group paying closer at-
tention to aircraft that appeared around the designated “friendly airbase”, significant
performance improvements were not observed across the board, and not at all with
identifying hostile aircraft.
Anecdotal evidence was found for the benefit of using the decision support system
on the total number of correct hostile classifications at trial 2 when looking specifi-
cally at the participants who had the choice to use the system or not. It is therefore
tentatively suggested that if provided with the option to utilise an automated system
to aid performance, those who opted to use the system were able to correctly identify
more critical (i.e. hostile) tracks compared to those who did not utilise the system. As
the system would only classify neutral tracks, utilising the system may have allowed
participants time to recheck previously made classifications or to scan the environment
and therefore see potential hostile tracks appear. When they took back control they
were then able to select and correctly classify those tracks.
This study utilised a unique design in that participants were presented with a single
realistic (i.e. high complexity, low probability of criticality and inherently uncertain)
scenario and were given the option to decide to use the automated system or not.
Therefore, the finding that task performance was found to improve for the high prob-
ability tracks but not for the low probability tracks and that use of the system, in
some cases, supported the participant to identify a greater number of low probability
tracks has implications for operational environments. It is the low probability events
that carry the greatest risk to personnel in operational environments and therefore the
quick identification of these events is crucial. These findings support the literature that
shows that individuals develop biases to high probability events which can result in cues
to low probability events being missed. It should also be noted that these results could
be an artefact of participants being novices at the task. Although all participants com-
pleted training in the task there was limited exposure to low probability events during
the training, with more experience of low probability events detection of these events
during the task may improve.
6.5.2 H2: Individuals in low automation condition will select DSS
more than individuals in the high automation conditions
H4 was not supported by the data as no significant difference was found between the
low automation and high automation conditions and selection of the DSS. However, the
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rationales provided by participants as to why they used the automated system suggest
that the information provided about the system was a factor behind these decisions.
For example, “I chose to use it at these points due to being informed that it was as
reliable as a well trained experienced operator, therefore I tried to use it as a method of
backing up the decisions that I made”, this quote highlights that this participant, from
the low automation condition, was using the system as a team-mate, to corroborate
their decisions. Further one participant from the high automation condition stated,
“I believe that automated systems are better at consistently getting these types of deci-
sion[s] right than humans” they were also rated as a high user of the system. Although
anecdotal, these findings support the notion that previous understanding and expec-
tations of systems do influence later decisions around system use and therefore it is
vital that future research focuses on how to measure these expectations and to match
system functionality to them in order to support appropriate system use. The findings
from this study are in line with previous literature which has posited the influence of
previously held views towards automation and uptake of an automated system. Further
supporting the importance of training with a system prior to use. Detailed training
and the transparency of the system will enable the operator to develop a full awareness
of the value the system can provide to task completion; this knowledge will then be-
come a motivational factor behind uptake in operational environments. Additionally,
there were no differences in use across the two trials, suggesting that participants will
continue to use an automated system in a similar way each time they complete the
task. This finding highlights the importance of facilitating accurate understanding of
functionality and effective implementation of a system during its first application, as
future use of the system will be closely related to this.
6.5.3 H3: Individuals will use DSS when task demands exceed cogni-
tive capacity (when workload is high)
As expected workload was found to significantly decrease with practice at the task.
However, contrary to H2 workload was not associated with decisions to use the au-
tomated system. Although no statistical support was found for H2, the rationales
provided by participants following the main task suggest that perceived workload was
a factor in the decision to use the automated tool or not. Additionally, over 50% of the
participants who chose to use the automated system during trial 1 reported high work-
load on average across the task. Therefore, this study supports the previous literature
that has discussed the value of exploring workload and its impact upon automation
uptake and use.
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It was also found that during trial 2, participants who were experiencing low global
workload were able to recheck more classifications, thereby making more changes to
their decisions compared to the participants who were experiencing high global work-
load. No differences were found in relation to the total number of decisions changed
to correct decisions or incorrect decisions. Low workload allowed greater verification
behaviour via checking previously made decisions, although the analysis did not clearly
show that increased checking led to an increase in correct decisions. Providing opera-
tors with systems or training which enables them to deal with task demands and lower
workload is one possible avenue which could mitigate against the pitfalls of biased de-
cision making towards high probability events over low probability ones.
Global workload remained relatively stable across each phase and the desired work-
load metric of mental demand was produced by both scenarios. Additionally, both
scenarios were deemed to be of similar difficulty, which replicates the reality of oper-
ating on a ship in the same location for extended lengths of time. Although the initial
design plan was to cause an increase in workload during the critical incident, it was
decided to instead maintain workload levels as would be expected in the real world,
where the criticality of the environment can gradually increase. It would be of interest
to measure global workload of personnel daily when they are at sea to confirm, if as
posited by this study, that workload would remain relatively stable. Therefore, the
fact that workload was not found to be associated with using the automated system
supports the argument of Schwarz et al. (2014) that research should look beyond just
using workload as a user assessment measure.
6.5.4 H4: Individuals in low accountability condition will select DSS
(more times) compared to individuals in high accountability
condition
Accountability was found to be an internally generated construct as opposed to being
externally manipulated by the primes given to participants, supporting the fact that
accountability can be a challenging variable to externally manipulate (Skitka et al.,
2000). From this finding it is posited that the concept of felt accountability which
refers to an individual’s perceptions of their own accountability (Frink and Klimosky,
1998) was therefore explored in relation to decisions to select the automated system or
not. No significant relationship between accountability and selection of DSS was found,
therefore H3 is not supported by this data.
A significant association between self-reported accountability and incorrect deci-
sions was found at trial 1, participants who felt greater accountability made fewer
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errors at the task. This is in line with research that posits that individuals who feel
greater accountability will be more careful when making decisions (Beck et al., 2007).
However, as this association was not found at trial 2 and high levels of accountability
were also not associated to increased accuracy of decisions, as would be expected with
increased carefulness when making decisions, this finding should be interpreted with
caution.
A recent review on accountability literature has highlighted the potential influence
of social desirability on self-reported ratings of accountability (Hall et al., 2017). Par-
ticipants in this study were asked to rate their feelings of accountability on a scale of 1
to 10 and provided a range of ratings suggesting that this question was not necessarily
influenced by social desirability but that participants were providing an honest answer.
The fact that accountability ratings across the two trials were correlated within partic-
ipants further suggests that participants provided an honest rating of how accountable
they felt. However, in operational environments where there is a hierarchical structure
accountability may have a more overt influence on automation use or disuse. For in-
stance, literature has linked the importance of understanding one’s own role in a team
so that their accountability can be adjusted to that role (Adams and Webb, 2002; On-
nasch, 2015). Due to the difficulties of manipulating accountability experimentally it
would be of interest for future research to explore the potential influence accountability
has upon automation use or disuse in the field. It would also be of interest to develop
ARCS to increase external pressures and thereby generate greater levels of account-
ability. This will allow the robust testing of new systems and how they may influence
accountability and equally how accountability may influence their use or disuse in a
safe environment (Alison et al., 2013).
6.5.5 H5: Explore the relationship between scores on each cognitive
trait and automation use
Strong associations were found within participants for their scoring of each cognitive
trait measure which suggests that these measures were assessing trait characteristics.
However, there was found to be no association between scores on the six cognitive trait
measures and automation use.
6.5.6 H6: Explore the relationship between scores on each cognitive
trait and task performance
Task performance was not found to be reliably associated to scores on each cognitive
trait. That is, no relationships were observed across both trials.
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The results from this experiment tentatively posit the influence of attentional impul-
sivity on degrading task performance. The results from trial 1 suggest that individuals
who score highly on this subscale of the BIS-11 performed poorly in comparison to the
individuals who scored low on this subscale. Supporting research that has found an
association with impulsivity and attentional lapses (Levine et al., 2007). However, the
same difference was not observed at trial 2, it is posited this is due to the dramatic
increase in performance across all individuals at trial 2 overshadowing the interaction
between attentional impulsivity and task performance. It could be that experience at
the task mitigated the detrimental effect attentional impulsiveness can have upon task
performance, highlighting the importance and value of experience and training.
It was also found that individuals who scored highly on CF, and specifically the
CF-Alternative scale made fewer incorrect decisions during trial 1. However, this as-
sociation was not observed at trial 2 therefore these findings tentatively support the
literature that has shown how individuals who score highly on CF and CF-Alternative
scale are able to make fewer incorrect decisions under uncertainty and therefore are
able to adapt to uncertain environments.
Individuals high on NFC were found to make fewer correct hostile classifications at
trial 2, this may be due to experience of the low frequency of hostile tracks at trial 1 in-
fluencing expectations of the task and therefore resulting in information that supports
the presence of neutral tracks being seized upon early. This resulted in alternative
evidence or later information being ignored as individuals had already decided on track
classification.
6.5.7 Implications of findings
The findings from this study were unexpected, particularly that task performance was
not improved with access to the automated system. There are several considerations
that may account for why the findings from this study oppose the vast majority of
the literature that has explored human-machine-interaction. Firstly, the majority of
experiments exploring human interaction with automated systems compress the ‘sig-
nificant’ events into short scenarios (for example see Beck et al. (2007); Dzindolet et al.
(2003); Helldin (2014)). However, in real life personnel may go hours or days without
a significant threat and therefore creating experiments that elicit a ‘snapshot’ of the
overall task do not provide a complete picture (Hutchins, 1997). Therefore, the findings
from this study provide a novel and more realistic understanding of how people inter-
act with automated systems when conducting a task that takes time, has elements of
uncertainty and criticality but also is a task that, with practice, individuals in general
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feel capable, and are able to complete.
Although under time pressure, for instance participants had 30 minutes to classify
over 200 tracks, they were not subjected to more overt time pressure i.e. you must
make x number of decisions in y minutes. It may be of interest to run ARCS using a
scenario where the time pressure on each decision is more overt to participants to see
if interaction with and rational for using or disusing the system changes. However, if
the complete reality of the operational environment is not considered by researchers
then the findings from these studies will only be applicable in the limited instances
were operators are having to make decisions under extremely constrained parameters.
The wider literature on automation use posits that trust in the system is paramount
to enabling appropriate system use, however the findings from this study suggest that
during daily operations personnel will be capable of managing the classification task
manually. The potential implications of this are that when the operator is then faced
with an impossible task (due to time pressures or the number of incoming threats)
they may opt for the automated system not out of trust but out of a lack of choice.
Therefore, this brings into question whether current literature is providing findings
that are helping to support human-automation interaction across all circumstances or
only during situations when the choice of manual control is taken away from the human.
The use of a student sample for this study should also be considered when inter-
preting the findings. All students were novices at the task prior to taking part but as
was seen with the data analysis, all participants displayed learning effects the second
time they completed the task. Within the Royal Navy (RN) lower ranking personnel
will complete this classification task to build the recognised air picture. The majority
of these individuals may not have been to university as they will have joined the RN
out of school or college. Therefore, arguably university students should have the mental
aptitude to be able to learn how to perform, a simplified version of this task effectively,
as was evidenced by this studies sample. However, it would be of interest to run this
study with a sample of RN SME to explore how they interact with the automated
system.
Out of the total number of participants who had access to the system 72% (n= 18)
opted to use the system in trial 1, and 76% (n=19) opted to use the system in trial
2. The high percentages of participants choosing to use the system is contradictory to
previous literature that highlights a general preference for manual control (if it is an
option) over letting an automated system complete the task (Beck et al., 2007; Lee and
Moray, 1992). For example, Navarro and Osiurak (2015) found that for a preference
towards the automatic completion of the task to be found, the tool had to operate at a
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perceived 4x speed increase. However, the different experimental design employed by
this study may explain these findings. The system would only run for a short duration
(10 seconds) therefore participants may have perceived that the tool would not take over
the task thereby allowing them to maintain control of the task and still use the system.
Alternatively, the high rate of system use could have been an artefact of participants
not understanding how the system functioned, thereby selecting the tool to see what it
does. This fact is referred to by several participants in their feedback following the task.
Themes identified from supplementary data should be taken and developed further.
For instance, workload was reported by participants to be a factor behind their deci-
sion to select the automated system or not regardless of the level of workload reported.
Which suggests that not all motivational influences can be easily measured and anal-
ysed quantitatively highlighting the value of collecting qualitative rationales alongside
quantitative metrics when exploring the uptake of automated systems.
The common theme of using the system to see what it does highlights the im-
portance of involving the individuals who will be using the automated system in the
development and designing stages, as well as highlighting the importance of training.
Koltai et al. (2014) posit that appropriate calibration to an automated system can be
obtained through exposure and experience of real-world scenarios. The findings from
this study support this proposition. To improve skill an individual must be exposed
to training in high-validity environments and have adequate time and opportunity to
practice at the task (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). This is also true for developing an
understanding of how automated systems function and highlights the requirement for
the development of high-fidelity test beds that will allow operators to learn the new
skill of completing the task alongside an automated system. A lack of skill can result
in incorrect intuitions as was seen with participants. Although participants were given
clear instructions on how the system operated, for example that it would not check
their classifications but would make new classifications, participants incorrectly tried
to use the system to check their decisions. This suggests that how new systems are
introduced to operators and how training incorporates them into operations is crucial
to prevent misunderstanding on the role of the system. These findings could however
be an artefact of using a simulated environment as it has been found that participants
may focus on information searching over action implementation (Alison et al., 2015).
That is, participants did not just use the information presented in the training brief
but felt the need to use the system once to see for themselves what it did. Additionally,
it may be that participants were expecting the system to function in a particular way,
through holding an “automation schema” (Dzindolet et al., 2002; Rice and McCarley,
2011) therefore they were cognitively biased to expecting the system to check their
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decisions as opposed to hearing how the system actually functions. A relationship has
been found between expectations in a system pre-use and reported experience with
the system post-use (Li et al., 2008). With research arguing for human centred design
to enable systems to be built in accordance with operator expectations (Ashleigh and
Nandhakumar, 2007) future research should continue to explore the influence expecta-
tions have upon interaction with automated systems.
6.5.8 Limitations
Participants remained unaware of how ARCS functioned which confirms the opaque-
ness of the microworld. The scenarios presented to participants ran for 30 minutes and
were complex in their design supported by participants reporting a consistent level of
workload during the experiment. Finally, ARCS ran in real time therefore fulfilling the
three characteristics identified that constitute a valid microworld (Alison et al., 2013;
Brehmer and Do¨rner, 1993; Chen and Bell, 2016). Through the iterative development
of ARCS using the knowledge gained from conducting the study presented in chapter
3 and through informal conversations with experts, ecological validity was built into
the interface and the scenarios. However, there is divergence from the reality of the
task that ARCS was simulating as the task is usually conducted by a team of indi-
viduals working on the bridge for at least 4 hours. It was deemed unrealistic to ask
university students to spend over 4 hours in an experiment therefore the ARCS exper-
iment designed for this thesis ran for 2 hours. However, this length of time and the
repeated measures nature of the experiment negatively impacted upon the ability to
recruit participants. Although incentives were available, for example course credit or
payment, these incentives were not enough to ensure the aimed for sample size was
reached. However, the findings have important implications due to the chosen study
design. Participants were required to complete a task that was complex and long as
opposed to the widespread practice in human-machine-interaction literature when ex-
ploring threat detection of using blocks of short scenarios where arguably participants
are artificially primed to take action. Therefore, the findings are more generalisable
to tasks that are currently undertaken by personnel. Additionally, self-reported ques-
tionnaires rely on participants possessing awareness of themselves, i.e. insight into
their personality (Bari et al., 2016) and can be vulnerable to social desirability biases.
However, the fact that scoring by participants on each cognitive trait scale was reliable
across both trials suggests that social desirability biases were not observed in this study.
The scenario participants completed is specific to the first stage of conducting the air
defence task, the development of the recognised air picture. Therefore, the findings from
this study may not transfer to other tasks that are conducted on-board naval vessels, for
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example using an automated system to aid in navigating the vessel. However, lessons
can be passed on to similar tasks that involve making decisions under uncertainty when
dealing with high cognitive load and managing latent time pressures.
6.5.9 Chapter Summary
This chapter explored how several factors, motivational and cognitive, interact with
the decision to use an automated system or not and task performance. A high-fidelity
microworld experiment was run on a population of university students with the find-
ings highlighting that the use of automated systems is not always associated to task
performance improvements. Training effects were observed with task performance and
participants were found to utilise the automated decision support system in an equiv-
alent manner across both trials. These findings have interesting implications for the
literature that has argued the importance of transparency of system functionality as
the results presented suggest that individuals will approach uptake of an automated
system in a consistent way. Therefore, if inappropriate uptake occurs initially it is likely
that this inappropriate use will persist. The findings from this study also highlight the
necessity of taking a mixed-methods approach to this field of research. For example, al-
though workload was not statistically found to influence uptake of the decision support
system it was commonly cited as a factor that impacted upon participants decisions to
select the tool as evidenced by the supplementary data.
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Chapter 7
General Discussion
7.1 Introduction
The aim of this thesis was to provide a novel contribution to the literature on human-
machine-interaction in the context of military operational environments. Specifically,
this thesis adopted a mixed-methods interdisciplinary approach to: (i) present the
decision-making stages of the air defence task; (ii) discuss how automated system are
currently used in operational settings and where they may be used in the future; (iii)
discuss the existing procurement process, highlighting the barriers to effective automa-
tion application; and (iv) develop a high-fidelity microworld to explore individuals’
rationales of using a generic automated system when performing a threat detection
task.
Qualitative methods were adopted to holistically explore the decision stages of the
air defence task, presented in Chapter 3. The same methods were again used to gain
contextual depth and breadth of understanding on the current operational use of au-
tomated systems by Royal Navy (RN) personnel and where personnel view the use of
automated systems will have the most benefit in the future. Additionally, and uniquely,
personnel were asked for their thoughts and experiences of the current procurement
process, Chapter 4 presents this study in full. Identified through this qualitative re-
search was the importance of developing and using simulated environments to explore
how individuals interact with automated systems. This was achieved using quantita-
tive methods with the development of the Automatic Radar Classification Simulation
(ARCS) and the running of a within subjects student experiment, presented in Chapters
5 and 6. The central contribution of this thesis was to: (i) update the understanding of
the decision stages of the air defence task in light of increasingly sophisticated weapons
technologies; (ii) identify the negative impact of lack of communication and collabo-
ration between personnel and system designers on automation uptake and use; and
(iii) to develop a micro-world of the initial stages of the air defence task that can pro-
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vide a robust simulated environment to test the interaction of human operators with
automated decision support systems. Therefore, this concluding chapter will:
(i) Provide an overview of thesis chapters
(ii) Discuss the main findings of this thesis and their implications
(iii) Identify and discuss the methodological strengths and weaknesses alongside rec-
ommendations for future research
7.2 Overview of thesis chapters
 Chapter 1: outlined the psychological underpinnings of this thesis drawing on
the Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) and heuristics & biases literature to
empirically ground the research conducted for this project. Additionally, the
chapter provides an overview of the literature into human-machine-interaction to
provide context to the problem space under exploration
 Chapter 2: presents the mixed-method framework developed and followed by this
thesis and highlights the challenges typical to interdisciplinary research, such as
access to Subject Matter Experts (SME).
 Chapter 3: presents the first qualitative study. RN SME completed a ques-
tionnaire that explored the decision making stages of the air defence task. The
findings highlight that the high-level stages of the task; Observe, Identify and
Classify, and Decide and Act, have remained the same over the last 30 years.
 Chapter 4: presents the second qualitative study which explores current auto-
mated systems and how they are used operationally by RN personnel. Addition-
ally, this chapter presents where personnel view automated systems will play a
role in the future as well as opinions towards the procurement process. It was
identified that often systems are released into service not fit for purpose. This
has a detrimental impact on capability and increases the financial costs associated
with bringing systems into service.
 Chapter 5: describes how ARCS was initially tested with two pilot studies. These
pilot studies confirm the ability of ARCS to provide research with a high-fidelity
microworld to explore automation use decisions in the maritime environment.
 Chapter 6: presents the findings from the student experiment run with ARCS.
The findings of this study show that the introduction of an automated decision
support system does not necessarily lead to task performance improvements. Ad-
ditionally, that the mixed-methodology adopted enabled a holistic understanding
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of when and why individuals were selecting to use an automated decision support
system.
7.3 Summary of main findings
7.3.1 Operational use of automated systems in the RN
The central contribution this thesis makes is in exploring the operational use of au-
tomated systems in the RN. Revisiting the air defence task in Chapter 3 to update
the descriptive model of this task, it was revealed that the key stages of this complex
duty have remained the same over the last 30 years. Additionally, the identical areas
identified by Holt in 1988 that could benefit from the application of automation re-
main of importance for current RN personnel. For example, Force Threat Evaluation
and Weapon Allocation (TEWA) remains crucial considering the continued require-
ment to work across nations. These findings raise pertinent questions as to why the
same areas are still in need of support. Therefore, the next step of this thesis was to
explore the operational use of automated systems by personnel today - what systems
are available to personnel and how do they impact upon operations. Chapter 4 pre-
sented detailed qualitative findings that highlighted the ubiquitous nature of automated
systems in tasks performed by RN personnel across the domains of above water, un-
derwater, mine countermeasures and land and littoral manoeuvres. However, a critical
finding of this thesis was the disconnect that exists between system designers and the
personnel who will be required to use the systems developed. As discussed in Chapter
5, academia is uniquely placed to provide open architecture environments that are de-
signed to promote collaboration and knowledge sharing between system designers and
end users. Academic institutions are less constrained by commercial competition com-
pared to industry partners and are organisations that foster a culture of collaboration
and interdisciplinary research. This thesis has evidenced that this culture is required to
understand how automated systems currently interact and, in the future, will interact
with human decision making.
Highlighted just over 30 years ago by Tolcott and Holt (1987) the development of
new automated systems tends to be driven by popular technologies as opposed to the
systematic and holistic evaluation of the user’s needs. This results in systems that are
not always necessary, are overly complicated or are not fit for purpose. This thesis has
evidenced that this is still often the case which can have detrimental effects on capa-
bilities as well as increase the financial costs associated with procuring new systems.
With the current austerity policy that the UK has been operating under since 2010,
the fact that the current procurement process can result in increasing the financial
costs associated with the development of new automated systems to support capability
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is concerning. In order to enable continued development of new systems to support
military capability it is essential that the procurement process is improved to deliver
systems that are both cost and performance effective. These factors also contribute to
incorrect use and/or disuse of current and new systems. However, it is worth remem-
bering that not all decision avoidance is irrational (Anderson, 2003), if the systems
do not perform a required function it is understandable why they will not be used.
Similarly, if automated systems are overly complicated and opaque, personnel may not
fully understand the system functionality and therefore when and why they should be
utilising the system. Thus, the findings of this thesis support the argument for de-
signing transparency into automated systems to facilitate operator’s understanding of
functionality (Colebank, 2008; Johansson, 2010). The findings also highlight the vital
requirement for developers to work collaboratively with the end users throughout the
design, development and implementation stages to ensure that new systems are fit for
purpose and utilised appropriately.
Literature has shown that effective communication within multi-agency systems is
required to support situation awareness and decision-making (Waring et al., 2018). A
further key finding of this thesis is the importance of effective communication. Chapter
3 supports this by highlighting the need for effective communication within the opera-
tions room team to facilitate accurate development of the recognised air picture. Ineffec-
tive communication can result in increasing uncertainty around situational awareness.
As all threat evaluation decisions are based on Situation Awareness (SA), if the SA is
uncertain or incorrect this will negatively affect accurate decision making. Examples
provided in this thesis highlight the consequences inaccurate decision making can have
in this environment, for example the USS Stark incident. Additionally, it is accepted
that communication is vital to developing shared understanding and common frames
of reference that are required in order for the team to function effectively. Chapter
4 highlighted the requirement to facilitate communication between system developers
and end users to support the appropriate development of new automated systems. To
achieve this, innovative approaches must be developed and evaluated, for example the
Athena project highlighted in Chapter 4. Currently these channels do not appear to
be robust and therefore system designers and end users are not developing a shared
understanding which results in erroneous system development and use.
Uncertainty was a critical factor identified by Chapter 3 as impacting on the
decision-making process within the air defence task, supporting the wealth of literature
that highlights the ubiquiousness of uncertainty in military environments (discussed in
detail in Chapter 1). Chapter 3 also identified the importance of clear communication
to mitigate against continued uncertainty in environments that are characterised by
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time pressures and criticality. This finding supports the literature that has highlighted
the importance of clear and effective communication in multi-team system functioning
in critical environments (Waring et al., 2018). Evidenced by Chapter 4 is that uncer-
tainty can be increased with the introduction of new automated systems that do not
function as expected or required which can lead to disuse. Yet, in Chapter 6 uncertainty
was also found to motivate automation use in order to avoid dealing with uncertainty.
The automated decision support system facilitated the omission of decisions that were
perceived to be highly uncertain. These findings suggest that uncertainty plays a fun-
damental role in influencing decision making and use of automated systems. This role
is context dependent and complex therefore future research must continue to take into
account the effect of uncertainty to mitigate against problems it can cause (i.e. decision
inertia).
7.3.2 Uptake of automation
Operator error has been commonly cited as the primary cause of sociotechnical system
failure (Driskell and Salas, 1991) and has been associated with how complex the system
is. For instance, the more complex and opaque the system is the increased likelihood
that automation misuse or disue will occur. The findings from Chapter 6, where it
was observed that participants opted to use the decision support system to see how it
functioned, further support the importance of system transparency in facilitating au-
tomation uptake. However, it is not just transparency with regards to system operation
but also in terms of doctrine and guidelines of system use that is crucial to supporting
appropriate uptake and preventing system failure. Continued attention is required by
organisations to develop clear guidance on the ethical stance towards incorporating
automated systems into daily use. This guidance will feed into how accountable opera-
tors perceive their actions to be which will influence automation uptake. Additionally,
systems must operate in a transparent way so that if a fault occurs or an error is made
it is possible to understand what went wrong or why the system opted for the decision
it did, this will only be possible if systems can be understood transparently. Academia
can support the development of this guidance through continuing to explore organisa-
tional cultures and how these cultures are changing. This thesis suggests that it is vital
to continue to explore sociotechnical organisations as technologies continue to develop
and be introduced. Understanding the organisational culture and the influence this
can have upon individual and team decision making is required in order to identify the
facilitators and barriers to effective decision making in complex environments.
Additionally, identified by the findings of this thesis is the importance of facilitating
adaptability to make effective decisions. Team decision making requires the actor to
make assumptions about what the other members are doing based on what the others
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know, believe or want - the actor must take the perspective of the other team members
(Boland et al., 1992). This ability to anticipate what other team members may need
is crucial for superior team performance and adaptability to task demands (Serfaty
et al., 1998). If the team consists of human operators and an automated system that
functions as a ‘black-box’ and not in a transparent way it is difficult for the operator
to understand system functionality and therefore make assumptions in order to super-
vise the system’s actions properly. Adaptability can be supported through experience
and training therefore the importance of facilitating immersive and frequent training
opportunities for all actors in the sociotechnical system is once again highlighted. A
central contribution of this thesis is the development of ARCS as a flexible and valid
microworld that future research can utilise to explore human-machine-interaction in
the maritime domain.
One main finding from the ARCS experiment was that task performance, and crit-
ically identification of hostile tracks, was not improved with access to the decision
support system. This highlights that the introduction of automated systems may not
necessarily lead to immediate task performance improvements, as was also reported by
RN personnel in Chapter 4. This finding further highlights the need to ensure that
systems that are developed will provide end users the support needed to increase capa-
bility. Just because it is now possible to automate most tasks, does not mean that all
tasks need to be automated. It remains of interest to explore and develop robust train-
ing programmes that support the development of operator’s adaptive expertise which
enables them to notice the non-routine (i.e. increasing their own performance) as well
as to function effectively within a sociotechnical team (i.e. the team which consists of
the operator and the automated decision support system). Research has shown that
specification of learning objectives are required at individual and team levels (Salas and
Cannon-Bowers, 1997) and therefore training programmes must take into consideration
how these objectives interact, as well as making sure each objective is addressed during
training. This will enable the sociotechnical team to acquire skills, knowledge and a
sense of efficacy, all of which are argued to support adaptability (Chen et al., 2005).
Additionally, as the common method of training automated systems is by using vast
data banks of “known” patterns of life and information, how system developers train
awareness of the “unknowns” into systems remains of interest. For instance given that
the last time the RN fought a comprehensive air battle was during the Falklands War
(2nd April 1982-14th June 1982) there is a paucity of data that contains current po-
tential “unknown” threats. Training how to extrapolate the “unknowns” into potential
knowns will enable human operators and automated systems to remain robust and ef-
fective when facing contradictory and novel stimuli.
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It is interesting that the results from the student experiment were unexpected and do
not support the common arguments that come from the literature on human-machine-
interaction. It is posited that the findings stem from the ecological validity of the task.
As already discussed the scenarios presented did not induce fluctuations in workload to
effectively mimic the reality of the operational environment on a normal day. Addition-
ally, participants were explicitly asked for their rationales behind using the automated
system which revealed the influence of commonly mentioned factors in the literature
such as uncertainty and workload behind their decision to utilise the automated system,
even though these factors were not clearly identified by the quantitative analysis. In
contradiction to previous research this thesis found that levels of system uptake were
high among participants and that uptake was approached similarly between trails. It
is posited that the high levels of uptake were due to participants maintaining a sense of
control over the task as it was their choice to use the system or not, a system was not
imposed on their decision-making process. Therefore, participants were able to utilise
the system to support and complement their decision making as opposed to being asked
to use a system that takes over a certain stage of the decision-making task.
7.4 Implications and recommendations
Identified by the literature as a flaw of research on traditional rational models of decision
making is the failure to take into account contextual factors (Eyre et al., 2008a). A sim-
ilar flaw can be attributed to the traditional literature on human-machine-interaction.
The stripping away of contextual factors to allow clear distinctions to be made of task
levels has removed the complexity and intuition that influences how humans make de-
cisions and interact with automated systems (Jamieson and Skraaning, 2017). This
thesis has evidenced through qualitative research (discussed in Chapter 4) that tradi-
tional research into and design of automated decision support systems does not always
support better ‘in the field’ decision making, as new systems are not designed holis-
tically and therefore are not fit for purpose. There is however a new movement away
from the traditional Level of Automation (LOA) and abstraction of task components.
The findings from this thesis support the need for this new approach to understand how
automation interacts with human decision making. The role of the human remains crit-
ical to ensuring that systems are utilised effectively, humanely and ethically, thus they
cannot be an afterthought of system designers. Developing mental models and man-
agement of attention are critical skills to learn to function effectively in a sociotechnical
environment therefore more attention should be given to including the end-users in the
design and development stages of new automated systems. Chapter 4 also evidenced
that there is a desire from the end-users of systems to be included in their development.
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There is great value in research from context-rich environments that can pro-
duce credible and transferable conclusions (Mishler, 1990), therefore attention must
also be paid to supporting more pragmatic and holistic research into human-machine-
interaction. Consequently, this thesis adopted an NDM approach to the research which
enabled the extrapolation of real-world recommendations from the findings that are
presented. The collection of data from two qualitative studies with a unique body of
experts has opened an important window into understanding the operational use of
automated systems by the RN. Concern has been raised with only listening to experts
when exploring organisational practice and decision making. By only focusing on a lim-
ited group of experts this can produce an incomplete picture of organisational practice
(Gore et al., 2006). Cognisant of this, a large body of RN personnel were invited to take
part in stage 2 of this thesis representing a range of experiences, job roles and levels of
expertise (N = 53). Therefore, a detailed and novel picture of organisational practice
across various levels of the RN was drawn from the analysis presented in Chapter 4.
It is typical of industry to use “in-house” experts to provide recommendations and
expert knowledge when undertaking research or developing new technology. Whilst
these individuals do possess expertise, a key recommendation of this thesis is to use
multiple sources of expertise. That is, to collaborate with multiple experts who have
current experience of organisational operations at multiple hierarchical levels. More
extensive collaboration is required to support the development and more importantly
the effective integration of automated systems into operational use.
This thesis has drawn from the literature into automation and decision making.
The findings have revealed that although the NDM community has developed and ad-
vocated for approaches that support decision centered design there remains a disconnect
between system developers and the end users (evidenced in Chapter 4). Often there
is also the inability from the literature into automation to state what the individual
can achieve without an automated option within the study design. This results in a
skew towards perceiving the application of decision support systems to any problem as
beneficial, which has arguably led the research community to focus primarily on how
individuals can be made to ’trust’ automation. However, as evidenced by this thesis
in Chapter 6, individuals are capable of performing complex tasks and were found to
not significantly benefit from having the ability to use an automated decision support
system. This thesis therefore recommends that the first step to any automated decision
support system development is not to assume that the individuals require automation
to perform their task better but should be to explore if the individual would actually
benefit from being given the option of an automated decision support system.
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Research has shown that incorrect mental models can also hinder learning (Rouse
and Morris, 1986) therefore the development of high-fidelity safe to fail environments
within which personnel can practice the task whilst cooperating with the new systems
is vital. This thesis does not suggest that it is the first to advocate for the concept
of utilising high-fidelity training environments. However, such environments can often
be overlooked due to the expense of creating them and the time it takes to develop
and run effective training scenarios which enhance transfer and adaptive capabilities
(Kozlowski, 1998). However, such environments will provide users with a sense of typ-
icality which functions as a baseline. This will enable abnormalities to be identified
(Cannon-Bowers and Bell, 1997; Klein et al., 2005) thereby facilitating system error de-
tection. Additionally, this thesis has highlighted the prevalence of Doyle’s catch, that
is that developers are creating automation that works for one situation within idealised
settings but when that automation is implemented into an operational environment it
lacks robustness (Woods, 2016). Therefore, not only would the increased application of
immersive high-fidelity environments support operators’ training they would also sup-
port the robust development of systems that are not brittle when used in the real world.
As previously mentioned, a further central contribution of this thesis to the wider
academic domain is the development of ARCS. Due to the flexibility that has been
designed into ARCS this microworld can be used to explore research questions that lie
beyond the scope of this thesis. For example, future research could develop scenarios
that involve team structures and decision making to explore the uptake of automation
across teams. Additionally as ARCS can handle bolted on automated systems, future
research can look to utilise ARCS to test newly developed systems in a robust way.
7.5 Methodological strengths and weaknesses
The next section of this discussion chapter will present the methodological strengths
and weaknesses of the research approach taken. The majority of the data collected
for this thesis was qualitative in nature and an inductive approach to analysis was
taken. This resulted in the conclusions drawn being strongly grounded in the data,
a strength of this thesis. Additionally, in order to mitigate concerns that qualitative
research is less scientific, where possible inter-rater reliability was conducted to sup-
port the reliability of the analysis and therefore the findings. Presented in Chapter 2
is a clear overview of the mixed-methods approach taken by this work. Providing this
framework delivers clarity to the methodologies chosen to explore the research aims
of this thesis, explicitly stating how and why each method was utilised. This thesis
took an exploratory and experimental approach to contributing to the literature on
human-machine-interaction. It has been argued that mixed-method approaches are re-
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quired when researching complex environments (Greene et al., 2001) and sociotechnical
environments are inherently complex. Therefore, opting for the use of mixed-methods
which required both qualitative and quantitative data was an appropriate approach
to take. Multiple methods draw on the strength of both research styles which enable
the development of conclusions that can be placed in context of the operational envi-
ronment. This produces a holistic understanding of the operational use of automated
systems. It is argued that triangulation and complementarity that is enabed by using
mixed-methods can strengthen real-world research by increasing the validity and depth
of research findings. The strength of this thesis lies therefore in the complementary na-
ture of using multiple methods which has increased the depth of understanding gained
by the research; further increasing the ecological validity of the work.
NDM research aims to provide practitioners with positive recommendations in or-
der to support their operations and decision making (McAndrew and Gore, 2013). One
challenge typical of NDM research and that was encountered by the author of this the-
sis is gaining the approval for research from several distinct ethical approval boards. It
is vital that all psychological research adheres to the appropriate ethical organisational
bodies that have a stake in the research. This can however cause delays to the collection
of data, in this instance a delay of 8 months was endured due to the requirement to
gain ethical approval from the Ministry of Defence’s ethical committee.
An additional challenge to NDM research is with developing interpersonal relation-
ships with SME who are vital to enabling conclusions drawn from naturalistic research
to be grounded ecologically. There must be ‘buy in’ from these experts to the research
programme which is built through the researcher’s consideration of the research aims
but more importantly the possible benefits that can be provided to practitioners. For
example, study 1 in this thesis had a small response from SME, mainly due to a re-
stricted number of experts and a lack of their availability at the time of the research,
but also due to the working relationship between the author of this work and the ex-
perts being new. However, study 2 had a 90% response rate of SME asked to complete
the questionnaire. This is due to a number of factors: i) buy in from the gatekeepers
at Dstl due to having developed a working relationship over a number of years and
through clear communication of the merits of the research; ii) the research is highly
topical to ongoing inhouse work at Dstl; and iii) it was novel for personnel to be ex-
plicitly asked their views on this topic and therefore the research provided them with
an outlet to their opinions and views that was not previously available to them. It
transpired that the majority of personnel had not been consulted on their views and
opinions of automated systems and as they utilise a range of automated systems on a
daily basis this is an area that they are well placed and willing to comment on. This
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thesis has focused on the viewpoints of the end user as the majority of literature on
human-machine-interaction has focused on features of the system to provide practical
recommendations to system developers. A recognised limitation of this thesis is that
system designers were not recruited and consulted on their experiences with working
alongside practitioners when developing new automated systems. It would be of in-
terest to explore this experience from both sides of the collaborative process that is
required to develop systems that are fit for purpose. It will be through understanding
both sides of the table that practical recommendations can be developed for both sys-
tem designers and end users.
The design of ARCS ensured that a realistic scenario was run to explore the uptake
of an automated system during a threat detection task. There is often a tendency
for research into human-machine-interaction to use short, specific, and overt scenarios.
However, how far this replicates the reality of tasks in the real world is not always clear.
The scenarios run in ARCS were long (30 minutes each), presented participants with no
clear number of potentially hostile tracks and did not dramatically fluctuate perceived
workload. The scenarios were designed to mimic the reality of sitting at an operations
desk for long durations without a specific alerted event. Therefore, replicating some of
the boredom and monotony of the task that operators face in reality. Although this
design increased the ecological validity of the task it did have negative implications on
the number of participants that were recruited due to the length of the experiment;
reflected in the ideal sample size not being reached. However, the value of exploring
automation uptake in an ecologically valid way arguably outweighs the limitations
of a small sample size. The design of the experiment further reduced the negative
impact of limited sample numbers through utilising a within-subjects approach. This
enabled interesting analysis to be conducted which looked at individual performance
across both trials. The amount of data collected by ARCS on each participant also
strengthens the conclusions that can be made from the experiment. Appendix Seven
presents alternative ways in which data collected by ARCS could be explored by future
research.
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7.6 Future directions
Greene and Caracelli (1997) argue that multiple methods facilitate exploring complex
phenomena by providing contextual understanding. However, this depth often comes
hand in hand with identifying the complexity that underlies the situation. Therefore,
follow through from research may be required in order to ensure that the interpreta-
tions of findings can be understood by the intended audience, for instance policy makers
(Greene et al., 2001). The remainder of this chapter will present ideas for future direc-
tions of research to build from the findings of this thesis.
The main finding from this thesis is the importance of developing and maintaining
effective communication and collaboration between serving personnel, researchers and
system designers. Therefore, it is recommended that future research continues to ex-
plore ways in which to develop and support these inter-disciplinary links, for example
the Athena Project. At the time of writing, it is unclear how effective the Athena
Project has been for the US Navy in facilitating communication and knowledge ex-
change between academia, industry and the military. Future research will be required
to explore the effectiveness of programmes like the Athena Project and, if found to be
effective, similar concepts should look to be developed and utilised worldwide.
The importance of task expertise was also highlighted. For example, identifying
the capabilities of personnel to manage the extra workload that implementation of new
automated systems can produce whilst still completing their day-to-day tasks. As sys-
tems become increasingly technical the nature of task expertise is changing. Personnel
are required to develop expertise on the systems they interact with as well as the ex-
pertise to manage the task manually should the system fail. It has been evidenced
in this thesis that personnel are not commonly consulted in the development of new
systems which have a direct impact on their working day tasks. Although not ex-
plicitly explored within this thesis the findings of Chapter 4 raise important questions
with regards to training. From the authors experience current training procedures vary
in terms of what command level, job role and operational systems are being trained.
It would therefore be worthwhile to explore the effectiveness of each training path to
explore how robust the current training courses are. Effective training is vital to devel-
oping adaptive expertise (Brown, 2007; Hutton et al., 2017; Militello and Klein, 2013).
Adaptability is a key tenant of expertise and good decision making, it is also necessary
for the viability of a sociotechnical system (Naikar, 2018).
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Mentioned in the introduction to this thesis was the potential impact decision inertia
may have upon automation misuse or disuse. Although this topic was beyond the scope
of this thesis, the impact of decision inertia is an interesting area for future research
to explore. Within military contexts and as stated by one SME that took part in this
research “any decision is better than no decision”. However, research has shown that
individuals have a tendency to avoid decisions when: faced with non-time bounded
situations, working alongside multiple teams, and when dealing with uncertainty in
high-accountability environments (Alison et al., 2015; 2010). As automated decision
support systems are being introduced into such environments it would be prudent to
explore how the application (or disuse) of these systems mitigates against decision in-
ertia or increases its occurrence. Individuals have a tendency to associate less wrong
doing with inaction as opposed to action (Eyre et al., 2008a) which can manifest as
remaining in the information search phase in order to avoid feelings of regret. There-
fore, one possible motivation behind utilising an automated system could be in order
to avoid making the difficult decisions. However, the moral and ethical consideration
of operating with automation may mitigate this interaction as legally the human op-
erator is accountable should the system make an error. Consequently, does the use
of automated systems reduce the occurrence of decision inertia through increasing the
accountability felt by personnel when working alongside an automated system as op-
posed to another human. This is an interesting area of research that would benefit
from further exploration.
7.7 Final Conclusions
The aim of this thesis was to explore the uptake of automated systems in the mar-
itime air defence environment. It has contributed to the literature on human-machine-
interaction by adding to the limited body of research that has explored automation
uptake in operational settings. It achieved this by taking a mixed-methods approach
to combine expert knowledge with more traditional experimental measures. Two qual-
itative questionnaires were developed and distributed to RN SME. With the insight
gained from these studies a simulated microworld was developed and tested utilising a
student sample. Critically this thesis has identified that new systems are often intro-
duced not fit for purpose due to a disconnect between end user and system designer.
This has negative implications on personnel workload, capability development and fi-
nancial pressures on the organisation. One way in which to address this is by the
development and increase in use of immersive simulation environments within research
and during training. Therefore, this thesis also provides researchers with a novel mi-
croworld - ARCS with which research into the uptake of automation in the maritime
environment can be explored in a holistic and ecologically valid way. Additionally, the
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ARCS experiment highlighted that task performance is not necessarily always improved
by the uptake of automated decision support systems. This finding links back to the
responses from personnel, highlighting the crucial importance of supporting collabora-
tive links between system designers and end users. Therefore, this thesis recommends
that focus on how to develop and maintain effective links across military organisations,
academia and industry is required to ensure that newly designed systems are fit for
purpose and do provide the required support to personnel to increase capabilities.
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A Appendix One
1 
 
STAGE 1: VIGNETTE SURVEY 
1.1 PARTICIPANT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM 
What is the research?  You have been asked to take part in research that will examine decisions 
made within a ships operations room. In particular we are looking at understanding situations 
specific to air defence.  All the data gathered from these scenarios and questions will examine your 
opinions on the decision process that occurs within a ships operations room, from how situational 
awareness is developed to when defensive actions are taken.  Participation is completely 
anonymous and confidential. Your participation is completely voluntary and you are also free to 
withdraw from the research at any time should you decide you no longer wish to take part.  The 
results from this questionnaire will be used to develop training aides and software improvements to 
aid the decision-making process, with the aim to reduce the potential for indecision to occur.              
1. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time. 
2. I understand that none of my personal details will be recorded and that my responses are 
anonymous. 
3. I understand that in order to take part in the study I must be currently (or have been in the past) a 
member of the Royal Navy and that I have experience of working within a ships operations room. 
4. I understand that data supplied by me can be removed at my request at any time after my 
participation. 
5. I understand that all answers to the questionnaire must be at the unclassified level and I must not 
provide any information that is classified or sensitive.  
I understand the above statements and agree to continue with this questionnaire 
 I give consent to take part in this questionnaire (4) 
 
1.2 STAGE 2 VIGNETTE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Q1 Date of Birth: 
Q2 Gender 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
Q3 Rank: 
Q4 Time spent serving (years and months): 
 
Q5 Role duties and responsibilities you have conducted (e.g. FC, PWO etc.): 
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Please read through the scenario below, following will be 4 vignettes, each consisting of several 
questions. Please write your responses in the boxes provided. 
  
You are in a T45 deployed, as part of a coalition maritime force, in response to a developing 
regional crisis. There have been no attacks yet on coalition forces however the designated 
hostile nation maintains aggressive rhetoric and its armed forces are at a high state of 
readiness. The Political Policy Indicator (PPI) is 'Yankee' - maintain the status quo (significant use 
of force to support specific objectives may be authorised). The Joint Operating Area (JOA) has 
been divided into two sectors with maritime Task Groups operating in each sector. Within its 
Task Group the T45 has been assigned the duty of Sector Air Defence Commander responsible 
for Battlespace Management within the assigned sector. This includes air identification and 
maintenance of the Recognised Air Picture, asset management, airspace de-confliction and 
control of air assets. The T45 is operating in international waters off the coastline of a 
potentially hostile nation. Hostile nation territorial waters (TTW) and territorial airspace (TTAS) 
extend out to 12nm from the coastline. 
Q1 Situation 1 - A number of active civil airways run either through or adjacent to the assigned 
sector of responsibility. A daily Air Tasking Order is being issued for friendly military air traffic 
operating in the JOA. T45 tasked to monitor air activity over the designated hostile nation and in 
particular any surveillance aircraft operating over the sea. 
  
Q1.1 Explain your thought process and the information used to develop shared situational 
awareness 
  
Q1.2 Which information is most important to your decision making process? 
  
Q1.3 Please answer the following questions 
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Q2 Situation 2- Air contact detected in the vicinity of hostile airbase, transits at 280 knots 
towards coastline then flies a 30nm barrier at 14,000 feet over the sea but inside TTAS. An 
airborne maritime search radar is detected on same bearing. Sometime later a new contact 
detected leaving the hostile coast at 100 knots/ 3,000 feet flies on a direct approach towards the 
T45. 
  
Q2.1 Explain your thought process and the information used to develop shared situational 
awareness 
  
Q2.2 Which information is most important to your decision making process? 
  
Q2.3 Please answer the following questions 
Q3 Situation 3- A hostile MPA has been identified and tracked remaining inside own territorial 
airspace. Two new air contacts detected flying in formation at 450 knots/ 20,000 feet initially 
operating 50nm from T45 in territorial airspace but then descend to 500 feet and accelerate 
towards T45.  Air contacts climb to 5000 feet when 30nm from T45 and turn on search radars. 
Initially no response to warnings but turn away at 15nm and establish radio contact. 
  
Q3.1 Explain your thought process and the information used to develop shared situational 
awareness 
  
Q3.2 Which information is most important to your decision making process? 
  
Q3.3 Please answer the following questions 
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 Q4 Situation 4- Hostile maritime force at sea and closing coalition Task Group, will soon be within 
range to use their Surface to Surface Guided weapons. Mobile coastal defence missile batteries 
have been moved to coastal locations putting coalition Task Group inside their engagement 
envelope. Large scale air activity detected over hostile territory, formations of aircraft 
marshalling close to the coastline.    
  
Q4.1 Explain your thought process and the information used to develop shared situational 
awareness? 
  
Q4.2 Which information is most important to your decision making process? 
  
Q4.3 Please answer the following questions 
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STAGE 2 STUDY INFORMATION AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
1.1 PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Exploring cognitions behind automated use 
MoDREC Application No : 785/MoDREC/16 
 
Invitation to Take Part 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study exploring cognitions that may 
underpin automation use. This research is part a PhD project funded by the Defence 
Science and Technology Laboratory’s (Dstl) National PhD Scheme.  Before you decide 
whether to participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and feel 
free to ask us if you would like more information or if there is anything that you do not 
understand. 
What is the Purpose of the Research ? 
The aim of this study is to explore the cognitive processes behind automation usage 
decisions in critical environments for example during the air defence task. 
Who is Doing This Research ? 
This research is being conducted by Miss Chloe Barrett-Pink as part of her PhD project 
supervised by Prof. Simon Maskell and Prof. Laurence Alison. The technical partner for this 
research is Mr Robert Walden. This research is funded by MOD via Dstl’s National PhD 
Scheme.       
Why Have I Been Invited to Take Part ? 
You have been invited to take part in this research as you have been identified as having the 
appropriate experience and/or training relating to above water warfare operations. This 
research aims to help further our understanding of automation usage decisions. 
Do I Have to Take Part ? 
No, your participation is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the research 
at any time should you decide you no longer wish to take part without giving a reason. This 
will not affect your training, or your military career, in any way.      
What Will I Be Asked to Do ? 
You will be asked to complete a series of questionnaires. Included in this will be several 
questions that relate to your personal experience of using automated tools/systems during 
your career. Please make sure any experiences described are generic and avoid any details 
that would remove the anonymity of your answer.  
 
All results collected will be anonymised and will be used for this study and future research 
within this project. If you wish to remain updated with the findings of this study and the 
overall project that your participation will aid, please contact the researcher.  
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What are the Benefits of Taking Part ? 
There are no direct benefits from taking part. However, the results from this study will be 
used to further our understanding of the influence cognitive factors have upon the decision to 
use automated decision support systems.  
What are the Possible Disadvantages and Risks of Taking Part ? 
There are no significant risks or disadvantages anticipated from taking part. 
Can I Withdraw from the Research and What Will Happen If I Withdraw ? 
Yes, you are free to withdraw from the research at any time should you no longer wish to 
take part and you do not have to give a reason for doing so. This will not affect your military 
career, in any way. Any data that has been collected up to the point at which you choose to 
withdraw will be removed from analysis and destroyed.      
Are There Any Expenses and Payments Which I Will Get ? 
No 
Will My Taking Part or Not Taking Part Affect My Service Career ? 
No, this research project will not impact your service career in any way  
Whom Do I Contact If I Have Any Questions?  
If you would like any more information on the researcher and what the study entails please 
email Prof. Simon Maskell (smaskell@liverpool.ac.uk) or Chloe Barrett-Pink (c.barrett-
pink@liverpool.ac.uk). 
Whom Do I Contact If I Have a Complaint? 
In accordance with standard practice at the University of Liverpool, if you have any 
complaints please contact the University Ethics Committee (ethics@liverpool.ac.uk)  
What Happens If I Suffer Any Harm ? 
In the unlikely event that you suffer any harm as a direct result of taking part in this study, 
you can apply for compensation under the MoD’s ‘No-Fault Compensation Scheme. 
Will My Records Be Kept Confidential ? 
All the data collected will be anonymised and stored in a locked filing cabinet and/or on a 
password protected storage device during the course of this research. Following completion 
all consent forms will be forwarded to the MoDREC Secretariant to be stored for 50 years in 
accordance with extant UK legislation and MoD policy. 
Who is Organising and Funding the Research ? 
The research is part of a Dstl PhD funded studentship     
Who Has Reviewed the Study ? 
This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Ministry of Defence 
Research Ethics Committee (MoDREC). 
 
This study has also been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the University of 
Liverpool Ethics Committee.  
 
Further Information and Contact Details 
Name : Miss Chloe Barrett-Pink 
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Address : University of Liverpool, School of Psychological Sciences, Bedford Street South, 
L69 7ZA 
Tel No : +44(0)151 794 3936 
E-mail : c.barrett-pink@liverpool.ac.uk 
 
Compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki 
This study complies, and at all times will comply, with the Declaration of Helsinki 1 as 
adopted at the 64th WMA General Assembly at Fortaleza, Brazil in October 2013. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you would like to take part in this research 
then please read and sign the attached consent form. 
 
1.2 PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Exploring cognitions behind automation use 
MoDREC Reference: 785/MoDREC/16 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research.  The aim of this research is to explore the 
potential link between certain cognitive traits and attitudes towards automation use. This survey 
consists of 8 sections each designed to explore specific cognitions and their association to 
acceptance and use of automated decision support tools.  You will be asked to complete a series of 
questionnaires. All results collected will be anonymised and will be used for this study and future 
research within this project. If you wish to remain updated with the findings of this study and the 
overall project that your participation will aid, please contact the researcher.  The survey should take 
around 20 minutes, all responses are anonymous. 
Consent 
Please read each statement and check the box if you agree. By checking this box and continuing with 
this survey you are consenting to take part in this research.  
 1. The nature, aims and risks of the research have been explained to me. I have read and 
understood the Information for Participants and understand what is expected of me. All my 
questions have been answered fully to my satisfaction.  ☐ 
2. I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to participate in 
this project, I can notify the researchers involved and be withdrawn from it immediately without 
having to give a reason. I also understand that I may withdraw from it at any time, and that in 
neither case with this be held against be in subsequent dealings with the Ministry of Defence.  ☐ 
                                                             
1 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki [revised October 2013].  Recommendations 
Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. 64th WMA General 
Assembly, Fortaleza (Brazil). 
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3. I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I 
understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance 
with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. ☐ 
 4. I agree to volunteer as a participant for the study described in the information sheet and give full 
consent.     ☐ 
Participant’s Statement: 
I  …………………………………………………… 
agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information for 
Participants about the project, and understand what the research study involves. 
Signed:         Date : 
Investigator’s Statement: 
 
I Chloë Barrett-Pink confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable 
risks (where applicable) of the proposed research to the Participant 
 
 Signed:        Date:  
 
 
Authorising Signatures 
 
The information supplied above is to the best of my knowledge and belief accurate. I clearly 
understand my obligations and the rights of research participants, particularly concerning 
recruitment of participants and obtaining valid consent. 
 
Signature of Chief Investigator 
  
…………………………………… Date:  
 
Name and Contact Details of Chief Investigator:  
Prof. Simon Maskell 
Email: smaskell@liverpool.ac.uk 
Telephone: +44(0)151 794 4573 
 
Student Researcher: 
Name: Chloë Barrett-Pink    
Email: hlcbarre@liverpool.ac.uk 
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1.3 STAGE 2 - QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Section 1 (of 8) 
 
Please provide the following information about yourself by writing your answer in the space 
provided. 
 
1. Gender …………………………… 
2. What is your age in years?    ……………………………….. 
3. What is your current job title? ………………………………………………………………………………… 
4. How long have you held this role? (in years and months) 
…………………………………………...…………………………………………………………………………………… 
5. What previous job roles have you held? (please provide length of time spent at each) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
6. In total, over the course of your career, how long have you spent at sea? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
7. How long has it been since you were last at sea? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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2. Section 2 (of 8) 
Please ensure that any descriptions be generic and avoid sensitive details that would remove the 
anonymity of your answers. 
1. In your opinion, do you see automated tools/systems having a role in future naval 
operations? 
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2. Where do you see such tools/systems having the most benefit and why?  
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3. During your time spent at sea or during training, how often did you interact with and utilise 
automated tools or systems? (i.e. daily, weekly, monthly, once etc) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
4. What were the tools you used and how did they aid your operations?  
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5. Have you ever been consulted in the development of new tools/systems prior to their 
release into operational use? 
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6. What are your views on the consultation of current and future personnel during the design 
and development stages of new automated tools/systems?  
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3. Section 3 (of 8) 
Please use the scale below to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. I am good at 
“sizing up” 
situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. I have a hard time 
making decisions 
when faced with 
difficult situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. I consider multiple 
options before 
making a decision 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. When I encounter 
difficult situations, 
I feel like I am 
losing control 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. I like to look at 
difficult situations 
from many 
different angles 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. I seek additional 
information not 
immediately 
available before 
attributing causes 
to behaviour 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. When 
encountering 
difficult situations, 
I become so 
stressed that I 
cannot think of a 
way to resolve the 
situation 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. I try to think about 
things from 
another person’s 
point of view 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. I find it 
troublesome that 
there are so many 
different ways to 
deal with difficult 
situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. I am good at 
putting myself in 
others’ shoes 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. When I encounter 
difficult situations, 
I just don’t know 
what to do 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
12. It is important to 
look at difficult 
situations from 
many angles 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
13. When in difficult 
situations, I 
consider multiple 
options before 
deciding how to 
behave 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14. I often look at a 
situation from 
different view 
points 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
15. I am capable of 
overcoming the 
difficulties in life 
that I face 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
16. I consider all the 
available facts and 
information when 
attributing causes 
to behaviour 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
17. I feel I have no 
power to change 
things in difficult 
situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
18. When I encounter 
difficult situations, 
I stop and try to 
think of several 
ways to resolve it 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
19. I can think of more 
than one way to 
resolve a difficult 
situation I’m 
confronted with 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
20. I consider multiple 
options before 
responding to 
difficult situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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4. Section 4 (of 8) 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your 
beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I think that having 
clear rules and order 
at work is essential 
for success 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. Even after I’ve made 
up my mind about 
something, I am 
always eager to 
consider a different 
option 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. I don’t like situations 
that are uncertain 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. I dislike questions 
which could be 
answered in many 
different ways 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. I like to have friends 
who are 
unpredictable 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. I find that a well-
ordered life with 
regular hours suits my 
temperament 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. I enjoy the 
uncertainty of going 
into a new situation 
without knowing 
what might happen  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. When dining out, I 
like to go to places 
where I have been 
before so that I know 
what to expect 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. I feel uncomfortable 
when I don’t 
understand the 
reason why an event 
occurred in my life 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. I feel irritated when 
one person disagrees 
with what everyone 
else in a group 
believes  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. I hate to change plans 
at the last minute 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
12. I would describe 
myself as indecisive 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
13. When I go shopping, I 
have difficulty 
deciding exactly what 
it is I want 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14. When faced with a 
problem I usually see 
the one best solution 
very quickly 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
15. When I am confused 
about an important 
issue, I feel very upset 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
16. I tend to put off 
making important 
decisions until the 
last possible moment 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
17. I usually make 
important decisions 
quickly and 
confidently 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
18. I have never been late 
for an appointment or 
work 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
19. I think it is fun to 
change my plans at 
the last moment 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
20. My personal space is 
usually messy and 
disorganised 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
21. In most social 
conflicts, I can easily 
see which side is right 
and which is wrong 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
22. I have never known 
someone I did not like 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
23. I tend to struggle with 
most decisions 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
24. I believe orderliness 
and organisation are 
among the most 
important 
characteristics of a 
good student 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
25. When considering 
most conflict 
situations, I can 
usually see how both 
sides could be right 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
26. I don’t like to be with 
people who are 
capable of 
unexpected actions 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
27. I prefer to socialise 
with familiar friends 
because I know what 
to expect from them 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
28. I think that I would 
learn best in a class 
that lacks clearly 
stated objectives and 
requirement 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
29. When thinking about 
a problem, I consider 
as many different 
opinions on the issue 
as possible 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
30. I don’t like to go into 
a situation without 
knowing what I can 
expect from it 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
31. I like to know what 
people are thinking 
all the time 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
32. I dislike it when a 
person’s statement 
could mean many 
different things 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
33. It’s annoying to listen 
to someone who 
cannot seem to make 
up his or her mind 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
34. I find that establishing 
a consistent routine 
enables me to enjoy 
life more 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
35. I enjoy having a clear 
and structured mode 
of life 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
36. I prefer interacting 
with people whose 
opinions are very 
different from my 
own 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
37. I like to have a plan 
for everything and a 
place for everything 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
38. I feel uncomfortable 
when someone’s 
meaning or intention 
is unclear to me 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
39. I believe that one 
should never engage 
in leisure activities 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
40. When trying to solve 
a problem I often see 
so many possible 
options that it’s 
confusing 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
41. I always see many 
possible solutions to 
problems I face 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
42. I’d rather know bad 
news than stay in a 
state of uncertainty 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
43. I feel that there is no 
such thing as an 
honest mistake 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
44. I do not usually 
consult many 
different options 
before forming my 
own view 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
45. I dislike unpredictable 
situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
46. I have never hurt 
another person’s 
feelings 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
47. I dislike the routine 
aspects of my work  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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5. Section 5.1 (of 8) 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your 
beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale: 
 
  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
6. I don’t mind doing 
things even if they 
involve extra effort 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. I am a “workaholic” ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. I feel excited just 
before I am about to 
reach a goal 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. I enjoy actively doing 
things, more than just 
watching and 
observing 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. I am a “doer” ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. When I finish one 
project, I often wait 
awhile before getting 
started on a new one 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
12. When I decide to do 
something, I can’t 
wait to get started 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
13. By the time I 
accomplish a task, I 
already have the next 
one in mind 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14. I am a “low energy” 
person 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
15. Most of the time my 
thoughts are occupied 
with the task I wish to 
accomplish 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
16. When I get started on 
something, I usually 
persevere until I 
finish it 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
17. I am a “go-getter” ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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SECTION 5.2 (OF 8) 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your 
beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale: 
 
  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. I never evaluate my 
social interactions with 
others after they occur 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. I spend a great deal of 
time taking inventory of 
my positive and 
negative characteristics 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. I like evaluating other 
people’s plans 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. I often compare myself 
with other people  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. I don’t spend much time 
thinking about ways 
others could improve 
themselves 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. I often critique work 
done by myself or 
others 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. I often feel that I am 
being evaluated by 
others 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. I am a critical person ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. I am very self-critical 
and self-conscious 
about what I am saying 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. I often think that other 
people’s choices and 
decisions are wrong 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. I rarely analyse the 
conversations I have 
had with others after 
they occur 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
12. When I meet a new 
person I usually 
evaluate how well he or 
she is doing on various 
dimensions (e.g. looks, 
achievements, social 
status, clothes) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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6. Section 6 (of 8) 
Read each of the following statements and place a tick in the appropriate box. Do not spend too 
much time on any statement. Answer quickly and honestly.  
 Rarely/Never Occasionally Often Almost 
Always/Always 
1. I plan tasks carefully ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. I do things without thinking ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. I am happy-go-lucky ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. I have “racing” thoughts ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. I plan trips well ahead of time ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. I am self-controlled ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. I concentrate easily ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. I save regularly ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. I find it hard to sit still for long 
periods of time 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. I am a careful thinker ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. I plan for job security ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
12. I say things without thinking ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
13. I like to think about complex 
problems 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14. I change jobs ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
15. I act “on impulse” ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
16. I get easily bored when solving 
thought problems 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
17. I have regular medical/dental 
check-ups 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
18. I act on the spur of the moment ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
19. I am a steady thinker ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
20. I change where I live ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
21. I buy things on impulse ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
22. I finish what I start ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
23. I walk and move fast ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
24. I solve problems by trial-and-
error 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
25. I spend or charge more than I 
earn 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
26. I talk fast ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
27. I have outside thoughts when 
thinking 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Rarely/Never Occasionally Often Almost 
Always/Always 
28. I am more interested in the 
present than the future 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
29. I am restless at lectures or talks ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
30. I plan for the future ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
7. Section 7 (of 8) 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. 
For example, do you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? 
Please respond according to the following scale to indicate how much you agree or disagree with 
each statement. 
 
I see myself as someone who... 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. Does a 
thorough 
job 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. Can be 
somewhat 
careless 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. Is a reliable 
worker 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. Tends to be 
disorganised 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. Tends to be 
lazy 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. Perseveres 
until the 
task is 
finished 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. Does things 
efficiently 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. Makes plans 
and follows 
through 
with them 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. Is easily 
distracted 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
  
212
8. Section 8 (of 8) 
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with each 
according to your beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I usually trust machines 
until there is a reason 
not to 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. For the most part, I 
distrust machines 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. In general, I would rely 
on a machine to assist 
me 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. My tendency to trust 
machines is high 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. It is easy for me to trust 
machines to do their job 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. I am likely to trust a 
machine even when I 
have little knowledge 
about it 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Participant Debrief - please retain 
 
Thank you. 
You have now completed the questionnaire which signifies the end of your 
involvement with this study. The researchers would like to thank you for taking 
part. 
This questionnaire was designed to explore the relationship between certain 
cognitive traits and propensity towards trusting autonomous tools and 
systems.  
Can I contact the researcher for more information or to provide feedback 
about the study? 
YES- we value your feedback and reflections on the research study to aid in 
future research. If you have any questions about the current study, would like 
to provide any feedback (positive or negative) or would like a copy of the 
results of the research then please contact the researchers at c.barrett-
pink@liverpool.ac.uk 
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C Appendix Three
ARCS STUDY ADVERT, PARTICIPANT INFORMATION, CONSENT FORM AND 
DEBRIEF SHEET 
1.1 STUDY ADVERT & FLYER 
 
 
PARTICIPANTS WANTED! 
EXPLORING THE UPTAKE OF AN AUTOMATED DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO?  
Following completion of both 
sessions, you will receive £10 
for your time! 
HOW WILL YOUR PARTICIPATION HELP? 
The results from this study will be used to further our understanding of the relationship 
between human and automated system.  
WHAT DO I DO IF I AM INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING? 
If you would like to be involved in this study, and/or would like any more information on the 
researcher, what the study entails, please email  
Chloë Barrett-Pink at c.barrett-pink@liverpool.ac.uk  
WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU! 
 
Session 1: 
• Complete Scenario A using a simulated 
operations room. 
• Complete a short series of questionnaires 
on your experiences. 
The task will take no longer than 2 hours.  
Session 2 (two weeks later): 
• Complete scenario B using a simulated 
operations room. 
• Complete a short series of questionnaires 
on your experiences 
The task will take no longer than 2 hours. 
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 1.2 ARCS PARTICIPANT STUDY INFORMATION 
 
Exploring the uptake of an automated decision support system 
MoDREC Application No : 785/MoDREC/16 
 
Invitation to Take Part 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study exploring the use of an 
automated system designed to aid individuals' decision making as part a PhD project funded 
by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory’s (Dstl) National PhD Scheme.  Before 
you decide whether to participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully and feel free to ask us if you would like more information or if there is anything that 
you do not understand. 
What is the Purpose of the Research ? 
The aim of this study is to explore the motivational and cognitive processes behind decision 
making during a classification task. 
Who is Doing This Research ? 
This research is being conducted by Miss Chloe Barrett-Pink as part of her PhD project 
supervised by Prof. Simon Maskell and Prof. Laurence Alison. The technical partner for this 
research is Mr Robert Walden. This research is funded by MOD via Dstl’s National PhD 
Scheme.       
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Why Have I Been Invited to Take Part ? 
You have been invited to take part as you replied to the advert posted around campus. This 
research aims to help further our understanding of the relationship between human and 
automated system.  
Do I Have to Take Part ? 
No, your participation is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the research 
at any time should you decide you no longer wish to take part without giving a reason.  
What Will I Be Asked to Do ? 
This is a two-part study. You will be asked to complete a realistic Naval scenario involving 
the classification of icons on the radar picture into neutral, friendly or hostile aircraft.  
It is important to be as accurate and confident as possible with each classification decision. 
First, a short training presentation will be given to provide you with information on the 
background to the task and how the system works. You will then complete a 15-minute 
training round to familiarise yourself with the task and the system. Following this, the main 
30-minute task will begin. During which there may be the option to use an automated 
decision support system to help you complete the task. Following the main task, you will be 
asked to complete a series of questionnaires which should take no longer than 30 minutes. 
In total the whole task will take no longer than 2 hours.  
Two weeks later you will be asked to return and complete the task again. A new scenario will 
be presented within which all icons on the radar must be classified as accurately and quickly 
as possible.    
All results collected will be anonymised and will be used for this study and future research 
within this project. If you wish to remain updated with the findings of this study and the 
overall project that your participation will aid, please contact the researcher.   
What are the Benefits of Taking Part ? 
None to you directly, however you will receive £10 for your time in completing both parts of 
the experiment.  
What are the Possible Disadvantages and Risks of Taking Part ? 
There are no significant risks or disadvantages anticipated from taking part. However, during 
the training segment you will be exposed to a YouTube clip which may be potentially 
upsetting. You will be given prior warning of this material and provided with the option to not 
view this video clip. 
Can I Withdraw from the Research and What Will Happen If I Withdraw ? 
Yes, you are free to withdraw from the research at any time should you no longer wish to 
take part and you do not have to give a reason for doing so. Any data that has been 
collected up to the point at which you choose to withdraw will be removed from analysis and 
destroyed.      
Are There Any Expenses and Payments Which I Will Get ? 
Yes, upon completion of both parts of the experiment you will receive £10 for your time.  
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Whom Do I Contact If I Have Any Questions?  
If you would like any more information on the researcher and what the study entails please 
email Prof. Simon Maskell (smaskell@liverpool.ac.uk) or Chloe Barrett-Pink (c.barrett-
pink@liverpool.ac.uk). 
Whom Do I Contact If I Have a Complaint? 
In accordance with standard practice at the University of Liverpool, if you have any 
complaints please contact the University Ethics Committee (ethics@liverpool.ac.uk)  
What Happens If I Suffer Any Harm ? 
In the unlikely event that you suffer any harm as a direct result of taking part in this study, 
you can apply for compensation under the MoD’s ‘No-Fault Compensation Scheme. 
Will My Records Be Kept Confidential ? 
All the data collected will be anonymised and stored in a locked filing cabinet and/or on a 
password protected storage device during the course of this research. Following completion 
all consent forms will be forwarded to the MoDREC Secretariant to be stored for 50 years in 
accordance with extant UK legislation and MoD policy. 
Who is Organising and Funding the Research ? 
The research is part of a Dstl PhD funded studentship     
Who Has Reviewed the Study ? 
This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Ministry of Defence 
Research Ethics Committee (MoDREC). 
 
This study has also been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the University of 
Liverpool Ethics Committee.  
 
Further Information and Contact Details 
Name : Miss Chloe Barrett-Pink 
Address : Univeristy of Liverpool, School of Psychological Sciences, Bedford Street South, 
L69 7ZA 
Tel No : +44(0)151 794 3936 
E-mail : c.barrett-pink@liverpool.ac.uk 
 
Compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki 
This study complies, and at all times will comply, with the Declaration of Helsinki 1 as 
adopted at the 64th WMA General Assembly at Fortaleza, Brazil in October 2013. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you would like to take part in this research 
then please read and sign the attached consent form. 
  
                                                             
1 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki [revised October 2013].  Recommendations 
Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. 64th WMA General 
Assembly, Fortaleza (Brazil). 
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 1.3 PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Study title: Exploring the uptake of an automated decision support system 
Name of Researcher: Chloë Barrett-Pink 
 
Please tick boxes 
1. The nature, aims and risks of the research have been explained to me. I have read and 
understood the Information for Participants and understand what is expected of me. All my 
questions have been answered fully to my satisfaction. 
2. I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to participate 
in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and be withdrawn from it immediately without 
having to give a reason. I also understand that I may be withdrawn from it at any time, and that in 
neither case will this be held against me in subsequent dealings with the Ministry of Defence. 
3. I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. 
I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in 
accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
4. I agree to volunteer as a participant for the study described in the information sheet and give 
full consent. 
 
Participant’s Statement: 
 
I …………………………………………………… 
 
agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction 
and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the 
Information for Participants about the project, and understand what the research study 
involves. 
Signed:   Date:         
  
 Investigator’s Statement: 
 
I Chloë Barrett-Pink confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any 
foreseeable risks (where applicable) of the proposed research to the Participant 
 
     
Signed:          Date:  
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Authorising Signatures 
 
The information supplied above is to the best of my knowledge and belief accurate. I clearly 
understand my obligations and the rights of research participants, particularly concerning 
recruitment of participants and obtaining valid consent. 
 
Signature of Chief Investigator 
  
…………………………………………………… Date:  
 
Name and Contact Details of Chief Investigator:  
Prof. Simon Maskell 
Email: smaskell@liverpool.ac.uk 
Telephone: +44(0)151 794 4573 
 
Student Researcher: 
Name: Chloë Barrett-Pink    
Email: hlcbarre@liverpool.ac.uk 
 
1.4 PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF SHEET 
 
DEBRIEF AND FURTHER INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Thank you 
 
You have now completed the experiment which signifies the end of your involvement with 
this study. The researchers would like to thank you for taking part.  
More information 
The experiment was designed to explore the uptake and use of an autonomous system 
designed to support decision making within a complex environment.  
Can I contact the researchers for more information or to provide feedback about the 
study? 
Yes – we value your feedback and reflections on the research study to aid future research. If 
you have any questions about the current study or would like to provide any feedback 
(positive or negative) then please contact the researcher at c.barrett-pink@liverpool.ac.uk  
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D Appendix Four
ARCS EXPERIMENT INFORMATION  
1.1 TRAINING SLIDES (THE SCENARIOS AND INFORMATION FOR EACH CONDITION WAS SEPARATED 
WHEN PRESENTED TO PARTICIPANTS) 
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 1.2 INFORMATION SHEET 
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1.3 TRACK SYMBOLOGY  
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1.4 DEFINITIONS OF NASA-TLX WORKLOAD DIMENSIONS 
 
MENTAL DEMAND Low/High How much mental and perceptual activity was required 
(e.g. thinking, deciding, calculating, remembering, 
looking, searching etc.)? Was the task easy or 
demanding, simple or complex, exacting or forgiving? 
PHYSICAL DEMAND Low/High How much physical activity was required (e.g. pushing, 
pulling, turning, controlling, activating etc.)? Was the 
task easy or demanding, slow or brisk, slack or 
strenuous, restful or laborious? 
TEMPORAL DEMAND Low/High How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate 
or pace at which the tasks or task elements occurred? 
Was the pace slow and leisurely or rapid and frantic? 
PERFORMANCE Good/Poor How successful do you think you were in accomplishing 
the goals of the task set by the experimenter? How 
satisfied were you with your performance in 
accomplishing these goals? 
EFFORT Low/High How hard do you have to work (mentally or physically) 
to accomplish your level of performance? 
FRUSTRATION LEVEL Low/High How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and 
annoyed versus secure, gratified, content, relaxed and 
complacent did you feel during the task? 
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E Appendix Five
QUESTIONNAIRE GIVEN TO PARTICIPANTS FOLLOWING ARCS 
 
SECTION 1 (OF 8) 
Please provide the following information about yourself by ticking the appropriate box or write your answer in 
the space provided. 
I.D. Number: ……………… 
Gender: ………………………… 
What is your age in years?     ………………………………………………………… 
What course did you previously study? …………………………………………………………………… 
What course are you currently studying? …………………………………………………………………. 
 
SECTION 2 (OF 8)  FOR PARTICIPANTS IN CONDITION A  
1. From 1-10 how would you rate your performance (1=poor, 10=perfect) …………………………….. 
2. On a scale of 1-10 how accountable did you feel towards the decisions you made? (1=not 
accountable, 10= very accountable) …………………………………. 
3. Did you recheck tracks once you made a classification decision? YES/NO 
4. If YES, how often did you recheck and why? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5. If you could perform the scenario again, is there anything you would do differently? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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 SECTION 2 (OF 8)  FOR PARTICIPANTS IN CONDITIONS B AND C 
1. From 1-10 how would you rate your performance (1=poor, 10=perfect) …………………………….. 
2. On a scale of 1-10 how accountable did you feel towards the decisions you made? (1=not 
accountable, 10= very accountable) …………………………………. 
3. Did you choose the use the decision support system at any point(s) during the scenario? YES/NO 
a. Why did you choose to use the decision support 
system?.........................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................. .........................
......................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................. .........................
......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................... 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
4. Reflecting on your performance, were there any occasions that you think you should have used the 
decision support system but did not and why? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
5. Reflecting back on the scenario, were there any occasions that you felt you could have used the 
decision support system earlier but did not? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………...………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
6. What made you not choose the system at an earlier 
point?....................................................................................................................... ...................................
............................................................................................................................. .......................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................. .......................................
............................................ 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
228
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
7. Did you recheck tracks once you made a classification decision? YES/NO 
8. If YES, how often did you recheck and why? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
9. If you could perform the scenario again, is there anything you would do differently? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
SECTION 3 (OF 8) 
Please use the scale below to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. I am good at 
“sizing up” 
situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. I have a hard time 
making decisions 
when faced with 
difficult situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. I consider multiple 
options before 
making a decision 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. When I encounter 
difficult situations, 
I feel like I am 
losing control 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
5. I like to look at 
difficult situations 
from many 
different angles 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. I seek additional 
information not 
immediately 
available before 
attributing causes 
to behaviour 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. When 
encountering 
difficult situations, 
I become so 
stressed that I 
cannot think of a 
way to resolve the 
situation 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. I try to think about 
things from 
another person’s 
point of view 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. I find it 
troublesome that 
there are so many 
different ways to 
deal with difficult 
situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. I am good at 
putting myself in 
others’ shoes 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. When I encounter 
difficult situations, 
I just don’t know 
what to do 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
12. It is important to 
look at difficult 
situations from 
many angles 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
13. When in difficult 
situations, I 
consider multiple 
options before 
deciding how to 
behave 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14. I often look at a 
situation from 
different view 
points 
 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
15. I am capable of 
overcoming the 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
difficulties in life 
that I face 
16. I consider all the 
available facts and 
information when 
attributing causes 
to behaviour 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
17. I feel I have no 
power to change 
things in difficult 
situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
18. When I encounter 
difficult situations, 
I stop and try to 
think of several 
ways to resolve it 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
19. I can think of more 
than one way to 
resolve a difficult 
situation I’m 
confronted with 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
20. I consider multiple 
options before 
responding to 
difficult situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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SECTION 4 (OF 8) 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your beliefs 
and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I think that having 
clear rules and 
order at work is 
essential for 
success 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. Even after I’ve 
made up my mind 
about something, I 
am always eager 
to consider a 
different option 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. I don’t like 
situations that are 
uncertain 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. I dislike questions 
which could be 
answered in many 
different ways 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. I like to have 
friends who are 
unpredictable 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. I find that a well 
ordered life with 
regular hours suits 
my temperament 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. I enjoy the 
uncertainty of 
going into a new 
situation without 
knowing what 
might happen  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. When dining out, I 
like to go to places 
where I have been 
before so that I 
know what to 
expect 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. I feel 
uncomfortable 
when I don’t 
understand the 
reason why an 
event occurred in 
my life 
 
 
 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
10. I feel irritated 
when one person 
disagrees with 
what everyone 
else in a group 
believes  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. I hate to change 
plans at the last 
minute 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
12. I would describe 
myself as 
indecisive 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
13. When I go 
shopping, I have 
difficulty deciding 
exactly what it is I 
want 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14. When faced with a 
problem I usually 
see the one best 
solution very 
quickly 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
15. When I am 
confused about an 
important issue, I 
feel very upset 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
16. I tend to put off 
making important 
decisions until the 
last possible 
moment 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
17. I usually make 
important 
decisions quickly 
and confidently 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
18. I have never been 
late for an 
appointment or 
work 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
19. I think it is fun to 
change my plans 
at the last minute 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
20. My personal space 
is usually messy 
and disorganised 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
21. In most social 
conflicts, I can 
easily see which 
side is right and 
which is wrong 
 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
22. I have never 
known someone I 
did not like 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
23. I tend to struggle 
with most 
decisions 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
24. I believe 
orderliness and 
organisation are 
among the most 
important 
characteristics of a 
good student 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
25. When considering 
most conflict 
situations, I can 
usually see how 
both sides could 
be right 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
26. I don’t like to be 
with people who 
are capable of 
unexpected 
actions 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
27. I prefer to socialise 
with familiar 
friends because I 
know what to 
expect from them 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
28. I think that I would 
learn best in a 
class that lacks 
clearly stated 
objectives and 
requirement 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
29. When thinking 
about a problem, I 
consider as many 
different opinions 
on the issue as 
possible 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
30. I don’t like to go 
into a situation 
without knowing 
what I can expect 
from it 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
31. I like to know what 
people are 
thinking all the 
time 
 
 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
32. I dislike it when a 
person’s 
statement could 
mean many 
different things 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
33. It’s annoying to 
listen to someone 
who cannot seem 
to make up his or 
her mind 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
34. I find that 
establishing a 
consistent routine 
enables me to 
enjoy life more 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
35. I enjoy having a 
clear and 
structured mode 
of life 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
36. I prefer interacting 
with people whose 
opinions are very 
different from my 
own 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
37. I like to have a 
plan for everything 
and a place for 
everything 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
38. I feel 
uncomfortable 
when someone’s 
meaning or 
intention is 
unclear to me 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
39. I believe that one 
should never 
engage in leisure 
activities 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
40. When trying to 
solve a problem I 
often see so many 
possible options 
that it’s confusing 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
41. I always see many 
possible solutions 
to problems I face 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
42. I’d rather know 
bad news than 
stay in a state of 
uncertainty 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
43. I feel that there is 
no such thing as an 
honest mistake 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
44. I do not usually 
consult many 
different options 
before forming my 
own view 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
45. I dislike 
unpredictable 
situations 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
46. I have never hurt 
another person’s 
feelings 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
47. I dislike the 
routine aspects of 
my work (studies) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
SECTION 5.1 (OF 8) 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your beliefs 
and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. I don’t mind doing 
things even if they 
involve extra effort 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. I am a “workaholic” ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. I feel excited just 
before I am about to 
reach a goal 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. I enjoy actively doing 
things, more than just 
watching and 
observing 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. I am a “doer” ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. When I finish one 
project, I often wait 
awhile before getting 
started on a new one 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. When I decide to do 
something, I can’t wait 
to get started 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. By the time I 
accomplish a task, I 
already have the next 
one in mind 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. I am a “low energy” 
person 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. Most of the time my 
thoughts are occupied 
with the task I wish to 
accomplish 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
11. When I get started on 
something, I usually 
persevere until I finish 
it 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
12. I am a “go-getter” ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
SECTION 5.2 (OF 8) 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your beliefs 
and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale: 
 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. I never evaluate my social 
interactions with others 
after they occur 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. I spend a great deal of 
time taking inventory of 
my positive and negative 
characteristics 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. I like evaluating other 
people’s plans 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. I often compare myself 
with other people  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. I don’t spend much time 
thinking about ways 
others could improve 
themselves 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. I often critique work done 
by myself or others 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. I often feel that I am being 
evaluated by others 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. I am a critical person ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. I am very self-critical and 
self-conscious about what 
I am saying 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. I often think that other 
people’s choices and 
decisions are wrong 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. I rarely analyse the 
conversations I have had 
with others after they 
occur 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
12. When I meet a new person 
I usually evaluate how 
well he or she is doing on 
various dimensions (e.g. 
looks, achievements, 
social status, clothes) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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SECTION 6 (OF 8) 
Read each of the following statements and place a tick in the appropriate box. Do not spend too much time on 
any statement. Answer quickly and honestly.  
 Rarely/Never Occasionally Often Almost 
Always/Always 
1. I plan tasks carefully ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. I do things without thinking ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. I am happy-go-lucky ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. I have “racing” thoughts ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. I plan trips well ahead of time ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. I am self-controlled ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. I concentrate easily ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. I save regularly ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. I find it hard to sit still for long 
periods of time 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. I am a careful thinker ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. I plan for job security ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
12. I say things without thinking ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
13. I like to think about complex 
problems 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14. I change jobs ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
15. I act “on impulse” ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
16. I get easily bored when 
solving thought problems 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
17. I have regular medical/dental 
check-ups 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
18. I act on the spur of the 
moment 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
19. I am a steady thinker ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
20. I change where I live ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
21. I buy things on impulse ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
22. I finish what I start ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
23. I walk and move fast ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
24. I solve problems by trial-and-
error 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
25. I spend or charge more than I 
earn 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
26. I talk fast ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
27. I have outside thoughts when 
thinking 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
28. I am more interested in the 
present than the future 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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 Rarely/Never Occasionally Often Almost 
Always/Always 
29. I am restless at lectures or 
talks 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
30. I plan for the future ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
SECTION 7 (OF 8) 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you agree 
that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please respond according to the 
following scale to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement.   
 
I see myself 
as someone 
who… 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree a 
little 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Agree a 
little 
Strongly 
Agree 
 1. Does a 
thorough job 
     
 2. Can be 
somewhat 
careless 
     
 3. Is a reliable 
worker 
     
 4. Tends to be 
disorganised 
     
 5. Tends to be 
lazy 
     
 6. Perseveres 
until the task is 
finished 
     
 7. Does things 
efficiently 
     
 8. Makes plans 
and follows 
through with 
them 
     
 9. Is easily 
distracted 
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SECTION 8 (OF 8) 
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with each 
according to your beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I usually trust machines 
until there is a reason not 
to 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. For the most part, I distrust 
machines 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. In general, I would rely on a 
machine to assist me 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. My tendency to trust 
machines is high 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. It is easy for me to trust 
machines to do their job 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. I am likely to trust a 
machine even when I have 
little knowledge about it 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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F Appendix Six
ACCOUNTABILITY PRIMES 
1.1 PRIMES FOR CONDITION A – CONTROL GROUP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DAILY TASKING ORDERS 
MISSION 
Your mission is to build the air picture through classifying each 
track on the radar. Of particular importance is to identify any 
possible hostile targets and inform Command of their presence.  
Your overall performance is judged based on your performance 
individually. It is vital that the task is performed as accurately as 
possible, mistakes and errors are not acceptable. 
You will be held individually accountable to Command and responsible 
for any errors made.  
You will be expected to provide an account of your performance. 
 
 
DAILY TASKING ORDERS 
MISSION 
Your mission is to build the air picture through classifying each 
track on the radar. Of particular importance is to identify any 
possible hostile targets and inform Command of their presence.  
Your overall performance is judged based on your performance 
individually. Please try to be as accurate as possible, however, as 
this is a complex task it is expected that small errors may be made. 
You will not be held individually accountable to Command for any 
errors made. 
You will be expected to provide an account of your performance. 
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1.2 PRIMES FOR CONDITIONS B & C  
 
 
 
 
 
 
DAILY TASKING ORDERS 
MISSION 
Your mission is to build the air picture through classifying each 
track on the radar. Of particular importance is to identify any 
possible hostile targets and inform Command of their presence.  
Your overall performance is judged based on your performance 
individually and as a team with the tool. It is vital that the task 
is performed as accurately as possible, mistakes and errors are not 
acceptable. 
You will be held individually accountable to Command and responsible 
for any errors made.  
You will be expected to provide an account of your performance. 
 
 
DAILY TASKING ORDERS 
MISSION 
Your mission is to build the air picture through classifying each 
track on the radar. Of particular importance is to identify any 
possible hostile targets and inform Command of their presence.  
Your overall performance is judged based on your performance 
individually and as a team with the tool. Please try to be as 
accurate as possible, however, as this is a complex task it is 
expected that small errors may be made. 
You will not be held individually accountable to Command for any 
errors made. 
You will be expected to provide an account of your performance. 
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G Appendix Seven
EXAMPLES OF ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO EXPLORE THE DATA COLLECTED FROM 
ARCS 
1.1 PARTICIPANT DECISION MAKING 
Using MATLAB it is possible to generate an individual map of interaction for each participant. These 
detail the flight paths of each track, the tracks participants correctly and incorrectly identified, as 
well as the tracks that the automated system classified (see Figures below). 
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 With the data that ARCS collects it is also possible to visually playback each completed scenario.  
From this it is possible to explore if certain search strategies equate to more accurate decision 
making.  Although this thesis did not specifically look at search strategies ARCS has the potential to 
provide this information if future research required it.  
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